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Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position
- RexRollman 14y agoWhat a clusterfuck this situation is.
- Toshio 14y agoZaReason spoke out on this issue at FOSDEM (direct link to webm file): http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/fosdem/2013/maintracks/K.1.105/UEFI_SecureBoot.webm http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/fosdem/2013/maintracks/K.1.105/UEF...
- UnoriginalGuy 14y agoThe thing about secure boot is that it is a GOOD idea done very badly indeed. What was needed was for a trusted neutral party(or two) to be the owner of the root key, and for that organisation to hand out child keys (e.g. Microsoft, Open Source Initiative, Apple, etc) who could in turn generate child keys (all of which could be revoked). Essentially we need the "internet model" of key exchanges for this too. I cannot understand who thought it was a good idea for Microsoft to be the only authorised party to generate keys. Even from Microsoft's perspective it is just asking to get anti-trust-ed again.
- JonnieCache 14y agoThe internet model of key exchanges sucks, and there is currently much wailing and gnashing of teeth over what to do about it. That's what linus is talking about here: "They are almost certainly going to be more secure than depending on some crazy root of trust based on a big company, with key signing authorities that trust anybody with a credit card." Not to mention this kind of thing: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=476766 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=476766 Also, when it comes to stuff this important, there is no such thing as a trusted neutral party.
- UnoriginalGuy 14y agoThe internet model of key exchanges /does/ suck, but yet somehow the Secure Boot model is yet worse still. The main issue with the internet model is how uncompetitive the whole thing is. You have just a few companies handing out keys and they charge upwards of $50 a year just for the "pleasure" of having secured communications. Secure boot would likely suffer from the same problem. But yet I'd still take that over this...
- thristian 14y agoThe nice thing about SecureBoot is that there is no root key—you can have whatever keys you like installed on your system, you don't have to get permission from a central authority. If you want code signed with your key to run out of the box on random PCs, you just have to convince each PC manufacturer to include your key in the hardware key-store of the systems they ship, a purely independent transaction. It's just that, well, there's only really one software manufacturer with enough clout to get all the hardware vendors to include its key, and it's a heck of a lot easier to just get a sub-key signed by their master key than pretty much anything else.
- TheAnimus 14y agoYes, this is the issue I see in all this. None of the linux vendors banded together to create a NPO which would simply manage keys, ensure it was avialable to all manafacturers. Maybe even provide a logo/stamp/certification/brand so people can instantly see it's supported. The fact that ONLY Microsoft have done this isn't really the fault of Microsoft. The fact that devs can't agree on the most elegant way of providing the chain of trust, in a manner which plays nicely is again, not Microsofts fault. Yet Microsoft is being flamed for this.... Why exactly is this their fault?
- icebraining 14y agoWhat about Haiku, or any other OS which doesn't have a big enough community to get their key in? Why should OS installation be a privilege of popularity, with others forced to jump through hoops? MS is at fault for pushing this whole system. Whether Linux distros could or not join the system is a red herring.
- TheAnimus 14y ago>MS is at fault for pushing this whole system. Whether Linux distros could or not join the system is a red herring. What?! Pushing UEFI, which isn't their design, which has been used by Apple and other for years, or pushing secure boot? Secure Boot is a damned good idea, and whilst IANAL it appears that for a windows sticker you MUST allow it to be switched off. So its Microsoft are in fact pressuring OEMs to ensure that people can run other OS's on their kit (except ARM). What this is about is how the other OS's can get the benefit of SecureBoot, well, if they can't get their act together as I mentioend above, why should they fuss that someone else gets SecureBoot. Lets be hoenst too, most people who need such simple "mum proof protection" are on Windows anyway.
- rwmj 14y agoThe real use for secure boot is within a single company/organization where you want to control exactly what runs on the computers you own. That's an argument for secure boot to be switched off by default, and for the companies that want it to manage their own keys. Although Microsoft will now point at me and say "but, but we need to prevent boot sector viruses!" it's telling that no other operating system except Windows commonly suffers from this problem.
- jwoah12 14y ago> it's telling that no other operating system except Windows commonly suffers from this problem. This is an honest question, as this area isn't my specialty, but could this be for the same reason that people used to perpetuate the myth that Macs don't get viruses? Attackers simply target the platform with the largest market share.
