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Personally (i.e. not speaking on behalf of my employer) I'm not terribly keen on SPDY being HTTP 2.0. It fixes HTTP/1.1 pipelining by adding a layer of binary c
by jgrahamc 14y ago
Personally (i.e. not speaking on behalf of my employer) I'm not terribly keen on SPDY being HTTP 2.0. It fixes HTTP/1.1 pipelining by adding a layer of binary complexity to a protocol that has succeeded by being simple and textual.
Also, it's a sort-of-layer because it really is dependent on details of HTTP (such as the existence of headers) to operate so it is not an independent layer. In networking I'm much happier when layers are independently specified.
Also, I think the implementation of header compression is poor because it uses a fixed dictionary that is based on current HTTP headers. There's no provision for negotiation of this going forward. It would be better if the compression dictionary were negotiated on session creation. Notice how the dictionary has been updated between standard drafts. Once it's in the standard updates will not be possible.
And SPDY requires TLS which means that if it were HTTP 2.0 it would require the deployment of certificates everywhere. That's an added expense for a web site operator. Unless SSL certificates are suddenly free and trivial to deploy then that would make HTTP 2.0 complex.
I would much rather see a proposal to change HTTP so that pipelining works, using textual headers and not require TLS.
- kibwen 14y agoHave you tried getting your voice heard in the standardization process?
- tbrownaw 14y agorequires TLS which means that if it were HTTP 2.0 it would require the deployment of certificates everywhere. That's an added expense for a web site operator. Unless SSL certificates are suddenly free and trivial to deploy Get the browser vendors to stop being idiots, and treat self-signed SSL connections as identical to plaintext connections. Or even better get them to implement a notary model [ http://perspectives-project.org http://perspectives-project.org ] (as a default rather than an extension), that doesn't allow for a single insecure CA to break the security of the entire web.
- revelation 14y agoI never thought about it from that angle. You are right, it makes no sense for browser vendors to display a big fat warning page because someone signed a certificate himself while they never let you know that 90% of the websites you use are transferred in plain-text over a wholly untrusted network.
- zobzu 14y agoNot exactly. The fat warning is there so that you don't get a false sense of security by seeing a little lock. But then again, we're now moving to a "if its self signed, you can't access the site, you can't bypass the check even". I wonder how much verisign pays some of us.
- tptacek 14y agoVerisign did not pay Mozilla to make it harder to click through the broken certificate warning.
- zobzu 14y agoDo you mean that you can't bypass the certificate warning anymore in Firefox? (or will not in the near future) If that is so, what is your reasoning behind it?
- danielweber 14y agowe're now moving to a "if its self signed, you can't access the site, you can't bypass the check even". wait wait wait what? I am currently in a space where we have to deal with self-signed certificates all the time. I fully accept that people like me will have to deal with more hassles from this so that people don't get their paypal accounts hijacked as easily. But I've yet to find out that I simply cannot connect to a site with a self-signed certificate.
- zobzu 14y agoHave a look at http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/07/19/hope9talk.html http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/07/19/hope9talk.html for a glimpse of the future:)
- zobzu 14y agoI work for some of the said vendor (and I'm being vague on purpose here). I took part of the discussion. I made the same point you did. People don't care. The argument was quickly dismissed by a "go get a cert for free at startssl". Seriously. I think the Internet is a social change, and transforms people into idiots indeed. People in groups have always been more stupid than single persons. And Internet makes us all one freaking huge group of people. Apparently if you don't share the popular idea you must be destroyed (you'll see this happen often in HN comments too). Otherwise, here's another project, that works on the same principles as perspectives, but has a better back-end (albeit WAY less marketing) IMO http://web.monkeysphere.info/ http://web.monkeysphere.info/
- tptacek 14y agoThe first step towards an alternative to the multiple- single- points- of- failure CA model is already underway: it's Trevor Perrin and Moxie Marlinspike's TACK project (currently an Internet Draft). TACK allows sites to cache certificate pins, typically after first contact, so that any site on the Internet can have the same protection that Google's properties have today by virtue of the hardcoded pins in Chrome. As Moxie Marlinspike has said, on HN even, TACK is a sensible and achievable first step towards a substrate that we can build notaries or other trust models on top of. It doesn't require years of study and consideration; it merely extends something that browser vendors already do for their preferred sites. Meanwhile, browsers can't simply treat sites under self-signed certificates as normal plaintext HTTP sites. The user reached the site through an HTTPS URL, which promised them security. When the browser detects and warns about a self-signed certificate, it is telling the user "this site is lying about its security". The simple way to understand this: start by asking what a browser should do when the Citibank Online Banking Login presents a broken cert, and then ask how the browser should know when it's OK for a site to present as merely "not encrypted" (ie, HN login) and when it's not OK (ie, online banking). It can't. The browser has to assume that HTTPS sites with broken certificates are sensitive. Remember also, the "broken certificate" case is exactly what happens when an attacker intercepts a TLS connection for a MITM attack.
