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So, even if the vulnerability (with insecure keys) is fixed, unless the architecture is changed, I suppose all sim-cards will remain wide-open to intelligence s
by e12e 13y ago
So, even if the vulnerability (with insecure keys) is fixed, unless the architecture is changed, I suppose all sim-cards will remain wide-open to intelligence services -- as one would have to assume that they'd put quite an effort into getting their hands on a copy of these keys.
- mje__ 13y agoSIM's use a derived key - which means that getting your hands on that key would only affect that specific SIM, and generally the Km (master key) exists only on an HSM. There's not much point in the intelligence services going after these keys, if they can just put a box in the operator's data center and capture unencrypted traffic
- yaantc 13y agoThe architecture is fine. A better explanation would be: if an incompetent operator use obsolete technology then its SIM card can be hacked. But any half-decent should be immune to this (there are billions of SIMs, and here it's "millions" only vulnerable). First, in a proper network the mobile device and the network mutually authenticate themselves. So the cell can't be faked. Then it's very easy for the network to filter such management SMS and only allow them from their trusted server. It's a very basic security precaution. If done, you don't depend on the SIM crypto scheme for secure SMS, but here too using DES is a joke and 3DES / AES have been available for ages. So I guess it's another sensationalistic report made to draw readers for most. As for intelligence services, they already have access for domestic operators. This could only be for foreign and loosy operators maybe.