- rwmj 14y agoLinux servers are far more common than Windows servers, and servers usually have loads of bandwidth making them especially valuable targets for spammers and fraudsters.
- nexox 14y agoBut Linux servers require root access (or physical access, which frequently amounts to the same thing) to modify the bootloader. If you've already got root, then you don't really need to install a bootkit - you may as well just install a modified kernel or kernel module rootkit.
- tbrownaw 14y agoUnlike desktops, servers are mostly run by people who have at least some idea of what they're doing.
- chris_mahan 14y agothe key word in your sentence being some.
- perlgeek 14y agoI don't know if there's really a good way to implement it. No matter how you do it, it seems to have the same problems as SSL CAs and certificates (that is, some CAs are corrupt/negligent/compromised). And in your proposal, what do you do if the root key ever gets compromised?
- brudgers 14y ago"trusted neutral party" Such as? Should Microsoft trust WC3? Or Foxconn trust the United Nations? Every organization requires funding. How would this party receive it? Because the world is unfortunately short of philosopher kings, we are probably better served by the marketplace when it comes to hardware manufacture.
- meaty 14y agoNo it's a shit idea from end to end. Any PKI based system is a shit idea unless you are personally in control of the trusted root CA, which in this case you're not. I think that is what Linus is saying. Google for "certificate authority compromised" and you'll see what utter wads of shit for brains this could be entrusted to.
- cooldeal 14y ago>Any PKI based system is a shit idea unless you are personally in control of the trusted root CA, which in this case you're not With UEFI secure boot, you can delete Microsoft's key and add you own.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- kevinoid 14y agoYou can be "personally in control of the trusted root CA" using SecureBoot. Just replace the Platform Key with your own key.[1] Or am I misunderstanding your objection? 1. http://blog.hansenpartnership.com/owning-your-windows-8-uefi-platform/ http://blog.hansenpartnership.com/owning-your-windows-8-uefi...
- meaty 14y agoYes I know this but its more the fact that there is no CRL that a new device can import so you are not in control of the pre-seeded keys. So if you have kit on the shelf for months and MS's private key is leaked or cracked then you have a large stock of compromised machines waiting to roll. I doubt any average PC retailer will be able to deal with manual key revocation. The same goes for your average government agency or health service. It should ship with no PKI/certificate scheme at all. We don't need it and it doesn't work and its blatantly obvious. Secure boot is entirely worthless from end to end.
- InclinedPlane 14y agoWhat advantages would any system controlled by a central authority give you that a system which was entirely local and required specific manual intervention (e.g. typing in a pre-set password or private key) in order to authorize any change to the boot loader would not?
- speeder 14y agoI always thought that the secure boot is a very, very, very bad idea. In fact the whole UEFI in general I think it is a clusterfuck of mishmashed random ideas, some good, many bad. What I intend to do personally, is attempt to don't use secure boot. And this all might explain the e-mail I got from Lenovo 10 minutes ago... I asked them for a non-Windows machine. They replied saying that they from now on only manufacture machines with Windows. At first I was: "wtf? why?" now this article remembered me that now we have firmware tied to Microsoft, and this explains then why ThinkPads must come with Windows. Here in Brazil this is illegal, and Lenovo for example got sued (and lost) once. I hope a rain of lawsuits make this shit stop.
- mtgx 14y agoI think the Germans were pretty concerned about this, too. I could definitely see a lawsuit against them there, considering how "weird" (but usually right) Germany is when it comes to things like these.
- rplnt 14y agoWhat exactly is illegal? Selling a machine with OS or not selling it without one? And as for the "this explains then why ThinkPads must come with Windows" - no. It doesn't explain it. Secure boot has to be present on Windows certified machine, not the other way around. Lenovo can sell whatever they want (but apparently it's beneficial for them economically to only sell Windows machines). Also, certified machine has to have secure boot disable-able. So it's not about you not being able to use the machine with Linux, it's about not being able to use Secure Boot with Linux.
