4 ms·

Can you explain exactly why this is bad?

by bobthebob 3mo ago

estearum 3mo ago
[flagged]
- rcxdude 3mo ago
  I would assume the poster is asking for a more detailed explanation of the implied connection between this and the plane crashes.
  - estearum 3mo ago
    Well that is profoundly lazy. Here, put it into your favorite LLM: "Is there a suspected or established relationship between Boeing's self-certification and the 737 MAX crashes?" That will almost certainly link to the thousands of pages of Congressional, OIG, FAA testimony, investigation, and reporting. Does GP think Boeing's self-certification authority was revoked after the accidents just for funsies? By random chance?
    - deleted 3mo ago
      [deleted]
    - akerl_ 3mo ago
      As has been noted in several of the comments, the crashes were a result of a faulty design, not aircraft failing to meet the design. The self-certification here wasn’t part of the chain of events that led to the crashes; it appears to have been related to other issues the FAA uncovered as a side effect of their investigation.
      - estearum 3mo ago
        As has been noted in the actual reports, the crashes (as is true of all crashes) were the result of a specific chain of failures across several functions and organizations. One component of that chain of failures is the self-certification process. If the FAA had the resource and mandate to actually understand each aircraft design change, then it's very likely (not guaranteed, but very likely) that the MCAS design having a single point of failure on the AoA sensor would have been flagged as problematic by FAA.
        akerl_ 3mo ago
        Design changes are not part of the self certification process, they’re part of the type certification process, which has always been handled by the FAA.
        estearum 3mo ago
        Design changes de facto are part of the self-cert process because it had no requirement for FAA oversight of post-flight design changes. DOT OIG disagrees that this played no role. Here's from Page 2 of their report, i.e. the entire "Findings" summary: While FAA and Boeing followed the established certification process for the 737 MAX 8, we identified limitations in FAA’s guidance and processes that impacted certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the flight control software identified as contributing to the two accidents. First, FAA’s certification guidance does not adequately address integrating new technologies into existing aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete understanding of Boeing’s safety assessments performed on MCAS until after the first accident. Communication gaps further hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA’s ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA. For example, FAA has not yet implemented a risk-based approach to ODA oversight, and engineers in FAA’s Boeing oversight office continue to face challenges in balancing certification and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, the Boeing ODA process and structure do not ensure ODA personnel are adequately independent. While the Agency has taken steps to develop a risk-based oversight model and address concerns of undue pressure at the Boeing ODA, it is not clear that FAA’s current oversight structure and processes can effectively identify future high-risk safety concerns at the ODA. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certificat...
        rogerrogerr 3mo ago
        You are confidently acting like you understand this process, while repeatedly confusing design certification (of the type) vs. airworthiness certification (of individual airplanes).
    - rcxdude 3mo ago
