5 ms·

> I think the Bitlocker "vuln" is a good reminder not to use vendor provided encryption for any sensitive data I don't think that's true. Some vendors have a b

> I think the Bitlocker "vuln" is a good reminder not to use vendor provided encryption for any sensitive data I don't think that's true. Some vendors have a better track record than others. Nobody's popped the storage encryption on iOS or MacOS devices yet AFAIK; and the fact that it's tied to a hardware secure element makes it pretty strong.

thefz 6mo ago
You mean aside from the NSA? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM
- otterley 6mo ago
  I don't see anything on the linked page that supports a conclusion that NSA has successfully broken the encryption at rest of an Apple device's storage since they introduced the secure element. Care to share a quote?
  - ffsm8 6mo ago
    Prism targeted network communication to my knowledge, hence the data wouldn't be siphoned from at rest encrypted devices. Instead it would've been leaked before it was copied to that local encrypted device, whenever it was transmitted over the wire. Eg when your background task uploaded it to iCloud or similar.
    - dcrazy 6mo ago
      It’s worth remembering that since Snowden, much of iCloud is now end-to-end encrypted using keys that Apple cannot unwrap: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keychain-recovery-secdeb202947/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keych...
      - ffsm8 6mo ago
        Fwiw, that's a clear statement - but only that. There is no way for us, the users, to know wherever they have the capability to add additional keys to decrypt the data because the platform isn't open source and doesn't have attestation wrt what's actually serving the requests. And it's worth remembering that apple had similar articles published before prism too which were ultimately proven to be groundless by prism.
        otterley 6mo ago
        What, exactly, was proven to be groundless?
        dcrazy 6mo ago
        The whole thing relies on hardware security modules, so even if you can prove that the whole software stack is working as described, there is literally no way to know that the SE isn’t secretly handing the OS keys that a third party can decrypt. There needs to be trust at some level, and trust in Apple the entity to not be outright lying about its thoroughly documented security posture is a reasonable level of trust for most people on the planet, including those who are at very real risk of targeted attack by state-level actors.
Veserv 6mo ago
Ah yes, the bizarro world where systems are normally unhackable so the default assumption is impenetrable security and you need to prove they are insecure. Thank god this is not the world where things get hacked all the time and where any claim of meaningful security is a extraordinary claim that demands extraordinary evidence and proof before credibly asserting it, but everybody just ignores that part and just pinky promises it and everybody just believes them for the 104th time without evidence.
- deleted 6mo ago
  [deleted]
- otterley 6mo ago
  [flagged]
  - Veserv 6mo ago
    That is not how the burden of proof works. You have the burden to demonstrate your extraordinary claim of security adequate to stop the NSA, a claim that flies in the face of the overwhelming prevailing trend of insecurity both in the industry and Apple in particular. Your claim has been made without evidence. It can be dismissed without evidence. And that is ignoring the fact that it is a claim actually made against the evidence, both ambient and particular. And no, Apple marketing does not qualify as evidence. You need a competent, unbiased, third-party with demonstrated discriminatory power to support such a claim.
    - otterley 6mo ago
      I’m afraid you have it backwards. I made only a claim that it hasn’t happened yet, based on the absence of stories that it has. That’s a negative claim, like “there’s no evidence that God exists.” It is not my burden to prove the absence of something. It is the burden of someone who makes a positive assertion (e.g. God exists) to support that claim with evidence. While you have every right to be skeptical about the security posture of Apple hardware, that doesn’t mean the burden is on me to conclusively prove that it can withstand the possible universe of attacks against it.
jiggawatts 6mo ago
Microsoft quietly dropped support for encryption offload support ("OPAL") in SSD drives because the hardware vendors were doing absolute clown-shoes things like a single static hard-coded key or the key was literally empty / all zeroes! There's levels of trust/security. I generally trust Apple's device encryption, assume BitLocker can be popped by a well-equipped nation state attacker, and the rest I trust about as far as I can throw them. PS: A related issue was (is?) that the comms between the CPU and the TPM chip on the motherboard isn't encrypted, signed, or in any significant way protected! Apparently it's relatively trivial to extract various keys including BitLocker encryption keys by simply clipping an oscilloscope to the TPM chip pins. Reference: https://www.techcentral.ie/windows-bitlocker-no-longer-trusts-ssd-hardware-protection/ https://www.techcentral.ie/windows-bitlocker-no-longer-trust...
- kotaKat 6mo ago
  > OPAL Ah, yes. Wave EMBASSY Suite, Wave Preboot, and all that other hot garbage. Best part of Wave Systems was their horrid support organization. I loved being the tier 0 rep they contracted and trained with zero software knowledge and being a catch-and-throw for all the angry people that locked themselves out of their laptops. "Sorry, buddy, all I can do is make you a Dynamics CRM ticket."
- dijit 5mo ago
  > Microsoft quietly dropped support for encryption offload support ("OPAL") in SSD drives because the hardware vendors were doing absolute clown-shoes things like a single static hard-coded key or the key was literally empty / all zeroes! That's just the default OPAL key. The idea was that you are supposed to SET the key... they made all paths go through the encryptor, so "unencrypted" was just a key with zeroes.

