4 ms·

I'm not a security guy, but it seems to me that it would also be useful to mask the URL. It's my understanding that a snooper could still see that you accessed

I'm not a security guy, but it seems to me that it would also be useful to mask the URL. It's my understanding that a snooper could still see that you accessed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1... , but not the content of the page. Maybe offer a search on the site that returns links that are generated just for you, so instead of going to the above url, you'd access something like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/onetime/45sdf3sd8re2dfa7w7erasdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/onetime/45sdf3sd8re2dfa7w7eras... (and throw away the key after the access).

13throwaway 13y ago
A snooper could only see you accessed en.wikipedia.org
burke 13y ago
At a really rough approximation, this is how an SSL pageview works: 1. DNS query in plaintext for en.wikipedia.org. 2. Open a connection to the resultant IP (the fact that you connect to this IP is trace-able). 3. Do an SSL handshake. 4. HTTP protocol stuff, including transmission of PATH_INFO, happens on the encrypted channel. 5. Server responds on encrypted channel.
- jahabrewer 13y ago
  Gotcha, thanks for the explanation.
- gsnedders 13y ago
  Also worthwhile pointing out that if you have a local DNS cache (you almost certainly do), and if there are several hosts sharing a IP, given a cache hit, the adversary will only know the connection is to one of a set of hostnames (those you have previously requested and for whom the cache is still valid) or the IP itself.
  - teddyh 13y ago
    Not with a modern browser with SNI. This transmits the host name in the initial unencrypted portion of the SSL connection.
pizzza 13y ago
Actually, there is quite a bit one can derive just by timing the requests and payload size. Given that the size of wikipedia articles at any given time can be calculated, as well as articles they link to, it's quite possible one could reconstruct a given wikipedia browsing session using metadata alone.
- jedunnigan 13y ago
  In turn, wiki could inject random packets of data into the payload to obfuscate the trail.

13throwaway 13y ago

A snooper could only see you accessed en.wikipedia.org

burke 13y ago

At a really rough approximation, this is how an SSL pageview works: 1. DNS query in plaintext for en.wikipedia.org. 2. Open a connection to the resultant IP (the fact that you connect to this IP is trace-able). 3. Do an SSL handshake. 4. HTTP protocol stuff, including transmission of PATH_INFO, happens on the encrypted channel. 5. Server responds on encrypted channel.

jahabrewer 13y ago
Gotcha, thanks for the explanation.
gsnedders 13y ago
Also worthwhile pointing out that if you have a local DNS cache (you almost certainly do), and if there are several hosts sharing a IP, given a cache hit, the adversary will only know the connection is to one of a set of hostnames (those you have previously requested and for whom the cache is still valid) or the IP itself.
- teddyh 13y ago
  Not with a modern browser with SNI. This transmits the host name in the initial unencrypted portion of the SSL connection.

pizzza 13y ago

Actually, there is quite a bit one can derive just by timing the requests and payload size. Given that the size of wikipedia articles at any given time can be calculated, as well as articles they link to, it's quite possible one could reconstruct a given wikipedia browsing session using metadata alone.

jedunnigan 13y ago
In turn, wiki could inject random packets of data into the payload to obfuscate the trail.