- belorn 14y ago> What they've told us privately is that as long as no-one comes along with a plausible exploit for Windows based on using a secure boot enabled Linux system, they don't care what we do. I guess we need to hide all those forensic distributions that can modify and access data on a windows machine. To name a few: backtrack, CAINE, and DEFT. If technology can modify and access data, it can also be used in an exploit. Some might even argue that running a forensic on a computer without the owners permissions is an exploit in itself. Edit: How could such technology be used you say. Package a usb drive that once plugged in, will reboot the machine and load a Linux distribution. Once loaded, it automatically modify the windows system and transfer any interesting data it find. Afterward, it erase itself and reboots, thus looking like any empty usb drive once windows boots up. If that is not an plausible exploit which an ordinary Windows users could trigger and become compromised, then I would like to hear the definition of an "plausible exploit".
- JonnieCache 14y agoRTFA. "This 'plausible exploit' has to be some way of getting ordinary Windows users to run the code and become compromised, it's not an experienced Linux user becoming root and subverting Windows on their local box."
- btilly 14y agoI do not think that you understand the suggested attack scenario. Pen testers are already familiar with the idea of leaving compromised USBs in a parking lot. A lot of normal users will pick one up, carry it in, and plug it into their computer to see what's on it. If the USB key will send your data to a third party, without user understanding or intervention, then that's a security problem.
- belorn 14y agoThinking about it, here is a bit more insidious (and complex) method: The usb drive install a linux system over the previous windows installation. Then it install a VM, and set it to run the old windows installation. Have boot set to quiet and on startup, load up the VM. While a bit slower, you now have hypervisor control over the machine, and the user can install how much anti-virus and anti-rootkits they want. You effectively eradicated the secure boot scheme with the help of the Red Hat key.
- aphexairlines 14y agoHow are PC vendors hoping to sell laptops to corporate buyers whose IT departments want to reimage all those machines (a lot of them with Linux images) without wasting time going into UEFI setup menus to turn off Secure Boot one machine at a time?
- etherealG 14y agothese cases are more easily covered by the corporation's key being included in those machines. big numbers of machines warrant that kind of effort from the manufacturer. the problem is when I want to generate my own key and use that as the only authority. the system doesn't support that model.
- recoiledsnake 14y ago>the problem is when I want to generate my own key and use that as the only authority. the system doesn't support that model. It does. You can add your own key and even remove Microsoft's if so wish. The facts are getting lost in this FUDstorm.
- tomjen3 14y agoWell it wouldn't have been a fud storm if Microsoft hadn't insistet on it being turned on by default. But if I were to remove a MS key, am I right in assuming that that would prevent anybody from running windows on that machine (at least without installing the key or turning it of)?
- recoiledsnake 14y agoIf it's turned off by default, it might as well be useless to protect the hundreds of millions of non-technical users who are more prone to get malware. >But if I were to remove a MS key, am I right in assuming that that would prevent anybody from running windows on that machine (at least without installing the key or turning it of)? Windows 8 boots fine without Secure Boot enabled or even supported. However, if you remove Microsoft's key but leave Secure Boot enabled, you're indicating that you don't trust Microsoft's code, in which case Windows will be prevented from booting on that machine. What is the value or the use case in removing Microsoft's key, leaving secure boot on and then trying to boot Windows on that machine?
- bcl 14y agoMatthew posted a good response yesterday: http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/23400.html http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/23400.html https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5295272 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5295272
- kogir 14y agoFrom my read of the article, Linus simply states his preference to actually support secure boot (and verify signatures), or not support it at all. He thinks attempts to "Secure Boot" a loader which then allows arbitrary code execution are a waste of time, and they are. If you don't want boot time signature verification, you should turn it off, not break the chain of trust. In fact, done right, perhaps hardware vendors that currently only provide binary blobs could be coerced into providing source. "Oh, you want to boot on our distribution? We don't sign blobs, but if you commit source we'll build and sign the module." If ever hardware does come out that doesn't allow you to opt out of signature verification or provide your own keys, just don't buy it.
- cooldeal 14y agoLinus posted a NSFW rant about it a few days ago. The story mysteriously went off the HN front page and subsequent submissions of the story went [dead]. http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5279531 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5279531 Rankings graph showing a deep dive. http://hnrankings.info/5279531/ http://hnrankings.info/5279531/ Part of Linus' email: >Guys, this is not a dick-sucking contest. If you want to parse PE binaries, go right ahead. >If Red Hat wants to deep-throat Microsoft, that's your issue. That has nothing what-so-ever to do with the kernel I maintain. It's trivial for you guys to have a signing machine that parses the PE binary, verifies the signatures, and signs the resulting keys with your own key. You already wrote the code, for chissake, it's in that f*cking pull request.
