6 ms·

I've been saying this for a while now (well, a couple weeks anyway). The defeat of the cryptography behind SSL communication is an inevitability given sufficien

by pvnick 13y ago

I've been saying this for a while now (well, a couple weeks anyway). The defeat of the cryptography behind SSL communication is an inevitability given sufficient time, so it would absolutely behoove intelligence agencies to store everything, including encrypted data. As Snowden said, one of the dangers of these programs is the possibility of going back in time to paint a normal life in the context of a wrongdoer. In a few decades, when powerful computers and algorithms have all but obliterated current encryption technologies, all of your current "safe" data might as well have been sent plaintext. Or the NSA could just demand private keys via FISA letter.

tsotha 13y ago
>Or the NSA could just demand private keys via FISA letter. I don't think you're legally obligated to retain private keys. If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day.
- jstanley 13y ago
  I think this can get you into some trouble in the UK, if not the US. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law
  - ra 13y ago
    Oh wow (from the wikipedia article): Australia The Cybercrime Act 2001 No. 161, Items 12 and 28 grant police with a magistrate's order the wide-ranging power to require "a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to" access computer data that is "evidential material"; this is understood to include mandatory decryption. Failing to comply carries a penalty of 6 months imprisonment. Electronic Frontiers Australia calls the provision "alarming" and "contrary to the common law privilege against self-incrimination." I wonder how that would work if you own the server, but only the individual users held their private keys?
    - bigiain 13y ago
      Hmmm. As someone under the jurisdiction of the Australian Cybercrime Act... I wonder if it's time to have policies in place for private keys - much like many corporate email retention policies. "We keep private keys for twelve months only. We create and deploy new keys every six months and securely delete all keys older than 12 months along with their passphrases - including physically destroying all drives that ever contained the key and/or backups of it. Any data not transitioned to new encryption keys before private key destruction is considered irretrievable." "Yes Agent Smith, that's a mighty fine $5 wrench you have there - here's _both_ my current private keys. Last year's? No sorry, here's the video of those disk drives being hammered to bits then melted down to sludge. (Ouch! Why are you hitting me? This plan was _flawless!_)"
    - babuskov 13y ago
      Probably the same as if you were renting an apartment to a criminal, and you gave him the keys and all the copies.
      - mtgx 13y ago
        How would you know he's a criminal? Also, why is it that everytime the authorities get away with making analogies with stuff in real life, like encryption compared to a locked box, or something, but when it's the other way around, say e-mail vs snail mail, suddenly they are not the same anymore, and they need to be treated differently (authorities can't look into your mail, but but get all your e-mail after 180 days).
    - tsotha 13y ago
      I think you could probably make the case you had no reason to believe sessions were "evidential material" because you aren't storing them and you have no reason to believe anyone else is either. Of course, once you get a notice there's probably nothing you can do.
  - dfc 13y ago
    I have found that the Crypto Law Survey is remarkably more detailed than wikipedia for crypto policy questions. Sadly the site is not as well known as wikipedia: http://www.cryptolaw.org/ http://www.cryptolaw.org/
    - jstanley 13y ago
      That hostname isn't resolving for me at the moment.
      - dfc 13y ago
        $ dig www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> +nocomments www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ;; global options: +cmd ;www.cryptolaw.org. IN A www.cryptolaw.org. 1801 IN A 77.74.54.129 ;; Query time: 45 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Tue Jun 25 19:27:38 2013 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 51
  - tsotha 13y ago
    Well, I'm not to worried about trouble in the UK.
- jcampbell1 13y ago
  > If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day. Doesn't that require getting a CA to re-sign your keys every day?
  - mortehu 13y ago
    Yes. The certificate contains a signature of your public key (and other data), which is derived from your private key.
mpyne 13y ago
Why do people keep repeating this trope that it's only a matter of time before encryption will be broken? Use a Diffie-Hellman style protocol to create and exchange a secret key for each session, use AES-256 if you're ultra-paranoid, then forget the session key. It even works today, and there are no known attacks against AES that can reduce the work enough to beat the heat death of the universe.
- merlincorey 13y ago
  I'll bite. Because we can't really predict the future and some far-fetched science-fiction sounding things such as quantum computers and future advancements we can't currently conceive of may completely and utterly change that, perhaps even overnight. From a paranoid security point of view, it's definitely a bad idea to assume your cryptography is perfect and always will be.
  - mpyne 13y ago
    And from a paranoid physical security point of view it's definitely a bad idea to assume I would survive my car trip to the grocery store every week.... I do it anyways, as it's still much better than the alternatives.
    - merlincorey 13y ago
      I believe this a logical fallacy. I didn't argue that due to said paranoia one should not engage in cryptography, any more than I would argue that one should not drive their car to the grocery store every week. I'm talking about complacency, and how it's a better idea for us to assume that sooner or later (if not currently) our best-known cryptography will be broken. If I recall correctly, in 2008, Simple Nomad[1] told us to consider PGP broken by the government. He wasn't saying it is... just we should consider it as such and find something better, before it's too late. [1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM
      - mpyne 13y ago
CPAhem 13y ago
Might be why Google is upgrading all SSL certs to 2048 bit http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-to-our-ssl-certificates.html http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-...

