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The important part of the diagram for Tor is the first NSA character, as you can see it still shows "Location" before you are routed through the Tor relay. Wit
by wyck 13y ago
The important part of the diagram for Tor is the first NSA character, as you can see it still shows "Location" before you are routed through the Tor relay.
With the location information it is possible to correlate the exit information via pattern matching, though it would take considerable analysis, this can be done by logging volume and timing information on the two sides. I am sure there are even better techniques to analyze exit/entry correlations, especially if you're not using a secure browser.
So having a private VPS doesn't really matter, in fact it can make matters worse because you are adding layers that can be "watched" before you hit an entry node, the more data that can be logged the easier it is to track.
You're best option is to choose random nodes, connect at random times and also look into using Tor bridges. If possible using several different IPS's or even better random wi-fi hotspots, though this is hardly convenient for most users.
Tor bridges: https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges.html.en
Whitepaper on Tor passive logging attacks (pdf): http://people.cs.umass.edu/~mwright/papers/wright-passive.pdf http://people.cs.umass.edu/~mwright/papers/wright-passive.pd...
- runeks 13y ago> With the location information it is possible to correlate the exit information via pattern matching, though it would take considerable analysis, this can be done by logging volume and timing information on the two sides. I am sure there are even better techniques to analyze exit/entry correlations, especially if you're not using a secure browser. I've thought the same. But I've also thought that if this is indeed possible, why does Silk Road still exist? Or does this analysis only apply Tor clients connecting to websites, and not Tor hidden services?
- haakon 13y agoHidden service routing works quite differently that regular exiting traffic. Twice the number of relays are involved, and the traffic is end-to-end encrypted instead of being visible to any relay (such as an exit node). Correlation attacks are always possible to a global passive adversary (which NSA may or may not be), but as far as I can tell, they seem much harder to pull off against hidden services.
- foley 13y agoI would think that if they did have the means to attack Tor they would not show their hand but taking down something as insignificant as Silk Road.
- e12e 13y agoAFAIK Silk road just deals in a bit of drugs (relatively low volume too, all things considered). For intelligence agencies, having evidence (even if inadmissible) of smaller crimes, is just leverage -- and leverage against people that might be able to render useful services (eg: provide deniable assets for framing someone with drugs). Now, if Silk Road did most of it's trade in weapons grade plutonium, things might be different. Remember, the whole reason the NSA-thing is a news story, is that it is illegal wire tapping. The feds can't use this for setting up a case.