      I did, in fact, spend a bit of time trying to look this up, because as pointed out by other comments, it was not entirely clear what relationship this revocation (which is about inspecting built aircraft vs the design) had to do with the crashes (which were primarily the result of a faulty design). I didn't find a particularly illuminating summary other than maybe the investigation also turned up some other problems. More to the point, the original poster was implying that there would be a relationship between the reinstatement of Boeing's self-certification and future crashes. Which I think would be worth some deeper analysis beyond 'corporations bad'.
      - estearum 3mo ago
        https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certificat...
        geonineties 3mo ago
        I perused that document. It says quite a bit on how the FAA needs to work on type certificates, but seems limited to that. It says nothing on airworthiness certificates. I'm assuming you know this, but the reason people say there's a hard difference on this is because they really are two different topics covering two different things. For the uninitiated, and simplified. For a particular aircraft you are about to board to be legally allowed to fly it needs an airworthiness certificate. An airworthiness certificate says _that_ particular airplane is essentially _identical_ to a prototype (or set of identical prototypes) that the manufacture has flight tested and demonstrated is safe to the certifying authority. The formal acceptance of the prototypes safety is called a "Type" certificate. The ability to say "we made this identical to our prototypes" is what the FAA is restoring the authority of Boeing to self certify, and is a _normal_ thing for a manufacturer to have. It's _abnormal_ for a manufacturer to not have that, as it's the certifying authority basically saying "you don't know how to physically construct airplanes". The document referenced says the FAA essentially accepted proofs / was pressured to accept assertions from Boeing that the type was actually safe, when it was not. That's basically saying Boeing didn't know how to _design_ aircraft.
    - bobthebob 3mo ago
      I think using an LLM to confidently reply to online commenters is more profound, but I digress
      - estearum 3mo ago
        Not sure if you just gave up halfway through the 4-sentence long comment, but I was actually suggesting that you use it to go find the thousands of pages of high-quality source information.
        bobthebob 3mo ago
        Which is a lazy reply.
- bobthebob 3mo ago
  Lazy Reddit style comments, do you ever contribute? I look down the chain of these comments and looks like others had no problem
  - estearum 3mo ago
    No what you see down the chain of comments are people confidently repeating the exact pattern that the OIG report on this failure actually blames for it. They keep insisting there's some binary distinction between type certification and production certification. The entire crux of OIG's diagnosis is that this is actually a much more permeable and fluid process, and the permeability of it is exactly what allowed a faulty MCAS design to make it to production.
    - rcxdude 3mo ago
      You would probably have gotten a better response by explaining this before posting vague, dismissive comments around the subject. If your post in response to the first question was the one that's like 6 responses deep in the argument here it would have been a pretty good contribution to the discussion.
atoav 3mo ago
There has been a history of problems with that exact airframe where people died. People dying is usually considered bad. Now root cause of the issue that airframe had before was that Boeing was given the leeway to certify it themselves with too little oversight by the FAA. In short: the airframe of the Boeing 737 MAX is so far away from the originally certified 737 airframe it is ridiculous to consider them the same airplane. The adjustments Boeing made via softeare to deal with the physical changes (like putting the much bigger engines forward so they have enough clearance under the wings without having to certifying this as a new airframe) was the cause of the incidents. A truly independent FAA would have never even remotely accepted that.

