3 ms·
Most sites suck because they want seemingly random passwords that are hard for people to remember. Most sites seem deathly afraid of spaces too and want relativ
by pixl97 14y ago
Most sites suck because they want seemingly random passwords that are hard for people to remember. Most sites seem deathly afraid of spaces too and want relatively short passwords.
While many sites would think this is a good password
"x5tRwz3m"
Length: 8 Strength: Weak. Entropy: 36 bits. Charset Size: 62 characters
Is impossible for me to remember. A easy to remember mixed (seemly, but not random) password like that is much easier to generate and use in a off-line dictionary attack.
"I like Microsoft's login page."
Length: 30 Strength: Very Strong. Entropy: 147.3 bits Charset Size: 73 characters
is a sentence and people are pretty good at remembering them.
Add in a tiny bit of complexity
"I like M?icrosoft's login p!age."
Length: 32 Strength: Very Strong. Entropy: 163.5 bits. Charset Size: 83 characters.
It is exceptionally unlikely that a cracking attempt will reveal that password and that some other type of flaw will be needed to reveal the password or gain access to the account.
- dchest 14y agoWhat did you use to calculate entropy? 147.3 bits for "I like Microsoft's login page."? Looks highly unlikely that a proper sentence consisting of 5 dictionary words has 147.3 bits of entropy. For comparison, a truly random string of 30 characters from 73 charset has ~185 bits.
- pixl97 14y agoThe site I used was http://rumkin.com/tools/password/passchk.php http://rumkin.com/tools/password/passchk.php Other tools also... https://www.grc.com/haystack.htm https://www.grc.com/haystack.htm http://www.passwordmeter.com/ http://www.passwordmeter.com/
- dchest 14y agoYeah, password strength estimators are often wrong.
- beala 14y agoHow did you find the entropy of these passwords? By my calculations 8 random characters from a set of 62 is 47.6 bits, not 36. (log(2,62)* 8 = 47.6) On a logarithmic scale, this is a huge difference. For the passphrase, 30 characters chosen from 73 is 185.7 bits (log(2,73)* 30). Even this isn't correct though, because the characters aren't randomly chosen. As the author says: "Not so for human-created passwords, where a sea of associations and language rules greatly reduces the search space." In other words, knowing that the first word is "I" limits the possibilities for the next word, and so on.
- pixl97 14y agoThe site I used was http://rumkin.com/tools/password/passchk.php http://rumkin.com/tools/password/passchk.php How would an attacker know what the first letter is? Yes an attacker can guess if sentence passwords are used that (a|A),(the|The),and (i|I) would be very common starters but after that the bigger search space complicates things. https://www.grc.com/haystack.htm https://www.grc.com/haystack.htm Read the sections on entropy and padding. Just using sentences alone does present attackers the ability to use an encyclopedia attack, but a few randomly placed symbols (padding) turns the endeavor back in to an exhaustive search.
- beala 14y agoAn attacker might be looking over your shoulder, and see the first characters of your password. Or he might read HN, and see that your preferred passphrase method is composed of english sentences with common substitutions. Maybe a website you're using leaks its password DB, and your "padding method" is exposed, reducing the search space back to what it was before the padding. I'm going to have to disagree with GRC here. "D0g.........." is a very bad password, especially if you use ".........." as your padding on every website. Even without this, common substitutions like '3' for 'e' or '!' or 'i' are accounted for in everything but the most naive cracking tools. Perhaps less likely, a timing attack in the auth system exposes the first few characters of your password, but not the rest. Why put up with these issues, when something like xkcd's 4 random words works well, is easy to remember and type, and calculates entropy in a uncontroversial way?
- 14y ago
- e12e 14y agoEven allowing a very generous 2 bits of entropy per letter, that is still just 60 bits worth, not over a hundred bits. Keep in mind that Shannon estimated the entropy of English text to be from 0.6 to 1.5 -- So 147.3 bits for any sentence from natural language seems awfully high. The actual randomness of such a password is a factor when using some intelligent means to walk the keys pace, such as Markov chains.