3 ms·
Persona is nice, because it is simple. It is still important to note that it is an alternative mostly to: "Trust that a user being able to read an email address
by e12e 14y ago
Persona is nice, because it is simple. It is still important to note
that it is an alternative mostly to: "Trust that a user being able to
read an email address is proof authenticating said user" -- in other
words sites using it have no expectation that the user need any form of
authentication before being issued a persona (Similar to eg: shared mail
accounts -- where having access to the email does not identify you as a
single person/user -- rather as a group of users -- which is subtly
different).
Additionally without any form of single sign out/invalidation of private
keys/session certificates other than expiration (please correct me if
I've missed something wrt sign-out/invalidation) -- persona is in some
ways less secure than "trust the mailbox": Even if you change your
password/secret key -- any (stolen) signed session certificate (aka
token/ticket in most other systems) will remain valid as far as the
authorizing site is concerned.
This is similar to a stolen cookie -- except the site cannot decide
how long the certificate is valid -- the identity provider does. So if
somedomain.net signs certificates valid for a year, the only thing you
can do as a site allowing persona logins, is mark said domain as "not
trustworthy enough" -- and disallow logins.
This is "fine" as long as Persona isn't used for anything "serious" --
however with social engineering attacks, anything that to the end users
appears to be proof of identity can be used to escalate privileges ("He
sent me a hipsterchat-message on kewlchat.net -- so I reset the
RDP-password like he requested").
I do think moving identity management "closer" to the user is good --
let the ISP, the various organizations the user is identified with vet
and administer the user database -- but for the general use case -- we
also need some form of trust between the sites, and the iDPs.
Shibboleth[1] is one approach to this -- but it is more complicated that
Persona, and has more overhead.
Personally I'd like to see a solution based around x509 certs and
organizations like https://cacert.org https://cacert.org -- but for that to work we need
browsers to get better at handling cerificates. That is -- we need a
user friendly way to manage identities based around x509 -- and we need
browsers and servers to expect to validate both server and client
certificates. Unfortunately such validation will entail a lot of
problems with expired certs etc... it's not a trivial problem to solve
in practice.
[1] http://shibboleth.net/ http://shibboleth.net/
- daemon13 14y agoFYI, latest stable Firefox says this: You have asked Firefox to connect securely to cacert.org, but we can't confirm that your connection is secure. Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.
- jessaustin 14y agoFYI, latest stable Firefox says... I'm sure e12e knows this. If you don't want to see that message, you need to install the CAcert root certificate in your browser or OS. While you're doing that, take a look at all the root certificates that are already in there: you might decide CAcert is more trustworthy than most of those organizations!
- e12e 14y agoIndeed. For some painful background, see eg: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215243 A fundamental problem with x509 and Certificate Authorities as it currently stands wrt https and browsers, is that all users almost randomly trust a few organizations to issue certificates -- and get warned of any other certificates -- but there is no decision on part of the user who they trust -- just some vague delegation to browser vendors on vetting CAs. For some more background, I suggest reading: http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/ssl-and-the-future-of-authenticity/ edit: Also, I tend to forget that cacert isn't included, as Debian are among the distributions that include them as a CA: http://wiki.cacert.org/InclusionStatus