Can you explain exactly why this is bad?

estearum 3mo ago

[flagged]

rcxdude 3mo ago
I would assume the poster is asking for a more detailed explanation of the implied connection between this and the plane crashes.
- estearum 3mo ago
  Well that is profoundly lazy. Here, put it into your favorite LLM: "Is there a suspected or established relationship between Boeing's self-certification and the 737 MAX crashes?" That will almost certainly link to the thousands of pages of Congressional, OIG, FAA testimony, investigation, and reporting. Does GP think Boeing's self-certification authority was revoked after the accidents just for funsies? By random chance?
  - deleted 3mo ago
    [deleted]
  - akerl_ 3mo ago
    As has been noted in several of the comments, the crashes were a result of a faulty design, not aircraft failing to meet the design. The self-certification here wasn’t part of the chain of events that led to the crashes; it appears to have been related to other issues the FAA uncovered as a side effect of their investigation.
    - estearum 3mo ago
      As has been noted in the actual reports, the crashes (as is true of all crashes) were the result of a specific chain of failures across several functions and organizations. One component of that chain of failures is the self-certification process. If the FAA had the resource and mandate to actually understand each aircraft design change, then it's very likely (not guaranteed, but very likely) that the MCAS design having a single point of failure on the AoA sensor would have been flagged as problematic by FAA.
      - akerl_ 3mo ago
        Design changes are not part of the self certification process, they’re part of the type certification process, which has always been handled by the FAA.
        estearum 3mo ago
        Design changes de facto are part of the self-cert process because it had no requirement for FAA oversight of post-flight design changes. DOT OIG disagrees that this played no role. Here's from Page 2 of their report, i.e. the entire "Findings" summary: While FAA and Boeing followed the established certification process for the 737 MAX 8, we identified limitations in FAA’s guidance and processes that impacted certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the flight control software identified as contributing to the two accidents. First, FAA’s certification guidance does not adequately address integrating new technologies into existing aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete understanding of Boeing’s safety assessments performed on MCAS until after the first accident. Communication gaps further hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA’s ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA. For example, FAA has not yet implemented a risk-based approach to ODA oversight, and engineers in FAA’s Boeing oversight office continue to face challenges in balancing certification and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, the Boeing ODA process and structure do not ensure ODA personnel are adequately independent. While the Agency has taken steps to develop a risk-based oversight model and address concerns of undue pressure at the Boeing ODA, it is not clear that FAA’s current oversight structure and processes can effectively identify future high-risk safety concerns at the ODA. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certificat...
        rogerrogerr 3mo ago
        You are confidently acting like you understand this process, while repeatedly confusing design certification (of the type) vs. airworthiness certification (of individual airplanes).
  - rcxdude 3mo ago
    I did, in fact, spend a bit of time trying to look this up, because as pointed out by other comments, it was not entirely clear what relationship this revocation (which is about inspecting built aircraft vs the design) had to do with the crashes (which were primarily the result of a faulty design). I didn't find a particularly illuminating summary other than maybe the investigation also turned up some other problems. More to the point, the original poster was implying that there would be a relationship between the reinstatement of Boeing's self-certification and future crashes. Which I think would be worth some deeper analysis beyond 'corporations bad'.
    - estearum 3mo ago
      https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certificat...
      - geonineties 3mo ago
        I perused that document. It says quite a bit on how the FAA needs to work on type certificates, but seems limited to that. It says nothing on airworthiness certificates. I'm assuming you know this, but the reason people say there's a hard difference on this is because they really are two different topics covering two different things. For the uninitiated, and simplified. For a particular aircraft you are about to board to be legally allowed to fly it needs an airworthiness certificate. An airworthiness certificate says _that_ particular airplane is essentially _identical_ to a prototype (or set of identical prototypes) that the manufacture has flight tested and demonstrated is safe to the certifying authority. The formal acceptance of the prototypes safety is called a "Type" certificate. The ability to say "we made this identical to our prototypes" is what the FAA is restoring the authority of Boeing to self certify, and is a _normal_ thing for a manufacturer to have. It's _abnormal_ for a manufacturer to not have that, as it's the certifying authority basically saying "you don't know how to physically construct airplanes". The document referenced says the FAA essentially accepted proofs / was pressured to accept assertions from Boeing that the type was actually safe, when it was not. That's basically saying Boeing didn't know how to _design_ aircraft.
  - bobthebob 3mo ago
    I think using an LLM to confidently reply to online commenters is more profound, but I digress
    - estearum 3mo ago
      Not sure if you just gave up halfway through the 4-sentence long comment, but I was actually suggesting that you use it to go find the thousands of pages of high-quality source information.
      - bobthebob 3mo ago
        Which is a lazy reply.
bobthebob 3mo ago
Lazy Reddit style comments, do you ever contribute? I look down the chain of these comments and looks like others had no problem
- estearum 3mo ago
  No what you see down the chain of comments are people confidently repeating the exact pattern that the OIG report on this failure actually blames for it. They keep insisting there's some binary distinction between type certification and production certification. The entire crux of OIG's diagnosis is that this is actually a much more permeable and fluid process, and the permeability of it is exactly what allowed a faulty MCAS design to make it to production.
  - rcxdude 3mo ago
    You would probably have gotten a better response by explaining this before posting vague, dismissive comments around the subject. If your post in response to the first question was the one that's like 6 responses deep in the argument here it would have been a pretty good contribution to the discussion.

atoav 3mo ago

There has been a history of problems with that exact airframe where people died. People dying is usually considered bad. Now root cause of the issue that airframe had before was that Boeing was given the leeway to certify it themselves with too little oversight by the FAA. In short: the airframe of the Boeing 737 MAX is so far away from the originally certified 737 airframe it is ridiculous to consider them the same airplane. The adjustments Boeing made via softeare to deal with the physical changes (like putting the much bigger engines forward so they have enough clearance under the wings without having to certifying this as a new airframe) was the cause of the incidents. A truly independent FAA would have never even remotely accepted that.