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By that logic, literally any ridiculous supposition must be taken seriously, because you can’t prove a negative.
by timr 12d ago
By that logic, literally any ridiculous supposition must be taken seriously, because you can’t prove a negative.
- myrmidon 12d agoNo, that does not follow. Any other argument against <ridiculous apocalyptic supposition> is perfectly fine, just not the "it hasn't happened before" one.
- timr 12d agoYou're arguing in favor of a teapot circling Mars. We can't prove it's not there, but telling me that "nobody has ever found it" is an invalid argument is obviously absurd. In that quote, the author is telling you that all of your past predictions of teapots have been wrong (which is 100% true -- the ridiculous doom has been going on since at least GPT-2. remember how that was "too dangerous to release"?) Show me why I should believe in this one.
- applfanboysbgon 12d agoThis is a grevious misuse of Russell's Teapot. You realise your assertion, if followed to its logical conclusion, is that because civilization has existed for this long, it can never collapse no matter what. > In that quote, the author is telling you that all of your past predictions of teapots have been wrong Past predictions have zero influence on future ones. If you flip a coin 10 times and get heads every time, the probability of your next coin flip coming up heads is 50%, not 100%, because it is independent of any prior trials. Moreover, if Alice and Bob each make 100 predictions and are 100% wrong, but Charles makes 10 predictions and is 100% correct, Alice and Bob's predictions have zero bearing on whether you should trust Charles' predictions. They are not even a factor to be considered. I don't think I even disagree with you in the broad picture. I am not concerned about language models. But you have committed three blatant logical fallacies in a row. You literally could not make a worse case for your position if you tried, I suspect.
- timr 12d agoYou're making a ridiculously improbable prediction that can never be falsified -- akin to beliefs in a vengeful God. Russell's Teapot is exactly the correct metaphor. The philosophical burden of proof lies on the person making empirically unfalsifiable claims. That is the point of Russell's Teapot.
- applfanboysbgon 12d ago> The philosophical burden of proof lies on the person making empirically unfalsifiable claims. You appear not to understand what a prediction is. "I believe X will likely happen because Y" is different from an assertion of fact that "X will happen". A prediction cannot even be empirically proved! You are simply suggesting that nobody is allowed to make a prediction, ever. Russell's Teapot, too, is not an argument that you cannot believe in God. It is an argument that the unfalsifiability of a claim is not a basis to assert that God exists.
- timr 12d agoYou can make whatever predictions you like. Don't expect other people to believe them and act on them unless you provide evidence.
- Cthulhu_ 12d agoThis is Pascal's Wager, which kind of brings us full circle again to AI doom predictions.
- jerf 12d agoThis is the civilization-scale Quantum Immortality argument... no civilization can be around that witnessed the end of civilization. (I refer to it that way rather than a "variant" because Quantum Immortality should always be parameterized by an acceptance function... for any given acceptance function, that function will be preserved in the quantum multiverse, and scoping the precision of the function affects the percentage of universes that retain it rather than whether it will be retained. There's actually nothing in that definition that requires that the acceptance function describe a "conscious system", you can stick something that accepts a "civilization" in there just as easily. Or "this rock over here". Or any other thing you like. Conscious systems are just a particularly interesting case to us conscious systems.) It's not a vacuous argument, though it is a funky one with very odd characteristics. But if you accept the suppositions underneath it, it does follow and is not vacuous. The suppositions are certainly not completely obviously true on their own terms, though.
- loopies 12d ago>Quantum Immortality argument I never really understood what is the explanation for ... old people that we notice as dying. In today's times you might have an argument that some kind of life extension could pop up and some of the people alive today could have that as an excuse. But like 100 years ago? How would people dying of old age "continue living"?
- jerf 12d agoFrom the point of view of the old people, exponentially large injections of improbability. This is also where it is important to understand the argument is parameterized. If your acceptance function is "a full human body living a full human life in the way I'm used to", then you're asking for a huge whackload of improbability to keep that body alive. If, on the other hand, you merely ask for "the minimum system that stays conscious", while that is still a huge whackload it is exponentially smaller, by a very substantial factor. Anyone who takes any sort of comfort in the argument doesn't understand it. It preserves minimal consciousness, for any and all definitions of "minimal consciousness". It does also preserve bodies, but at an exponentially smaller probability. You can even use as your acceptance function "civilization exactly as we know it today, with everyone currently living still alive in 1000 years" and that comes at a yet smaller exponential probability. All of these "exponential probabilities" as separated by numbers of zeros that themselves require exponential notation to write. But the universe itself is making so many splits and branches all the time that it has the "budget" for these probabilities to be true, somewhere in the quantum multiverse. Or, put another way, any event that you can draw a non-zero probability pathway for occurs. It is not impossible for me to spontaneously have my particular genetic defect reversed in every cell in my body, so there are branches where that happens... they're just exponentially unlikely compared to what we actually experience. It can literally be in %10^(-10^1,000,000,000) of the universes... but if it's not zero, it will happen, if the quantum multiverse is the correct view.
- fwlr 12d agoI’m not sure what logic you have imputed to my comment, but I’m having trouble connecting what you wrote to anything I was saying. I am criticising the argument “every past apocalyptic prediction was wrong, therefore this future apocalyptic prediction is wrong” (specifically, that it carries exactly 0 weight, because the counterfactual world where at least one past apocalyptic prediction was true, is also a world that does not contain this argument - so there is no world where the argument’s precondition can, even in principle, be false. Arguments are a little bit like rocketships in that they need “reaction mass” - there has to be some amount of false for the truth to push against in order to move our opinion.)
- timr 12d ago> I am criticising the argument “every past apocalyptic prediction was wrong, therefore this future apocalyptic prediction is wrong” That is not the argument being made. That is the straw man version you are presenting. Read the full paragraph, and the one after, and it's obvious: > There are myriad policy responses. Whatever we do, those responses will require popular consent and careful deliberation. No one person, or one company, or one movement, knows the answer and history is no guide, save that apocalyptic predictions about new technologies have, to date, all been wrong. > History does provide a great deal of guidance, however, about the use and misuse of government power. It tells us that the state is in fact likely the worst possible custodian for the most powerful publication and data analysis technologies. Emphasis mine.
- fwlr 12d ago“History is a guide to apocalyptic predictions in only one way: all previous apocalyptic predictions have been wrong” “History is a guide to state abuses of power in many ways, and most of them point in the same direction, that it is a very bad idea to invest powers like these with the state” These are two separate arguments. I am sympathetic to the latter and endorse it essentially as written, which is why I didn’t criticise it. My criticism of the former is not a metonymic dismissal of every other argument in the piece.