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SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow
- pvnick 13y agoI've been saying this for a while now (well, a couple weeks anyway). The defeat of the cryptography behind SSL communication is an inevitability given sufficient time, so it would absolutely behoove intelligence agencies to store everything, including encrypted data. As Snowden said, one of the dangers of these programs is the possibility of going back in time to paint a normal life in the context of a wrongdoer. In a few decades, when powerful computers and algorithms have all but obliterated current encryption technologies, all of your current "safe" data might as well have been sent plaintext. Or the NSA could just demand private keys via FISA letter.
- tsotha 13y ago>Or the NSA could just demand private keys via FISA letter. I don't think you're legally obligated to retain private keys. If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day.
- jstanley 13y agoI think this can get you into some trouble in the UK, if not the US. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law
- ra 13y agoOh wow (from the wikipedia article): Australia The Cybercrime Act 2001 No. 161, Items 12 and 28 grant police with a magistrate's order the wide-ranging power to require "a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to" access computer data that is "evidential material"; this is understood to include mandatory decryption. Failing to comply carries a penalty of 6 months imprisonment. Electronic Frontiers Australia calls the provision "alarming" and "contrary to the common law privilege against self-incrimination." I wonder how that would work if you own the server, but only the individual users held their private keys?
- bigiain 13y agoHmmm. As someone under the jurisdiction of the Australian Cybercrime Act... I wonder if it's time to have policies in place for private keys - much like many corporate email retention policies. "We keep private keys for twelve months only. We create and deploy new keys every six months and securely delete all keys older than 12 months along with their passphrases - including physically destroying all drives that ever contained the key and/or backups of it. Any data not transitioned to new encryption keys before private key destruction is considered irretrievable." "Yes Agent Smith, that's a mighty fine $5 wrench you have there - here's _both_ my current private keys. Last year's? No sorry, here's the video of those disk drives being hammered to bits then melted down to sludge. (Ouch! Why are you hitting me? This plan was _flawless!_)"
- babuskov 13y agoProbably the same as if you were renting an apartment to a criminal, and you gave him the keys and all the copies.
- mtgx 13y agoHow would you know he's a criminal? Also, why is it that everytime the authorities get away with making analogies with stuff in real life, like encryption compared to a locked box, or something, but when it's the other way around, say e-mail vs snail mail, suddenly they are not the same anymore, and they need to be treated differently (authorities can't look into your mail, but but get all your e-mail after 180 days).
- tsotha 13y agoI think you could probably make the case you had no reason to believe sessions were "evidential material" because you aren't storing them and you have no reason to believe anyone else is either. Of course, once you get a notice there's probably nothing you can do.
- dfc 13y agoI have found that the Crypto Law Survey is remarkably more detailed than wikipedia for crypto policy questions. Sadly the site is not as well known as wikipedia: http://www.cryptolaw.org/ http://www.cryptolaw.org/
- jstanley 13y agoThat hostname isn't resolving for me at the moment.
- dfc 13y ago$ dig www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> +nocomments www.cryptolaw.org @8.8.8.8 ;; global options: +cmd ;www.cryptolaw.org. IN A www.cryptolaw.org. 1801 IN A 77.74.54.129 ;; Query time: 45 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Tue Jun 25 19:27:38 2013 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 51
- tsotha 13y agoWell, I'm not to worried about trouble in the UK.
- jcampbell1 13y ago> If they start doing that I'll generate a new set of keys every day. Doesn't that require getting a CA to re-sign your keys every day?
- mortehu 13y agoYes. The certificate contains a signature of your public key (and other data), which is derived from your private key.
- mpyne 13y agoWhy do people keep repeating this trope that it's only a matter of time before encryption will be broken? Use a Diffie-Hellman style protocol to create and exchange a secret key for each session, use AES-256 if you're ultra-paranoid, then forget the session key. It even works today, and there are no known attacks against AES that can reduce the work enough to beat the heat death of the universe.
- merlincorey 13y agoI'll bite. Because we can't really predict the future and some far-fetched science-fiction sounding things such as quantum computers and future advancements we can't currently conceive of may completely and utterly change that, perhaps even overnight. From a paranoid security point of view, it's definitely a bad idea to assume your cryptography is perfect and always will be.
- mpyne 13y agoAnd from a paranoid physical security point of view it's definitely a bad idea to assume I would survive my car trip to the grocery store every week.... I do it anyways, as it's still much better than the alternatives.
