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I really hate the name "Perfect Forward Secrecy". There's no guarantee in ECDHE that the connections cannot be decrypted at some future time. All that's being i
by jgrahamc 13y ago
I really hate the name "Perfect Forward Secrecy". There's no guarantee in ECDHE that the connections cannot be decrypted at some future time. All that's being implied is that the key changes per connection.
Sure, it's 'better' than RSA with a long lived private key, but there could be advances that would breach ECDH and make none of this 'perfect'. Such as: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters_1115 http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securityma... If the NIST supplied curves used by the TLS standard had a backdoor none of this would be perfect.
- tptacek 13y agoWhat you hate is the word "perfect". "Forward secrecy", though, has a technical meaning: a compromise in the long-lived key material for the cryptosystem doesn't enable an adversary to go back and decrypt earlier saved sessions. The link you've provided doesn't implicate Diffie Hellman; it's in an obscure, virtually unused NIST standard that uses elliptic curves to generate random numbers. There are other things not to like about the NIST curves, but the methodology used to generate them is documented (I suppose you could generate your own using the same method) and is based on the literature on ECC from the late '90s.
- jgrahamc 13y agoYes, it's the word 'perfect' that really bothers me. I think it gives the general public the wrong impression.
- roc 13y agoPerhaps they should call it "pretty good"?
- tptacek 13y agoI just call it "forward secrecy". I think "complete" would be a better word than "perfect", but I think that neither are necessary.
- damarquis 13y agoCryptographers seem to have a thing for misleading names. A big one is "provable security" which really means "is at least as hard as another more old and famous problem that we are all guessing is hard to solve efficiently." In any case "provable security" alone is often too difficult to prove so more assumptions are added to make the proof go through. Saying you've obtained provable security under some assumptions doesn't sound very good though, so the assumptions are called "models" instead.
- lke 13y agoMaybe i'm reading it wrong but I have the impression that the problem here is the notion of forward secrecy. Forward Secrecy only garanties that given the master keys Eve still can't derive the session key. It says nothing about the scheme used to create the session key (which may not be safe) It only states that even if Eve gets the private key that won't give her any information on the session key. It's the "won't leek any information" part that makes it "Perfect". "Prefect" is used in the same way in "Perfect Information-Theorical Security" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_security http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_security) were the Info-Theoric Security is perfect if the cipher text doesn't leek any information about the plain text. The use of the word perfect seems consistent to me. The problem is actually understanding what we are talking about and what part of it is Perfect.
- dlitz 13y agoSo, the actual scheme is authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Its security is based on the discrete logarithm problem---it does not provide perfect information-theoretical security. "Forward secrecy" is an accurate term. "Perfect" is redundant and potentially misleading.