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I submitted a feature request for encryption over this (it's probably vulnerable to MITM attacks as-is, as you never verify the recipient). My request was: * G
by StavrosK 13y ago
I submitted a feature request for encryption over this (it's probably vulnerable to MITM attacks as-is, as you never verify the recipient). My request was:
* Generate the URL like sharefest.me/roomid#randomstring
* Sharefest encrypts the file contents before and after transmission with randomstring as key using the SJCL.
* Send the URL/key out of band, over a secure channel.
* Voila, end-to-end crypto.
I don't know if anything became of it, though.
EDIT: Oh, here it is: https://github.com/Peer5/ShareFest/issues/24 https://github.com/Peer5/ShareFest/issues/24
- shacharz 13y agoYea you're right, we just didn't get around to it yet. Thanks for the issue.
- StavrosK 13y agoYou are quite welcome, hopefully you'll find some time soon, it would make Sharefest the file transfer mode of choice for paranoid people like me :)
- arethuza 13y agoOut of interest, if the decryption is being done in a client by JavaScript, what's stopping a MITM attacker replacing the JavaScript crypto library with something that captures the source URL and key?
- skymt 13y agoThat's a well-known problem with JavaScript crypto: http://www.matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ http://www.matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ The short answer is that so long as the page is loaded entirely over TLS, and the TLS isn't stripped or subverted in any way, it's safe from MITM. Sharefest doesn't currently support TLS, so they would need to set that up prior to enabling end-to-end encryption.
- shacharz 13y agoThe P2P crypto is done by the browser. But not doubt that we need to load the entire page and scripts securely securely...
- StavrosK 13y agoNothing (assuming the MITM is someone who can break HTTPS or Peer5 themselves), which is why I proposed this: https://github.com/Peer5/ShareFest/issues/30#issuecomment-20554455 https://github.com/Peer5/ShareFest/issues/30#issuecomment-20... You can download ShareFest, audit it and store it locally so you can run your known-good version. It's just an HTML page and a few JS files (or at least it was, last time I looked). I was going to create a version of this that was a single webpage and had as little code as possible (for auditability and ease of saving/deployment), but other projects got in the way (plus it's easier to improve ShareFest than write it from scratch).
- 1O0101ll100O 13y agoIt's clearly not baseless paranoia anymore.
- StavrosK 13y agoThat's true, I guess. The funny thing is that the most I ever transfer is family photos and code, but I don't see why anyone should be able to look at even my family photos.
- kimlelly 13y agoThe other thing is, as with almost all web-based solutions, you're being tracked by various scripts in the background (Google API/JS, etc.). So, if you're paranoid, you're better off with a client solution.
- spyder 13y agoClient side solutions can do even more tracking because there is no browser sandbox. And for example the µTorrent client has ads in it which are probably tracked.
- kimlelly 13y agoYes, I suggest using open-source clients that don't include ads (such as RetroShare). µTorrent is not open-source, btw.
- imissmyjuno 13y agoSo if the issue is tracking regardless, why not use a non-tracking web app?
- StavrosK 13y agoSure, but a client solution doesn't have the ease-of-use of this for the other party. I use Ghostery, incidentally, but your general point is that security on a live webpage is impossible, which I agree with. That's why I proposed that the app be made into a downloadable package as well.