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I think you're completely and absolutely talking past the argument.
In the law as it exists, doing something "anonymously" for the purpose of committing a crim
I think you're completely and absolutely talking past the argument.
In the law as it exists, doing something "anonymously" for the purpose of committing a crime is itself a crime. It's not the act of changing the MAC address that is illegal by itself. That was the point.
Your point, I think, is that that "extra" crime is a silly law. Which I think many of us agree with. But it's still the law, and it's not unreasonable for a prosecutor to enforce it. In fact, they have a duty to do so.
Turning around and claiming that "the gubmint wants to lock up MAC randomizers!", however, is just dumb. That's not what the law in this case says at all.
Turning around and claiming that "the gubmint wants to lock up MAC randomizers!", however, is just dumb. That's not what the law in this case says at all.
That is exactly what the law says in this case. The government has declared that MAC randomization is the creation of fraudulent identities for the purposes of authentication, not unlike creating fraudulent photo identification.
You can say that randomizing a MAC address is not a crime, just as one can say that creating a fake passport for a movie is not a crime. The crime is in using that fake identification for authentication, which is obvious when customs asks for your passport, but undetectable when a network is using MAC addresses to enforce policy. If subverting that network policy is a felony, then MAC randomization is, by law, sometimes an involuntary felony.
While MAC addresses are obviously not a form of identification to technical folks, this stance would not be unprecedented as the US has also made it a felony to forge another trivially forged pseudo identify, Caller ID[1]. Enforcement of CNID spoofing is much easier given the nature of the phone system, since only a few providers bridge from VoIP to POTS.
[ 1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caller_ID_spoofing#Legislation_in_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caller_ID_spoofing#Legislation... ]
I haven't given this all much chance, but the OP's argument is basically that the current legal view of MAC spoofing is flawed in two ways, which no one seems to be addressing here. It is not an actual means of identifying an individual and it is part of ensuring a reasonable amount of privacy for the user.
It's more akin to wearing a fake mustache, than using a fake id.
It is not an actual means of identifying an individual and it is part of ensuring a reasonable amount of privacy for the user.
Technically. Yes, I think that anyone who understands the technology agrees with this. The problem is that the courts are enforcing it as if it were the digital equivalent of a photo id, and this is not a small problem.
Say I am not allowed on your premises, and I wear a fake mustache in order to get past a mechanism you put in place to stop me (such as guards with my picture), and I get charged with fraud for deceiving your guards because I gained access to something valuable.
This doesn't mean "oh noes! fake mustaches are against the lawz!!!11 they are going to lock up all the actors!"
In this hypothetical moustache example, is the "gained access to something valuable" the sticking point, or is it the "deceiving guards"?
I've changed my MAC/moustache plenty of times to "deceive some guards". Actually I'm doing it right now, this Comcast modem is a utter pain in the ass...
Or, if it is the "something valuable" part, would gaining access to that "something valuable" have been an issue if there was no deceit? Was Aaron's curl script A-okay right up until the point that he deceived?
Aaron's initial script may well have been illegal in and of itself, because it was bypassing JSTOR's limits on how many articles you can download. Aaron took so many more steps after that that it's hardly worth talking about his first action.
Two questions you need to seriously answer to make changing your MAC address on Comcast's network to be the exact same thing as what Aaron did:
1. Are you bypassing a security mechanism by changing your MAC address?
2. Did you gain something and/or cause them losses exceeding $5,000?
At the risk of being mildly self-incriminating...
> 1. Are you bypassing a security mechanism by changing your MAC address?
As far as I can tell? Quite possibly. If I don't make my router use my laptop's MAC address then I get hit with a captive portal at random times. This appears to be a security measure, though in my unresearched opinion I believe it to be a mis-firing of a security measure.
> 2. Did you gain something and/or cause them losses exceeding $5,000?
Considering the cost of my bill, it won't take me all that long to cross that limit.
>In the law as it exists, doing something "anonymously" for the purpose of committing a crime is itself a crime. It's not the act of changing the MAC address that is illegal by itself.
What, then, was the underlying crime, if not this unauthorized access nonsense where access was allegedly unauthorized only because he was supposedly hiding his identity? Keep in mind that it wasn't copyright infringement (which normally isn't criminal anyway), because it wasn't JSTOR pressing charges, it was MIT.
>Your point, I think, is that that "extra" crime is a silly law. Which I think many of us agree with. But it's still the law, and it's not unreasonable for a prosecutor to enforce it.
But there are two issues here: There is what prosecutors did, and what the law allowed them to do. Even if you don't have a problem with the prosecutors, we can still have a problem with the law and work to have it changed.
>In fact, they have a duty to do so.
No they don't. They have prosecutorial discretion. If the application of the law in a particular case is ridiculous, they have no legal or professional obligation to press those charges.
I don't think I disagree with anything you said.
I still don't see what it has to do with locking up MAC randomizers.
> No they don't. They have prosecutorial discretion. If the application of the law in a particular case is ridiculous, they have no legal or professional obligation to press those charges.
