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CloudFlare, PRISM, and Securing SSL Ciphers
- ctz 13y agoThe content in this post is in the section titled 'SSL on CloudFlare'. The text leading up to that is (at best) fluff and incorrect in parts.
- jgrahamc 13y agoPlease indicate what is incorrect and I will ask the CEO to correct.
- genwin 13y ago> To date, CloudFlare has never received an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. ... As part of these challenges, we always request the right to disclose at least the fact that we received such an order but we are not always granted that request. Are you challenging orders you haven't received? It might help to be more clear. For all we know, CloudFare has been required to give all its data to the NSA. The law allows that, and the law could prevent CloudFare from disclosing it.
- eastdakota 13y agoThere are orders other than FISA orders that we have challenged.
- genwin 13y agoI suggest the paragraph be more clear on that, then. "We may however receive orders unrelated to FISA, in which case we are legally allowed to challenge the order." It might be best to be completely forthcoming. Let the customers know that their data can always be secretly read by the NSA with CloudFlare's assistance, even all customers' data, but you challenge what you are legally allowed to challenge. Or say nothing about it. As it is the text implies that the customers' data is better protected against snooping, which isn't possible and most everyone knows that now, so it leads to suspicion.
- ctz 13y agoPoint by point: The first paragraphs make the mistake of assuming you need to break keys to collect SSL traffic (assuming no PFS). You can start collecting SSL traffic now, and break the keys at your leisure later on. I can see cases where breaking confidentially of contemporary communication even 10-20 years hence would be extremely valuable. "Just the power necessary to run the server farm needed to break a 1024-bit key would likely cost in excess of $20M/year" The ECRYPT II Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes suggests that an adversary with a budget of $10M should be countered with at least 78 bits of security, and that 1024-bit modulus RSA keys have 73 bits of security. I think this is a pretty good source on this sort of thing. "Google is a notable anomaly. The company uses a 1024-bit key" I've seen in the past Google presenting ECDSA server keys on P256, for some hosts and assuming your client advertises ECC with suitable extensions. Such keys are roughly equivalent in strength to 3248-bit modulus RSA keys. "This means that if the NSA, or anyone else, is recording encrypted traffic, they cannot break one private key and read all historical transactions with Google." An important note here: an active attacker can silently downgrade client connections to turn off PFS. "(Remember, for a naive algorithm, each bit doubles the time it takes to break the key, so a 2048-bit key isn't twice as strong, it is 2^1024 times as strong.)" This is dangerously misleading, even with the qualification. In fact, its around 2^30 times as strong. You really must assume your adversary is using the best available factoring algorithm, or your conclusions will be meaningless.
- vxNsr 13y agoAbout your first point, the slide would seem to indicate that the NSA didn't start collecting data until the dates posted. So for whatever reason they didn't collect data until that point, it's not clear if they've actually been able to read any of that data yet.
- agwa 13y ago> An important note here: an active attacker can silently downgrade client connections to turn off PFS. Are you sure this is true? SSLv2 didn't have any protection of the handshake so downgrade attacks were possible, but since SSLv3 the client and server send each other MACs of the handshake traffic so any tampering should be detected. Quoth Wikipedia, TLS and SSL 3.0 provide "Protection against a downgrade of the protocol to a previous (less secure) version or a weaker cipher suite." [1] [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 13y agoYou don't need elliptic curve to get forward secrecy from TLS; the ECC ciphersuites are very new, but the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman construction in TLS has been around for a long time.
- nonane 13y agoCan you please expand on this? Does using TLS (vs SSL2v3) automatically ensure you're using ephermal diffie hellman?
- tptacek 13y agoNo, it's a ciphersuite; the server and client have to agree to use it.
- newman314 13y agoNo. You can't control the client but you can have the server offer up a preferred list of ciphers. On nginx, this would be ssl_prefer_server_ciphers = on; for example
- staunch 13y agoThese may be useful https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/ https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/
- apendleton 13y agoUnfortunately, though, plain DHE is really slow, so it's pretty hardware-intensive to do it at scale, and to keep latency manageable. Google made a big deal out of moving to ECDHE the year before last, and part of that was that it allowed them to get perfect forward secrecy without sacrificing performance.
- JshWright 13y agoThis was _the_ thing I was looking forward to most in the release of Debian 7. A sufficiently recent version of OpenSSL to do ECDHE. Plain DHE is _killing_ our first load times...
- Ihmahr 13y agoThis article is about how difficult it would be for NSA to 'break' a cypher. But couldn't they just go to the certificate authority and get the keys? What could they then do with these keys?
- MichaelSalib 13y agoCertificate authorities don't have private keys. A CA could give the NSA the ability to forge certificates, which would allow the NSA to engage in active man in the middle attack, but that could be defeated with cert pinning. ETA: of course CAs have their own private keys, but they don't have the private keys of their customers.
- ihsw 13y agoCertificate pinning is just another attack vector, and MS/Apple/Google may all be keeping the NSA apprised of changes to browser/device certificate policies (inadvertently or otherwise).
- MichaelSalib 13y agoWhat do you mean?
- tjohns 13y agoCare to elaborate? I don't see how publishing a list of fingerprints of trusted certs would facilitate an attack. Especially given that the underlying certificates are public knowledge, sent as part of every HTTPS session.
- jiggy2011 13y agoIf CAs don't have private keys , how are they signing certificates?