- merlincorey 13y agoI believe this a logical fallacy. I didn't argue that due to said paranoia one should not engage in cryptography, any more than I would argue that one should not drive their car to the grocery store every week. I'm talking about complacency, and how it's a better idea for us to assume that sooner or later (if not currently) our best-known cryptography will be broken. If I recall correctly, in 2008, Simple Nomad[1] told us to consider PGP broken by the government. He wasn't saying it is... just we should consider it as such and find something better, before it's too late. [1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9AKpHtgpoM
- mpyne 13y ago
- CPAhem 13y agoMight be why Google is upgrading all SSL certs to 2048 bit http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-to-our-ssl-certificates.html http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/changes-...
- gcb0 13y agoSo the only solution is to increase the effort to decrypt. And for that we have to either/both increase complexity of the crypto (hard) and the amount of noise traffic. Changing the crypto would require lots of time to roll out new platforms and updated clients. Hence, the only feasible way to save the internet is to convert all porn sites to https. If you work on a ISP, block all porn connections over http, nature will find a way and the https sites will popup overnight.
- icebraining 13y agoWith SNI[1], the hostname is sent unencrypted (so that you can host more than one domain in a single IP address), so the watchers can simply filter out porn domains. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
- contingencies 13y agoAs of November 2012, the only major user bases whose browsers do not support SNI appear to be users of Android 2.x (default browser), Internet Explorer (any version) on Windows XP and versions of Java before 1.7 on any operating system. Apparently we can thank the French: http://www.edelweb.fr/EdelKey/ http://www.edelweb.fr/EdelKey/
- X-Istence 13y agoIt is sad, but by the time SNI is a viable extension to use, IPv6 should be in full swing and SNI will no longer be required :-(.
- graue 13y agoSNI is already plenty viable if you have few/no IE users. That's certainly not everyone, but it's good enough for some of us.
- bigiain 13y agoAnd while I know cPanel/WHM doesn't really belong in the same discussion as "encryption possibly resilient against state level attackers"… I note with interest that the latest cPanel update (11.38) includes SNI support. That's "switched on" an _huge_ userbase of webhosting that can now grab a cheap/free SSL cert without needing dedicated ip addresses, and who can then tell users "you'll need to upgrade your browser to use our secure site - have you tried downloading Chrome?" ;-)
- Arnor 13y agoThis sounds like a brilliant solution to a difficult problem, but I fear it only solves a portion of the problem. It deals with the issue of stolen keys, but how does it protect against cryptanalysis? If an organization were able to reveal the a key with a replicable process, couldn't it be simply repeated for each session key?
- jstanley 13y agoI think that is an intractable problem. It is impossible to design a system that is not vulnerable to flaws in its design. The idea is to design a system that doesn't have flaws.
- gknoy 13y agoI think your concerns are mitigated by the attack vectors. If cracking encryption with N bit length keys someday becomes trivial, it doesn't matter what keys we used in the past: You're right. My meager understanding is that we don't expect this to be the case anytime soon, and worries about moore's law or asics for cracking keys can be mitigated by increasing key size until it's infeasible to brute force. If your main SSL key is compromised/subpoenaed, at least you still have the PFS keys for individual conversations. Those would need to be subpoenaed (or otherwise made not-secret) as well, and so in theory your data is still safe even if they go after john Q terrorist's data.
- bigiain 13y agoThe hope is that the "replicable key revealing process" is difficult and time consuming - which is worthwhile for an attacker with sufficient resources if going to the effort to reveal a key results in breaking every encrypted session from that source. PFS means they'd go to all that effort to reveal an ephemeral key for only one session. It'd be _well_ worth the NSAs time/money to burn 10 million cpu hours brute forcing Google's TLS key if it gave them every encrypted session's cleartext past and future. It's not practical to burn 10 million cpu hours for every SSL session connecting to Google's servers.
- graue 13y agoAlthough even with PFS, cracking Google's private key would still give them access to every future encrypted session, until the key changed. So PFS is no panacea here.
- jcampbell1 13y agoCan someone explain why we don't get ECDHE on ubuntu 12.04 by default? On ubuntu 12.04 my apache has: SSLCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM:!ADH:!MD5 ` openssl ciphers 'HIGH:MEDIUM:!ADH:!MD5'` shows a ton of ECDHE stuff in the list. I am not sure what it takes to get apache to use the ECDHE ciphers.