- martinced 14y agoMS astroturfers? (they've pretty much ruined /. by now, wouldn't be surprised if they took control of HN too)
- recoiledsnake 14y agoI don't think flagging is enough to take a post from #2 to ~#200 in less than five minutes. My guess is the voting ring detector got triggered or it was mod action. The subsequent submissions of the same story from other outlets going dead suggests that it was mod action.
- mhurron 14y agoHN dislikes anything that shows that real people have real emotions. Humour, anger and whatnot have no place here.
- micampe 14y agoHN dislikes everything, just like the rest of the internet. Every day someone comments saying that HN is biased against their team (see your sibiling “MS astroturfers” comment), and it’s always a different team, often opposites. Yes, it’s annoying.
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- trotsky 14y agoHaving read through the entire thread instead of just the expletives, in my opinion it's a rare case of Linux and Greg being totally wrongheaded on the issue. The problem crops up because redhat submitted a pull request to enhance the existing in kernel live inclusion of additional trusted x.509 certificates. Note that this is 100% upstream and live. The pull was to add the ability to extract these x.509 certificates from UEFI PE binaries, as this is the only format they are available in from the only CA UEFI secure boot computers are guaranteed to trust - Microsoft's CA. Linus decided he didn't like it because he didn't like the idea of extracting a certificate instead of having it alone. Understandable, probably, except that leaves you in a situation where a secure kernel that was executed due to a microsoft CA chain of trust now can't make use of that CA's code signing services to decide if it wants to run a module solely because linus doesn't approve of parsing the file format that contains the key. The biggest place this comes up is binary only graphics drivers from ati and nvidia - without changes os's like fedora are going to refuse to run them because they're unsigned, which is unfortunate considering how uneven some of the open source 3d drivers are and the heavy reliance on 3d in all modern desktops environments. Meanwhile microsoft is perfectly willing to sign these drivers and has an existing substantial CA operation. Both ati and nvidia submit their windows drivers for signing to this CA all the time, so it'd be almost no extra effort for them to get their linux shims signed as well. But because linus thinks parsing a PE for a signed module key is asinine, he goes on to provide a series of rather off the cuff alternatives: a) Every distro should parse the PEs and add every key of every 3rd part module they wish to allow to run and embed these in their signed kernels, issuing a new kernel every time a driver revs. b) ok, maybe that's not ideal. how about every distro that wants to allow binary drivers to run builds their own CA infrastructure, verification and qualification team and revocation infrastructure. So that's a team at cannonical, redhat, novell, mint, oracle, ibm, etc. etc. c) ok, maybe full ca teams are a bit burdensome. How about all you distro guys just blind sign the binary drivers with your own signing key - worrying that MS might revoke your key because you blind signed an exploit is pointless fearmongering. d) ok, you're right this is harder than i thought. let's just collectively decide that users with secure boot enabled will be prevented from running any module not shipped by the os vendor. Aka fuck off unless you're using intel video. e) alright, maybe that's a little severe. Instead let's just punt entirely - even though we're going through the trouble of a chain of trust from firmware to boot loader to kernel to most modules, let's allow any unsigned binary module to be loaded by default. f) ok, i guess that kind of defeats the purpose. None of this is good security anyway - what we should be requiring is any user that wants to use secure boot should generate their own signing keys, add them to the firmware and then parse and sign everything they trust, repeating the process every time they update while of course protecting the signing key from attackers. I think that about covers it. Linus is really smart, but sometimes he makes a snap decision and then will perform whatever mental gymnastics are necessary to defend it to the death. And most of his inner circle will publicly go along with it because of the real chance he'll pay you back by randomly torpedoing something of yours sometime in the future. Linux's signed code infrastructure is currently the worst in the industry and Matthew and Redhat have provided the bulk of the improvements that everyone is using. It's going to provide real user benefit, even if the users are paralyzed by FUD. Getting in the way of the process or trying to punt it out of mainline and onto everyone who ships a distro isn't going to help anyone.