- danielweber 14y agoWhat's the status of implementations and/or toolsets for TACK? Can I test it on my clients' SSL websites? Are there settings in any popular webservers for activating TACK? (Oddly, I care least about the browser for this particular question.)
- tbrownaw 14y agoMeanwhile, browsers can't simply treat sites under self-signed certificates as normal plaintext HTTP sites. The user reached the site through an HTTPS URL, which promised them security. The user reached the site by clicking on a link or bookmark, and doesn't know or care about http vs https. start by asking what a browser should do when the Citibank Online Banking Login presents a broken cert It should not show the green "Citigroup Inc (US)" at the left of the address bar. If I go type "citicards.com" into the address bar, I end up redirected to a SSL site with an EV cert. If my DNS got hijacked, I would probably end up not redirected to the SSL site, rather than redirected to a site with a broken cert. So non-SSL sites are just as dangerous ad sites with bad certs, and should be presented the same way. how the browser should know when it's OK for a site to present as merely "not encrypted" (ie, HN login) and when it's not OK (ie, online banking). It can't. The browser has to assume that HTTPS sites with broken certificates are sensitive. The browser should visually distinguish sites that are safe for sensitive info from those that are not. Plaintext and self-signed SSL are both not safe. Site with "EV" certs are supposedly safe. Site with other CA-signed certs are also supposedly safe, but slightly less so. So, show EV sites with the green name by the address bar, like recent browsers do now. Show sites with other CA-signed certs with the little lock icon, and maybe color it light green. Show plaintext and self-signed sites with nothing at all, and maybe color the address bar slightly red. But, do this identically for non-signed and self-signed sites.
- paulsutter 14y agoIf you don't want to deal with certificates just keep using HTTP 1.1. If you want the speed and security improvements of 2.0, certificates will get cheaper and easier to obtain. Most of the certificate authorities' costs are one-time (validating identity). Issuing subsequent certificates costs them nothing. Pricing will adjust accordingly with increased demand (and in some cases already has). A fixed dictionary for header compression is a lot better than no compression dictionary. Negotiation would be added complexity/latency. Sure you could argue either way but it doesn't seem like a big deal. Google has done a great job on SPDY. It's proven at scale and performs really well. Making it a standard is a great move.
- fusiongyro 14y agoPoul Henning-Kamp said many of the same things when this came up last time, and I agree with both of you. https://www.varnish-cache.org/docs/trunk/phk/http20.html https://www.varnish-cache.org/docs/trunk/phk/http20.html IMO, a HTTP 2.0 standard based on SPDY is a small but meaningful illustration of the divergence from an idealistic egalitarianism to an oligarchy of a handful of huge organizations. The issues at stake here are basically monetary for Google and a few other companies. There's very little technical finesse here despite the added complexity, and certainly little to no reimagining or benefits to the vast majority of independent site operators or web developers.
- salmanapk 14y ago> Unless SSL certificates are suddenly free Oh god why so many people dont know about StartSSL.com. They've been offering free SSL certificates since quite some time.
- bickfordb 14y agoIt seems like it would be a lot simpler to fix the current pipelining infrastructure (already in the spec but not used?) and tag pipelined request/responses with request IDs.
- sophacles 14y agoI somewhat agree, however instead of making pipelining work in HTTP, they should remove it altogether, and focus the HTTP protocol to just the request response structure/headers. Then, create a second protocol - say HMWP (HTTP Multiplexed Wire Protocol) (not a real protocol, I just made that up) that focuses on pipelining, server-push, header compression, etc. This layering approach really feels more "internetty". It also would allow independent development in terms of network optimization and application handling. This split would also help adress conflicts between Cache/Proxy/Balancer developers and Application developers.