4 ms·
Strong support for the strategy of not putting your TOTP/MFA in your password manager, which has been argued on HN in the past.
by tedd4u 4mo ago
Strong support for the strategy of not putting your TOTP/MFA in your password manager, which has been argued on HN in the past.
- Terr_ 4mo ago> putting your TOTP/MFA in your password manager I suppose the inverse would be starting with a device that offers TOTP/MFA, and then making your password-manager/vault somehow available on that same device. In either case, bringing them together makes it easier for an attacker to compromise both at the same time. On reflection, I've never actually put my (personal) password vault on my phone, but that may be less of a conscious security stance than fulfilling a millennial stereotype, where certain tasks (like big purchases) are reserved for "a real computer." Closest I've gotten is having my USB backup keychain in the same pocket, so I could get to it in an emergency, but it's inconveniently air-gapped.
- rectang 4mo agoAs much as I like the Apple Passwords app, one of its downsides is that if I have my TOTP app on my iPhone, both passwords and TOTP live on the same device. So for many services I use Bitwarden for passwords.
- mcfly_c-137 4mo agoFor TOTP i use ente auth[0], which i can higly recommend. i also force most apps on iOS to ask for face id (long press on app icon to set this). [0] https://ente.com/auth/ https://ente.com/auth/
- toomuchtodo 4mo agoOr using a hardware authenticator.
- rolph 4mo agoi would also offer, do not use the same device for everything, make sure any local connectivity has firewalled [dot]finances, and [dot]tech lab from each other and else. you should probably split your network to further isolate. use intentional spelling mistakes in your password vault, edit the password by hand. you also need to have some way of authenticating login components to be sure your running your version of login, and not a trojan login.
- 8cvor6j844qw_d6 4mo ago> Strong support for the strategy of not putting your TOTP/MFA in your password manager Agreed, but I think using the same device to access your password manager and for dev is asking for trouble in the first place. Password managers assumes a non-compromised device. I don't think there exist a password manager that is explicitly designed for a compromised/hostile device. A password manager + built-in TOTP on a dedicated device is fine for most general usage. Important TOTPs can go to Yubikeys.
- deepsun 4mo agoBut it's a hassle to have at least 2 yubikeys in case you lose one. And since you regularly sign up for new websites with OTPs, gotta keep them in sync. So always carry both with you. And if you carry both, then it's easy to lose both at the same time. UPDATE: also gotta keep track separatelt of non-resident passkeys tied to Yubikey, because Yubikey doesn't know where it was used for non-resident. If you lose one yubikey, need to sync all passkeys to a new replacement one.
- zygentoma 4mo agoWould be nice if you could get an exact clone of a yubikey, so you always have a spare in case you lose one. Though I think there is also the option that sites can store some sort of identifier on the key, then this would not work:/
- cuu508 4mo agoI add a note in the password manager's notes field for sites where I've added Yubikeys as the second factor. I can get the list of the sites using search, and from time to time I go through them to check if a backup key needs to be registered. I create new accounts infrequently.
- 14u2c 4mo ago>Agreed, but I think using the same device to access your password manager and for dev is asking for trouble in the first place. That seems somewhat unrealistic? There are many passwords you need to use as part of dev work.
- uncivilized 4mo agoStory states he wasn't using 2FA for his 1password account at all.
- mixdup 4mo agowhy was he even bothering then
- cdmckay 4mo agoYou can make it so you need a YubiKey to login to 1Password the first time on a new device So just waiting for the password won’t be enough
- auxinl 4mo agoThe hackers will literally have access to _your_ device though. If your device is already trusted, I doubt that setting will do you any good.
- criddell 4mo agoOn Linux, would something like Snap or Flatpak have protected them? It seems nuts that a random executable should have access to the password service.
- embedding-shape 4mo agoUltimately it depends on the exact mechanism here, maybe the tool/README said "Run sudo ./setup-deps" and they followed it, or something similar, not sure any sort of software isolation would have helped at that point.
- Gigachad 4mo agoYes if the flatpak sandboxing is enabled. A flatpak can just request access to anything, the software store thing shows a bunch of scary warnings when they do this but many users probably ignore them.
- frereubu 4mo agoI think this is true in technical terms, but I have not seen a compelling description of what that looks like without it sounding like a real pain to manage. Does anyone have a description of something manageable?
- schrodinger 4mo agoWonder if you could run your password manager in an isolated sandbox that couldn’t provide the secret behind the TOTP, only the current value.
- GoodPepper50 4mo agoSeparate and additional auth service based on physical ownership is always nice!
- hibikir 4mo agoAt the very least, a different account for your password manager at work, hopefully paid by the company, which you don't install outside of company-controlled devices.