You either break the law, or you don't. The law should be the same for everybody and should NOT be applied selectively. It's actually outrageous that you imply otherwise.
Because this happens it's precisely the reason for why we have ridiculous laws in the first place. If this goes on pretty soon everybody will be a criminal, but the world will still turn for you, until you manage to upset somebody you shouldn't have.
And since we are on the subject, that's how the law works in totalitarian states.
You either break the law, or you don't.
This viewpoint is incredibly naive, and also wrong.
The law is not black or white, it is selectively enforced all the time, and context does matter in its application.
Had Aaron not been changing his MAC address, and not used a fake email, would his curl script have been illegal?
If changing your MAC is not itself an issue, how do we determine what (normally legal) things you cannot do after (legally) changing your MAC?
Just to point out that if a law is unjust, the prosecutor may have a duty qua prosecutor but qua human being he has a stronger duty to stand against that law.
Yes, it may be dangerous but the slippery slope is exactly that: 'as it is my legal duty, I shall try to make as much harm as possible'.
Conscience does exist...
> But it's still the law, and it's not unreasonable for a prosecutor to enforce it.
Orders to do something obviously wrong should be followed, because the law is the law. Nice thinking there.
> I've changed my MAC/moustache plenty of times to "deceive some guards". Actually I'm doing it right now, this Comcast modem is a utter pain in the ass...
Is this activity illegal? Like most questions in law, the answer is, "it depends".
Are you paying Comcast for internet? If so, its probably not illegal because they have authorized you to access the internet through their networks.
However, if Comcast's network authentication was based on MAC addresses and you spoofed yours to match a paying customer's, that would probably be wire fraud.
> Or, if it is the "something valuable" part, would gaining access to that "something valuable" have been an issue if there was no deceit?
I'm not sure what other laws would be relevant if there was no deception, but it certainly wouldn't be wire fraud. Deception is a pretty integral component to fraud.
> What, then, was the underlying crime,
are you actually asking? read section II of this article: http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/ http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/
the charges were wire fraud, computer fraud, unauthorized access, and computer damage.
> because it wasn't JSTOR pressing charges, it was MIT
when the charges are federal crimes, prosecutors decide whether or not to press charges. not wanting to press charges does not magically make criminal acts not criminal. if a guy beats the crap out of his girlfriend, and his girlfriend does not want to press charges, the prosecutor can still press charges.
>are you actually asking?
No, it was rhetorical. The point is the charge that MAC spoofing was relevant to was unauthorized access, but if MAC spoofing is sufficient to prove "unauthorized" then MAC spoofing would virtually always be unauthorized access to whatever you're accessing with a spoofed MAC. That interpretation would make MAC spoofing illegal without any underlying crime.
>when the charges are federal crimes, prosecutors decide whether or not to press charges. not wanting to press charges does not magically make criminal acts not criminal.
I'm not sure that's always true. If one of the elements of the crime is that what the defendant did was unauthorized (as was the case here) then if every victim authorized the behavior that element of the crime wouldn't be satisfied, no?
> if MAC spoofing is sufficient to prove "unauthorized"...
i agree. but its not. MAC is one piece of evidence. without the other evidence, the charges would probably be worthless.
> If one of the elements of the crime is that what the defendant did was unauthorized (as was the case here) then if every victim authorized the behavior that element of the crime wouldn't be satisfied, no?
In theory, I suppose. However, JSTOR not pushing for charges is not the same as JSTOR "authorizing" Aaron to access those files.
>MAC is one piece of evidence. without the other evidence, the charges would probably be worthless.
The trouble is that the other evidence can be just as spurious and circumstantial. It's the selection bias problem: You do a hundred thousand things in the process of downloading a journal article and fifteen of them are "suspicious" but those are the fifteen they present to a jury when trying to convict you.
> I would hope that someone would realize that wearing a ski mask for no reason has considerable downsides
On this note, I recall several years ago while in college getting a mass email from administration that warned students not to wear masks during Halloween on the street because doing so was banned in the city. A quick googling just now doesn't turn up anything of the sort, though it does seem some other states have laws concerning masks, though often with exceptions for children, holidays, religion, education, etc.
Swartz was not running an automated MAC randomization system.
His defense team vigorously contested the searches of his home, office, computers, even the netbook found in the closet at MIT under the aegis of his expectation of privacy at MIT; his team also attempted to have wire fraud indictments dismissed by challenging the notion of IP and MAC address "spoofing" constituted false statements. If Swartz had been continuously "spoofing" his addresses, he surely would have raised that point. Instead, he appears to stipulate that he was altering his addresses to bypass the authorization controls at MIT.
I wrote the first line of this comment a couple hours ago because I remembered reading this on Sunday, but it took me a while to track down the exact filing.
https://ia700504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.137971/gov.uscourts.mad.137971.64.0.pdf https://ia700504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.13...
