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No, it's not. There is nothing to vary by Dennett's account. Our two "red qualia" are exactly the same: non-existent. Dennett argues (actually, he just asserts

No, it's not. There is nothing to vary by Dennett's account. Our two "red qualia" are exactly the same: non-existent. Dennett argues (actually, he just asserts it over and over), that there is no such thing as subjective experience, so to speak. He argues that, whether or not my version of red is different than yours, we're sharing a common delusion -- the delusion of subjective, conscious experience. (Of course, we're aware of an experience, but more along the lines of a webcam program that, upon sensing the color red, flips some boolean is_aware variable.) I'd add that -- ok, qualia have many variations. From where do we deduce that it's a grand illusion? Matter has many different variations.

vinceguidry 13y ago
> He argues that, whether or not my version of red is different than yours, we're sharing a common delusion -- the delusion of subjective, conscious experience. I don't think Dennett is arguing that we're all zimboes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
- manicbovine 13y ago
  Correct, he argues that the formulation is incoherent. That is, certain parts of our physical makeup give rise to experience, and that we cannot entertain a coherent world containing minds that lacks subjective, conscious experience while retaining the other functional correlates of consciousness. This is exactly what I meant by 'delusion'... that, according to Dennett, there are no "qualia", nothing above and beyond the ordinary physicalist/reductionist (and scientific) account of experience. It's surprising from a personal view because experience seems so essential and real.
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nessus42 13y ago
I don't know about Dennett, but most materialist philosophers don't argue that qualia are an "illusion" or that they don't exist. Rather, they argue that qualia have a physical explanation. Or, as a philosopher would word it, "Mental properties supervene on physical properties."
- manicbovine 13y ago
  Yes, but there are so many brands of materialism. I'm not an expert on Dennett, but I believe he is best characterized as an eliminative materialist. He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). As for "mental properties supervene on physical properties" as a characteristic of materialism, even a dualist might consent to nomological supervenience.
  - nessus42 13y ago
    > He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). That seems almost nonsensical to me. Certainly people feel pain, etc. The question is what pain amounts to, not whether pain exists. There was a time, however, when some philosophers used the term "qualia" to refer definitionally to whatever parts of phenomenology could not be explained physically. Then other philosophers would deny the existence of qualia, but that way of speaking was rather muddled, so as far as I'm aware, this usage is uncommon these days. As for some dualists consenting to nomological supervenience, yes that is certainly the case. Epiphenomenalists such as Chalmers would indeed. But when one speaks of supervenience in this context without qualification, it usually refers to metaphysical supervenience. Or at least that's been my experience.
    - manicbovine 13y ago
      Dennett uses a strong definition of qualia (intrinsic, ineffable, nonphysical) and attempts to demonstrate that, under such a characterization, qualia cannot exist. Dennett's view (at least in the 1980s) is that, yes -- the weak (phenomenal) form of qualia you've described is coherent and obvious, but anything beyond that, particularly anything leading to an explanatory gap, is illusory. For example, he objects strongly to the existence of Nagel's intrinsic and non-representational qualia. Are you saying that the term 'qualia' (without qualification) nowadays refers mainly to phenomenal qualia? I agree that it's nonsense to deny phenomenal qualia.

vinceguidry 13y ago

> He argues that, whether or not my version of red is different than yours, we're sharing a common delusion -- the delusion of subjective, conscious experience. I don't think Dennett is arguing that we're all zimboes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

manicbovine 13y ago
Correct, he argues that the formulation is incoherent. That is, certain parts of our physical makeup give rise to experience, and that we cannot entertain a coherent world containing minds that lacks subjective, conscious experience while retaining the other functional correlates of consciousness. This is exactly what I meant by 'delusion'... that, according to Dennett, there are no "qualia", nothing above and beyond the ordinary physicalist/reductionist (and scientific) account of experience. It's surprising from a personal view because experience seems so essential and real.
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nessus42 13y ago

I don't know about Dennett, but most materialist philosophers don't argue that qualia are an "illusion" or that they don't exist. Rather, they argue that qualia have a physical explanation. Or, as a philosopher would word it, "Mental properties supervene on physical properties."

manicbovine 13y ago
Yes, but there are so many brands of materialism. I'm not an expert on Dennett, but I believe he is best characterized as an eliminative materialist. He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). As for "mental properties supervene on physical properties" as a characteristic of materialism, even a dualist might consent to nomological supervenience.
- nessus42 13y ago
  > He denies that qualia exist (or at least he used to). That seems almost nonsensical to me. Certainly people feel pain, etc. The question is what pain amounts to, not whether pain exists. There was a time, however, when some philosophers used the term "qualia" to refer definitionally to whatever parts of phenomenology could not be explained physically. Then other philosophers would deny the existence of qualia, but that way of speaking was rather muddled, so as far as I'm aware, this usage is uncommon these days. As for some dualists consenting to nomological supervenience, yes that is certainly the case. Epiphenomenalists such as Chalmers would indeed. But when one speaks of supervenience in this context without qualification, it usually refers to metaphysical supervenience. Or at least that's been my experience.
  - manicbovine 13y ago
    Dennett uses a strong definition of qualia (intrinsic, ineffable, nonphysical) and attempts to demonstrate that, under such a characterization, qualia cannot exist. Dennett's view (at least in the 1980s) is that, yes -- the weak (phenomenal) form of qualia you've described is coherent and obvious, but anything beyond that, particularly anything leading to an explanatory gap, is illusory. For example, he objects strongly to the existence of Nagel's intrinsic and non-representational qualia. Are you saying that the term 'qualia' (without qualification) nowadays refers mainly to phenomenal qualia? I agree that it's nonsense to deny phenomenal qualia.