- dfc 13y agoWhy not by default? Ask ubuntu and report a bug: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apache2/+filebug https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apache2/+filebug How to do it for yourself: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5171250 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5171250
- prg318 13y agoI think your first link may be incorrect? I also tried looking through the tracker but I wasn't able to find a relevant bug associated with this. Would you mind posting the link to the bug?
- jcampbell1 13y agoThe second link doesn't work as far as I can tell. I think the person that says we need Apache 2.4 to get ECDHE is correct. Adding ECDHE ciphers to the Apache 2.2 config doesn't seem to do anything. Following the advice in the second link actually turns off PFS for chrome compared to the default setup.
- dfc 13y agoI have a bad habit of linking to HN posts and assuming that people understand I mean "look at the comments." The Cloudflare instructions break chrome? That is my bad, I have not verified them myself recently. I usually use the cloudflare settings or jacob's duraconf[1]. Thanks to joeyh's mr I usually have duraconf checked out on any machine that I use. [1] https://github.com/ioerror/duraconf https://github.com/ioerror/duraconf
- dmix 13y agoThe big question is how are they going to prove the majority of the SSL traffic was from x person? The majority of identity would have to be via IP address. The IP stuff -> personal identity stuff requires it to be near present time does it not? ... unless the SSL content contains identifying information. But what percentage would that be in the future?
- elithrar 13y ago> The IP stuff -> personal identity stuff requires it to be near present time does it not? Collect logs from ISP that show IP <-> account. Many ISPs keep these logs around for a long while as it is.
- icebraining 13y agoAn account is not a person, and thankfully some courts are recognizing that: https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130218/21462222020/yet-another-court-says-ip-addresses-are-not-enough-to-positively-identify-infringers.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130218/21462222020/yet-a...
- jonknee 13y agoWhy would they have to prove anything? This is a secret program and nothing it turns up will show up in a non-classified arena.
- znowi 13y agoI'm a bit surprised to see duckduckgo.com not using PFS :/ Hopefully they implement it soon.
- Mithrandir 13y agoFrom https://duck.co/topic/duckduckgo-ssl-not-secure-enough#28469000001486713 https://duck.co/topic/duckduckgo-ssl-not-secure-enough#28469... : > We're aware and are planning accordingly. Thanks for the heads up, though.
- dhx 13y agoPopular libraries such as OpenSSL and GnuTLS support TLSv1.2 (NSA Suite B Crypto[1]). Typically this means preferring or forcing TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 with elliptic curve CURVE-SECP521R1 for maximum security. Refer to [2] for more information on the elliptic curve key sizes recommended to be used with various symmetric key sizes. The notable problem for many users (particularly client-side) is libraries such as NSS not yet supporting TLSv1.2[3] and therefore not supporting NSA Suite B Crypto. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_B_Cryptography https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_Suite_B_Cryptography [2] http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml [3] Refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementati... for a comparison of libraries providing TLS crypto.
- noveltyaccount 13y agoDoesn't SSL/TLS use a per-session symmetric key that is exchanged using the asymmetric server keys? Is the point of this article that even that per-session private key would be logged or re-generated and therefore prone to attack if the server private key were exposed?
- calmingbreeze 13y agoIf an eavesdropper records all traffic between client and server, he/she will also record the encrypted session key. If the server's private key is compromised, the eavesdropper can decrypt the session key and use it to read the rest of the communication for that session.
- noveltyaccount 13y agoThanks for clarifying, that makes sense.
- ww520 13y agoSpeaking of SSL attack, are BEAST and CRIME attacks on SSL still a problem in the wild? Have most browsers been patched against these kind of attacks?
- acd 13y agoGovernments can just run a "Real CA" trusted by most common web browsers, then that government run CA could occasionally emit new certificates of sites that the government wants to me man in the middle for. Then government does not have to decrypt the information as they are already man in the middle. Some users get the sites original certificate, others get the MITM certificate and interception. Thus trusting central CA is somehow broken from a security point of view. How many end users really check the certificates is coming from the right CA and has correct fingerprint? Then you do not need to decrypt the SSL traffic. Much easier.
- nemoniac 13y agoIs there a browser plugin that indicates more information than the padlock icon such as which cipher suite is being used for the current SSL connection and whether that suite uses PFS?
- rorrr2 13y agoChrome does it by default, just click on the padlock. Example: http://i.imgur.com/k1bhh77.png http://i.imgur.com/k1bhh77.png