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> can you get to a point where you can't subdivide anymore, are there absolute elements of experience? I have no idea. You had previously said: >...But its en
by manicbovine 13y ago
> can you get to a point where you can't subdivide anymore, are there absolute elements of experience?
I have no idea. You had previously said:
>...But its endless divisibility seems to indicate that there is no such animal.
From where do you get this conclusion? Earlier, you described that the rod/cone balance in my eye is likely to be different than yours, and that this results in different qualia upon viewing the color red. That's variation -- not divisibility -- and I doubt that it's endless (lest we have infinitely many rods/cones).
'Qualia' is the name given to experience after everything else is stripped away. I view a sunset: I'm aware of it, I have certain emotional and physical reactions, memories are triggered, and so goes that functional account of my experience. Yet, we intuitively feel that there is something above and beyond those aspects of the experience. Dennett wouldn't argue against our intuition for qualia, he'd just say that it's some combination of material/functional phenomenon.
His view is not radical: it conforms to the mainstream scientific account of our world. The minority view is to say, "Wait, no! These qualia are actual. There is something about experience above and beyond the functional correlates of consciousness."
- manicbovine 13y agoI want to add that, according to the standard scientific view, it ought to in theory be possible to catalog every component of experience down to whatever level necessary (neuron, molecule, electron... whatever). So, according to the mainstream view that Dennett holds, yes -- qualia (or rather, or illusion of qualia) can be cataloged and put into some framework of so-called "absolute elements". Philosophers on the other side of the table, who hold that qualia are non-illusory (and not mere epiphenomena), have varying and incomplete accounts. The best frameworks, by my own judgement, involve some sort of neutral monism. [1] [1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/