- _account 14y agoPhysical access is god access. Admin/root is god access. Guard them both with your life. I fail to see how handing over control of your boot to some 3rd party who clearly doesn't have the same interests that you do is anything but a horrible idea. Just physically secure your boxes(or VDI them) and use permissions and ACLs to do what they were designed to do[control and delegate authority]. A good first step for Microsoft, if it cares so much about security, is to stop making its users automagically admin for fogging a mirror, during new PC setup.
- csense 14y ago> handing over control of your boot to some 3rd party...a horrible idea It's actually a good idea if you're the party who's getting authority over the world's computers handed over to it. > use permissions and ACL I still have no idea how these work in the Windows world [1]. There's nowhere obvious in the UI or the "dir" command that shows you what the ownership and permission is [2], unlike Linux's ls -al. My one experience with Windows permissions is, in the early '00s, I put an NTFS partition on an external drive because I wanted to put >4GB files on it. I copied them and got a bunch of permissions errors opening them on another computer. My impression of Windows access controls from this: They're invisible things the OS attaches to your files which will potentially make them unreadable later. [1] I understand there's something called ACL's in Linux too, but I never use them. [2] I don't have much experience with multi-user Windows systems, and Linux has been my main OS for 3-4 years so I don't have as much experience with post-XP OS's.
- negativity 14y agoI'm glad Linus Torvalds is smarter than your average developer. Truly a solid chap. If he were lacking these kinds of personality traits, and shrank like a mouse every time there happened to be an opportunity to compromise the integrity of his project, Linux would have died long, long ago.
- guilloche 14y agoMS becomes so hateful with the secure boot trying to control everything. I will never buy any machine with secure boot enabled and will boycott any MS product.
- humanspecies 14y agoSolution: UEFI should not exist. Period. We don't need to argue over UEFI or anything about it. We need to get rid of it, simple as that. If Intel goes through with this, we need an antitrust case against them and we need Intel broken like Ma Bell. UEFI must not exist, period.
- ycomb7 14y agoIs it possible to "sign" windows 8 and other windows drivers with your own root key so you can have your own key in UEFI and have windows still work? I'm guessing that microsoft has no options for this at all, but I don't know for sure.
- gizmo686 14y agoYes. You can sign the binary the same way Microsoft, or anyone else, would sign the binary. At that point, you need only to add your public key to your key database and are good to go. Microsoft has no way to prevent this (short of requiring vendors not to allow people to add keys).
- Nux 14y agoI'm just going to put my fingers in my ears and not listen to anything anyone might say (write) that gets close to excusing the current situation or defending Secure Boot! As such: Secure Boot is just another lame attempt by Microsoft to slow down/control the competition; they are abusing their position on the market once again, like they did in the past, like they will do in the future. This is their way, "the wolf changes its coat, but not the disposition". This shows that now more than ever Microsoft is shitting their pants because of Linux/Android/Google/Ubuntu/RHEL/LibreOffice/FOSS SQL/etc; they are slowly but surely losing the war, they are losing market share on every front. The way things are now in 10-15 years I bet they will no longer have the 90% of PCs share they have today, but Secure Boot might give them some help. I can already imagine mr. Ballmer rubbing his hands in satisfaction: "oh, nice, we'll have the keys to all PC hardware". My advice: do not buy Microsoft, do not buy hardware on which Secure Boot cannot be disabled. We _must not_ have all PC hardware controlled by a single company - it is just stupid. And of all systems they chose CA? Really? After the epic way it failed time and again in the SSL cert industry - think Komodo or DigiNotar. Not to mention keys given to USA and other governments that will be able to easily install malware and other crap to control the "sheep" (the germans already have some "official" trojans lol). This is madness people.
- narrator 14y agoWhat if Microsoft refuses to sign your kernel because it violates their patents?
- foohbarbaz 14y agoDo I read this right? Is somebody suggesting teaching kernel to read some stupid shit MS "PE binaries"!? Go, Linus. Let kernel NOT even boot on these secure boot machines, see who runs back crying first. Dells and HPs of the world are already hurting from Windows 8 disaster. Let them lose some of the server market and all the commercial customers that buy PCs and give them to devs who install Linux right away.