by pvnick 13y ago

tsotha 13y ago

>Or the NSA could just demand private keys via FISA letter. I don't think you're legally obligated to retain private keys. If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day.

jstanley 13y ago
I think this can get you into some trouble in the UK, if not the US. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law
- ra 13y ago
  Oh wow (from the wikipedia article): Australia The Cybercrime Act 2001 No. 161, Items 12 and 28 grant police with a magistrate's order the wide-ranging power to require "a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to" access computer data that is "evidential material"; this is understood to include mandatory decryption. Failing to comply carries a penalty of 6 months imprisonment. Electronic Frontiers Australia calls the provision "alarming" and "contrary to the common law privilege against self-incrimination." I wonder how that would work if you own the server, but only the individual users held their private keys?
  - bigiain 13y ago
    Hmmm. As someone under the jurisdiction of the Australian Cybercrime Act... I wonder if it's time to have policies in place for private keys - much like many corporate email retention policies. "We keep private keys for twelve months only. We create and deploy new keys every six months and securely delete all keys older than 12 months along with their passphrases - including physically destroying all drives that ever contained the key and/or backups of it. Any data not transitioned to new encryption keys before private key destruction is considered irretrievable." "Yes Agent Smith, that's a mighty fine $5 wrench you have there - here's _both_ my current private keys. Last year's? No sorry, here's the video of those disk drives being hammered to bits then melted down to sludge. (Ouch! Why are you hitting me? This plan was _flawless!_)"
  - babuskov 13y ago
    Probably the same as if you were renting an apartment to a criminal, and you gave him the keys and all the copies.
    - mtgx 13y ago
      How would you know he's a criminal? Also, why is it that everytime the authorities get away with making analogies with stuff in real life, like encryption compared to a locked box, or something, but when it's the other way around, say e-mail vs snail mail, suddenly they are not the same anymore, and they need to be treated differently (authorities can't look into your mail, but but get all your e-mail after 180 days).
  - tsotha 13y ago
    I think you could probably make the case you had no reason to believe sessions were "evidential material" because you aren't storing them and you have no reason to believe anyone else is either. Of course, once you get a notice there's probably nothing you can do.
- dfc 13y ago
  I have found that the Crypto Law Survey is remarkably more detailed than wikipedia for crypto policy questions. Sadly the site is not as well known as wikipedia: http://www.cryptolaw.org/ http://www.cryptolaw.org/
  - jstanley 13y ago
    That hostname isn't resolving for me at the moment.
    - dfc 13y ago
      $ dig www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> +nocomments www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ;; global options: +cmd ;www.cryptolaw.org. IN A www.cryptolaw.org. 1801 IN A 77.74.54.129 ;; Query time: 45 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Tue Jun 25 19:27:38 2013 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 51
- tsotha 13y ago
  Well, I'm not to worried about trouble in the UK.
jcampbell1 13y ago
> If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day. Doesn't that require getting a CA to re-sign your keys every day?
- mortehu 13y ago
  Yes. The certificate contains a signature of your public key (and other data), which is derived from your private key.

mpyne 13y ago

Why do people keep repeating this trope that it's only a matter of time before encryption will be broken? Use a Diffie-Hellman style protocol to create and exchange a secret key for each session, use AES-256 if you're ultra-paranoid, then forget the session key. It even works today, and there are no known attacks against AES that can reduce the work enough to beat the heat death of the universe.

merlincorey 13y ago
I'll bite. Because we can't really predict the future and some far-fetched science-fiction sounding things such as quantum computers and future advancements we can't currently conceive of may completely and utterly change that, perhaps even overnight. From a paranoid security point of view, it's definitely a bad idea to assume your cryptography is perfect and always will be.
- mpyne 13y ago
  And from a paranoid physical security point of view it's definitely a bad idea to assume I would survive my car trip to the grocery store every week.... I do it anyways, as it's still much better than the alternatives.
  - merlincorey 13y ago
    I believe this a logical fallacy. I didn't argue that due to said paranoia one should not engage in cryptography, any more than I would argue that one should not drive their car to the grocery store every week. I'm talking about complacency, and how it's a better idea for us to assume that sooner or later (if not currently) our best-known cryptography will be broken. If I recall correctly, in 2008, Simple Nomad[1] told us to consider PGP broken by the government. He wasn't saying it is... just we should consider it as such and find something better, before it's too late. [1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM
    - mpyne 13y ago

CPAhem 13y ago

Might be why Google is upgrading all SSL certs to 2048 bit http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-to-our-ssl-certificates.html http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-...