- blibble 13y agoyou transmit your public key, identity and server information. the CA then verifies your identity, and then produces a certificate by signing (using their private key) the message digest of the concatenation of: - certificate information: server name/organisation/country/... (the "subject"), start date, end date, etc - your public key - the subject of their certificate your private key should never leave your system.
- alimoeeny 13y agoSo does Google use a proprietary implementation, or there are open source solutions to implement the ECHDE thing?
- eastdakota 13y agoNot proprietary. OpenSSL supports ECDHE. Can use your standard SSL key issued by any certificate authority.
- newman314 13y agoFor nginx, the following is an example: ssl_ciphers ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:RC4-SHA:AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA;
- adamt 13y agoThe NSA doesn't need to break Google/Facebook/Twitter's private key. They just need to have bought/stolen/subpoenaed/cracked the private key of any CA that is in your browser. E.g. a mole inside GoDaddy/RSA or anyone with an intermediate chained certificate. This would then enable a man-in-the-middle SSL attack. There are some challenges about implementing this with just a port-mirror or TAP, but it is possible. For means of an easy example, you can see the DNS requests coming from an end-user for 'www.gmail.com' and fake the response (racing against the real name server's response). This then points the user to your website with your fake Gmail certificate. You then simply proxy the data along to the real gmail and you have obtained the password for that uses gmail. This is the biggest weakness of SSL. Chrome now has protection [1] against fake google certificates. But for most sites/browsers you have little protection against this. [1] http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/enhancing-digital-certificate-security.html http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/enhancing...
- jlgreco 13y ago> This would then enable a man-in-the-middle SSL attack. We know they are not doing this en-masse though. It would be noticed by now if they were. They undoubtedly do it, but almost certainly only targeting individuals, or all users of obscure sites.
- marcosdumay 13y agoA man-in-the-middle attack done this way would be easy to detect. You just need to compare the site's key with the one you received, and they'd be different. Or, in simpler terms, that kind of attack would require the cooperation of several employees of the attacked companies. While just putting a mole there and copying the private key would require cooperation of only the mole in one of the positions that would need to cooperate at the other attack. (And breaking the key would happen only if the NSA wanted to give some easy money to computer manufacturers.) Rougue certificate authorities are the biggest weakness of SSL from the point of view of a user that wants to be sure that it's really his bank that is asking for a password. But the endpoints security are still the biggest weakness against a powerfull oponent like the NSA.
- dfc 13y ago
- tkorri 13y agoDidn't the companies (Google, Facebook etc.) just give the information to NSA, or did I miss something? I don't see how SSL key length is relevant in the whole discussion if the weakest link is the company, not the transport method used.
- sweis 13y agoIf you're terminating SSL in the edge network of CloudFlare or other CDNs, then your private key is going to be replicated to all their points of presence. Keys will be vulnerable to anyone with access to those PoPs, which are generally ISPs.
- MichaelSalib 13y agoI can't speak for other CDNs, but I know Akamai at least takes this extremely seriously. By seriously, I mean, machines that serve SSL are in locked racks with cameras and when unauthorized access occurs, the machines automatically wipe themselves. That's not complete protection but it gives you some assurance.
- sweis 13y agoI think CDNs make the best effort with the tools they have. However, many PoPs don't have locked racks, biometrics, or cameras. This means CDNs are limited to where they can safely terminate SSL connections, which impacts latency and ultimately their bottom line. (Disclaimer: I'm working on this problem.)
- eastdakota 13y agoAgree, generally. We have an interesting solution to this we'll be announcing soon.
- sweis 13y agoVery cool. Looking forward to hearing about CloudFlare's solution.
- leoc 13y ago> To date, CloudFlare has never received an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. Moreover, we believe that due process requires court review of executive orders. As a policy, we challenge any orders that have not been reviewed and approved by a court. This needs to be clarified urgently. Anyone reading this would, quite reasonably, assume that this court review would (maybe among other things) seek to protect them from unreasonable search and seizure, that to get court approval the US government would (at least in principle) have to establish probable cause (or at least some kind of level of cause) of some crime (or at least some kind of bad behaviour). In fact, for non-US-citizens living outside the US this is apparently (IANAL) not the case. They appear to have quite literally no rights that the FISC court is obliged or entitled to uphold in the face of a FISA 702/FAA 702 order targeting them - neither rights under the Fourth Amendment, nor under FISA or any other law. From any specified non-resident alien the US government can seemingly take whatever data it wants, for any reason, without even having to state the reason to the court. Blatant industrial espionage? 100% OK. Watergate-style snooping for information to use in political dirty tricks? 100% OK. (The US government is completely clear that the purpose of FISA 702 is to eliminate the probable-cause requirement: http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/faafoia20101129/FAAFBI0067.pdf http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/faafoia20101129/FAAFBI... ) Again, this will quite reasonably surprise people, who are used to for example having their US property protected by the Fifth Amendment even as non-resident aliens. Therefore CloudFlare's statement must make it clear and explicit to them that they are SOL once the US government decides it wants their data and that CloudFlare's demand for a court-approved order is a chocolate teapot when it comes to protecting them (as opposed to CloudFlare). > As part of these challenges, we always request the right to disclose at least the fact that we received such an order but we are not always granted that request. This could also use some clarification, since of the several thousand FISA orders served to other companies there doesn't seem to be any trace (IANAL) of one where the government has lifted the gag. The statement should make it clear that until there is a change of government policy, or law, or precedent then there is hardly a snowball's that CloudFlare's request will be granted.