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> He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). That seems almost nonsensical to me. Certainly people feel pain, etc. The question is what pain amounts

> He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). That seems almost nonsensical to me. Certainly people feel pain, etc. The question is what pain amounts to, not whether pain exists. There was a time, however, when some philosophers used the term "qualia" to refer definitionally to whatever parts of phenomenology could not be explained physically. Then other philosophers would deny the existence of qualia, but that way of speaking was rather muddled, so as far as I'm aware, this usage is uncommon these days. As for some dualists consenting to nomological supervenience, yes that is certainly the case. Epiphenomenalists such as Chalmers would indeed. But when one speaks of supervenience in this context without qualification, it usually refers to metaphysical supervenience. Or at least that's been my experience.

manicbovine 13y ago
Dennett uses a strong definition of qualia (intrinsic, ineffable, nonphysical) and attempts to demonstrate that, under such a characterization, qualia cannot exist. Dennett's view (at least in the 1980s) is that, yes -- the weak (phenomenal) form of qualia you've described is coherent and obvious, but anything beyond that, particularly anything leading to an explanatory gap, is illusory. For example, he objects strongly to the existence of Nagel's intrinsic and non-representational qualia. Are you saying that the term 'qualia' (without qualification) nowadays refers mainly to phenomenal qualia? I agree that it's nonsense to deny phenomenal qualia.
- nessus42 13y ago
  Well, this is a mighty difficult discussion to have in little HN boxes. I guess I can see what Dennett is getting at from your summary, but I've read other philosophers who would just argue instead that qualia are wholly representational. But not even all representationalists agree that qualia are wholly representational. Some of them, known as "externalists" (last I checked) believe, for instance, that the qualia of redness that you feel when you look at a ripe tomato--that feeling that feels irreducible--is actually the property of redness that the tomato itself has. That position seems completely nutty to me, but I guess one often becomes a famous philosopher for making nutty but interesting arguments. The last time I studied philosophy seriously, the typical wording to deny dualism would be to assert that "there is no explanatory gap" or "no 'hard' problem of consciousness". As for the different senses of qualia, when last I was studying philosophy, the primary sense of "qualia" used was that of phenomenal qualia. Sometimes other senses would be discussed, but I don't recall seeing many clear and compelling arguments being made based on these distinctions. Most of the debate at the time seemed to center around The Knowledge Argument.

manicbovine 13y ago

Dennett uses a strong definition of qualia (intrinsic, ineffable, nonphysical) and attempts to demonstrate that, under such a characterization, qualia cannot exist. Dennett's view (at least in the 1980s) is that, yes -- the weak (phenomenal) form of qualia you've described is coherent and obvious, but anything beyond that, particularly anything leading to an explanatory gap, is illusory. For example, he objects strongly to the existence of Nagel's intrinsic and non-representational qualia. Are you saying that the term 'qualia' (without qualification) nowadays refers mainly to phenomenal qualia? I agree that it's nonsense to deny phenomenal qualia.

nessus42 13y ago
Well, this is a mighty difficult discussion to have in little HN boxes. I guess I can see what Dennett is getting at from your summary, but I've read other philosophers who would just argue instead that qualia are wholly representational. But not even all representationalists agree that qualia are wholly representational. Some of them, known as "externalists" (last I checked) believe, for instance, that the qualia of redness that you feel when you look at a ripe tomato--that feeling that feels irreducible--is actually the property of redness that the tomato itself has. That position seems completely nutty to me, but I guess one often becomes a famous philosopher for making nutty but interesting arguments. The last time I studied philosophy seriously, the typical wording to deny dualism would be to assert that "there is no explanatory gap" or "no 'hard' problem of consciousness". As for the different senses of qualia, when last I was studying philosophy, the primary sense of "qualia" used was that of phenomenal qualia. Sometimes other senses would be discussed, but I don't recall seeing many clear and compelling arguments being made based on these distinctions. Most of the debate at the time seemed to center around The Knowledge Argument.