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I don't see how this really helps, though. The NSA can still force a CA to generate certs for any domain they wish to intercept and MITM everyone they care abou
by lucian1900 13y ago
I don't see how this really helps, though. The NSA can still force a CA to generate certs for any domain they wish to intercept and MITM everyone they care about. They are likely to have the resources for that.
- gojomo 13y agoBut that requires the greater cost/intrusiveness of an MITM, and could potentially be noticed as an unexpected change in the certificate. See for example the SSL Observatory project: https://www.eff.org/observatory https://www.eff.org/observatory
- e12e 13y agoIn the case where providers/servers are under NSA jurisdiction (or control, in the case of them hacking servers) -- they could also keep a copy of session keys. But that would force them to intercept at many more points than simply various edge routers (which is what they may or may not be doing now, having (or not having) equipment at ISPs/TelCos). Essentially, if you use gmail or outlook.com -- you'll just have to trust that no one has forced (or covertly) installed backdoored crypto libraries. I do think it is very likely security agencies (both foreign and domestic) have agents/assets working at large companies like Google and Microsoft -- I don't think it is very likely that they have been able to covertly subvert their infrastructure. But it certainly is possible.
- lucian1900 13y agoThey don't need to do that much. If they control a CA and a few ISPs (especially networks to the outside of the US, since apparently us in the rest of the world are fair game), they can MITM anyone reliably. The only defence is checking fingerprints, but few will bother.