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Forcing their customers to install government-affiliated alternative CAs, in turn allowing the government to spy on its citizens more easily via mis-issued cert

by lxgr 12d ago

Forcing their customers to install government-affiliated alternative CAs, in turn allowing the government to spy on its citizens more easily via mis-issued certs? Great, that'll show them.

misano 12d ago
This was the most anti-colonialist move America had ever made, but you can’t keep tiptoeing around your enemy forever.
- lxgr 12d ago
  > [...] you can’t keep tiptoeing around your enemy forever. If it doesn't cost the US anything and is strategically in their favor (via weakening an opponent), I really don't see why they couldn't have. On top of that, it'll make others find alternatives quickly, as has already been happening with e.g. payments and other critical infrastructures. What an incredible waste of soft power built over decades.
- Waterluvian 12d ago
  As an amateur student of history and a professional watcher of television, I think one possible conclusion I've drawn is that the happy state is tiptoeing around your enemy forever. Or rather, tiptoeing with your enemy. That there is no "and the enemy was defeated and we returned to the Shire and the galaxy is finally at peace." Quietness, even if it's not called peace, is the virtuous state we should endeavour to preserve.
  - deleted 12d ago
    [deleted]
AtNightWeCode 12d ago
CAs is the problem. Not who runs them...
throw0101d 12d ago
> Forcing their customers to install government-affiliated alternative CAs, in turn allowing the government to spy on its citizens more easily via mis-issued certs? How's the support for X.509 "Name Constraints" these days: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.... Would restricting it to only dot-ir domains be a mitigation? * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.ir https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.ir
- AtNightWeCode 12d ago
  The whole point with a CA is that you have a neutral third party participant. Kinda broken no matter how you look at it. Especially in this case.
- Hizonner 12d ago
  Why would the Iranian government put such a constraint in its own root certificate?
  - lxgr 12d ago
    I guess now would be a great time for browsers/OSes to ship a "trust this CA, but only for this TLD/list of domains" feature.
    - Hizonner 12d ago
      20 years ago would have been a great time for that one.
    - AtNightWeCode 12d ago
      It would be simple today to abolish the use of CAs but it just a big cargo biz that makes money on nothing as usual based on peoples incompetence. For 99% of all sites today security would be handled better without CAs. People simply don't understand how it works.
      - throw0101d 12d ago
egorfine 12d ago
Just like in russia and exactly because of sanctions. Excellent job, dear west.

by lxgr 12d ago

Forcing their customers to install government-affiliated alternative CAs, in turn allowing the government to spy on its citizens more easily via mis-issued certs? Great, that'll show them.

misano 12d ago

This was the most anti-colonialist move America had ever made, but you can’t keep tiptoeing around your enemy forever.

lxgr 12d ago
> [...] you can’t keep tiptoeing around your enemy forever. If it doesn't cost the US anything and is strategically in their favor (via weakening an opponent), I really don't see why they couldn't have. On top of that, it'll make others find alternatives quickly, as has already been happening with e.g. payments and other critical infrastructures. What an incredible waste of soft power built over decades.
Waterluvian 12d ago
As an amateur student of history and a professional watcher of television, I think one possible conclusion I've drawn is that the happy state is tiptoeing around your enemy forever. Or rather, tiptoeing with your enemy. That there is no "and the enemy was defeated and we returned to the Shire and the galaxy is finally at peace." Quietness, even if it's not called peace, is the virtuous state we should endeavour to preserve.
- deleted 12d ago
  [deleted]

AtNightWeCode 12d ago

CAs is the problem. Not who runs them...

throw0101d 12d ago

> Forcing their customers to install government-affiliated alternative CAs, in turn allowing the government to spy on its citizens more easily via mis-issued certs? How's the support for X.509 "Name Constraints" these days: * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.... Would restricting it to only dot-ir domains be a mitigation? * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.ir https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.ir

AtNightWeCode 12d ago
The whole point with a CA is that you have a neutral third party participant. Kinda broken no matter how you look at it. Especially in this case.
Hizonner 12d ago
Why would the Iranian government put such a constraint in its own root certificate?
- lxgr 12d ago
  I guess now would be a great time for browsers/OSes to ship a "trust this CA, but only for this TLD/list of domains" feature.
  - Hizonner 12d ago
    20 years ago would have been a great time for that one.
  - AtNightWeCode 12d ago
    It would be simple today to abolish the use of CAs but it just a big cargo biz that makes money on nothing as usual based on peoples incompetence. For 99% of all sites today security would be handled better without CAs. People simply don't understand how it works.
    - throw0101d 12d ago

egorfine 12d ago

Just like in russia and exactly because of sanctions. Excellent job, dear west.