From that court submission (https://ia700504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.137971/gov.uscourts.mad.137971.64.0.pdf https://ia700504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.13...):
>By the same token, obtaining new
IP addresses by “spoofing,” i.e., changing, the Acer’s MAC address, Indictment, ¶¶19(a)-(c), 27(a)-(c), also cannot constitute false statements or misrepresentations or omissions of material fact, nor can Swartz’s use of an automated collection device which made it appear that multiple people were
requesting articles rather than a single person making multiple requests, Indictment, ¶34(c). //
So they're really claiming that writing a program to appear to be many people accessing data when only being one person, that program solely being to gain unauthorised access, wasn't fraudulent at all.
Does anyone genuinely believe that?
Does anyone genuinely believe that?
Yes. Engineers deal with uncooperative systems all the time. One might have the task of getting SCADA system A to integrate with financial system B, and report to management system C. But SCADA system A rate limits requests from a single origin, and the financial calculations will be inaccurate without more frequent updates. So, the engineer creates a system that appears to be multiple different origins to SCADA system A, and the world still turns.
I think what terrifies lawmakers and non-technical people is that, for the first time in history, computers present a potential world in which their expectations of the outcome of force and command do not apply; a virtual universe in which the laws are entirely different, and it takes bending over backwards to make the old laws of the physical world apply in the virtual world. So they do the only thing they know how, apply the physical world's laws of force and command to that chunk of the physical world at the opposite end of the virtual world, in a scale that is proportional to their vast fear instead of the actual behavior.
OK but you don't do that for other peoples industrial control units.
Look I've done MAC spoofing, switched UA's, tunnelling, used VPNs and such; it's not rocket science - certainly a moderately computer able person with legal training is going to be able to understand such things.
It's like signing up for multiple API keys in contravention of the ToS, you know it's not authorised.
There's nothing especially technical about what happened my only incredulity is that anyone supposes a person doing such a hack wouldn't know it's not _authorised_ (ie countenanced by the system owners). The first thought in addressing the access limit is that switching IP and/or MAC and/or UA is likely to enable access to 3(?) more JSTOR docs - but there's a realisation implicit within that of the JSTOR owners having only authorised a very limited access.
Now if we're talking about the ridiculousness of the proposed sentence that's an entirely different matter ...
As an aside I'm surprised no-one has crowdsourced the gathering of all JSTOR docs, they'd need an index, a script to pass the links to a person for download and a repository for upload. It would be just as copyright infringing as any other method but far harder to trace - the majority of it could be automated I'd expect (perhaps not the JSTOR registration).
If you must use a door analogy, your sign would actually read "Party inside. Please join us!" with a bowl full of keys sitting beside the door.
Now imagine if each key is valid for only five openings of the door. When someone comes back to your place for a sixth time and their key doesn't work anymore, is it really reasonable to be upset if they choose another key from the bowl?
What happened is that you managed to hit on one of my pet peeves, which is laws that prohibit innocuous things just because sometimes bad people do them. Like the DMCA prohibition on circumventing technical measures that control access to a copyrighted work. I really hate laws like that because they criminalize legitimate conduct (like circumventing for the purposes of fair use criticism) and have no benefit whatsoever over just applying the same penalties to the real bad act (e.g. copyright infringement that isn't fair use), all they do is expand the scope of criminality beyond the actually undesirable act so that it ensnares otherwise upstanding and innocent people. This is especially bad when the penalties are calibrated for the worst possible intent in doing the thing, e.g. mass scale for-profit infringement, and then applied with that severity to everyone in violation of proportionality.
The CFAA is the same way. It prohibits unauthorized access, which seems like it would generally be bad (though it's vague enough that who knows) and with no provision for looking into the circumstances to evaluate how bad, then goes on to impose penalties as though the unauthorized access was in furtherance of something like terrorism or bank fraud rather than accessing a wifi to check your email, even though the latter is still covered and subject to the same extreme penalties.
And none of this is about black and white, which is why I objected to the example. Wanting black and white laws is about fighting vagueness: Too much specificity is bad because it's too complicated and no one can understand it (see: tax code), but too much vagueness is also bad -- even worse -- because then you have no possible way to know what it actually means until you get told by a judge, by which point it's far too late.
The problem with your example is that it isn't an example of too much vagueness, it's an example of too much breadth. Take two examples: "Don't do things" and "don't do bad things without a good reason." The first isn't really vague at all -- it just covers everything, which is useless and stupid. So the problem is that it's too broad. The second isn't too broad -- it's pretty good at only criminalizing things that ought to be -- but it's hopelessly vague.
And it's overbreadth which is the trouble with "it is illegal to break locks." It covers breaking locks even for good reasons. So you need a list of exclusions or you end up like the DMCA: You're allowed to break them if they're your locks, or if necessary in order to do something legitimate, etc. Which is actually a counterexample of being okay with relatively simple laws and not needing a list of caveats to go along with them. Because we can't make things that simple, or we get the DMCA and the CFAA, which are both terrible and need to be seriously overhauled.