thefz 6mo ago

You mean aside from the NSA? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM

otterley 6mo ago
I don't see anything on the linked page that supports a conclusion that NSA has successfully broken the encryption at rest of an Apple device's storage since they introduced the secure element. Care to share a quote?
- ffsm8 6mo ago
  Prism targeted network communication to my knowledge, hence the data wouldn't be siphoned from at rest encrypted devices. Instead it would've been leaked before it was copied to that local encrypted device, whenever it was transmitted over the wire. Eg when your background task uploaded it to iCloud or similar.
  - dcrazy 6mo ago
    It’s worth remembering that since Snowden, much of iCloud is now end-to-end encrypted using keys that Apple cannot unwrap: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keychain-recovery-secdeb202947/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keych...
    - ffsm8 6mo ago
      Fwiw, that's a clear statement - but only that. There is no way for us, the users, to know wherever they have the capability to add additional keys to decrypt the data because the platform isn't open source and doesn't have attestation wrt what's actually serving the requests. And it's worth remembering that apple had similar articles published before prism too which were ultimately proven to be groundless by prism.
      - otterley 6mo ago
        What, exactly, was proven to be groundless?
      - dcrazy 6mo ago
        The whole thing relies on hardware security modules, so even if you can prove that the whole software stack is working as described, there is literally no way to know that the SE isn’t secretly handing the OS keys that a third party can decrypt. There needs to be trust at some level, and trust in Apple the entity to not be outright lying about its thoroughly documented security posture is a reasonable level of trust for most people on the planet, including those who are at very real risk of targeted attack by state-level actors.

Veserv 6mo ago

Ah yes, the bizarro world where systems are normally unhackable so the default assumption is impenetrable security and you need to prove they are insecure. Thank god this is not the world where things get hacked all the time and where any claim of meaningful security is a extraordinary claim that demands extraordinary evidence and proof before credibly asserting it, but everybody just ignores that part and just pinky promises it and everybody just believes them for the 104th time without evidence.

deleted 6mo ago
[deleted]
otterley 6mo ago
[flagged]
- Veserv 6mo ago
  That is not how the burden of proof works. You have the burden to demonstrate your extraordinary claim of security adequate to stop the NSA, a claim that flies in the face of the overwhelming prevailing trend of insecurity both in the industry and Apple in particular. Your claim has been made without evidence. It can be dismissed without evidence. And that is ignoring the fact that it is a claim actually made against the evidence, both ambient and particular. And no, Apple marketing does not qualify as evidence. You need a competent, unbiased, third-party with demonstrated discriminatory power to support such a claim.
  - otterley 6mo ago
    I’m afraid you have it backwards. I made only a claim that it hasn’t happened yet, based on the absence of stories that it has. That’s a negative claim, like “there’s no evidence that God exists.” It is not my burden to prove the absence of something. It is the burden of someone who makes a positive assertion (e.g. God exists) to support that claim with evidence. While you have every right to be skeptical about the security posture of Apple hardware, that doesn’t mean the burden is on me to conclusively prove that it can withstand the possible universe of attacks against it.

jiggawatts 6mo ago

Microsoft quietly dropped support for encryption offload support ("OPAL") in SSD drives because the hardware vendors were doing absolute clown-shoes things like a single static hard-coded key or the key was literally empty / all zeroes! There's levels of trust/security. I generally trust Apple's device encryption, assume BitLocker can be popped by a well-equipped nation state attacker, and the rest I trust about as far as I can throw them. PS: A related issue was (is?) that the comms between the CPU and the TPM chip on the motherboard isn't encrypted, signed, or in any significant way protected! Apparently it's relatively trivial to extract various keys including BitLocker encryption keys by simply clipping an oscilloscope to the TPM chip pins. Reference: https://www.techcentral.ie/windows-bitlocker-no-longer-trusts-ssd-hardware-protection/ https://www.techcentral.ie/windows-bitlocker-no-longer-trust...

kotaKat 6mo ago
> OPAL Ah, yes. Wave EMBASSY Suite, Wave Preboot, and all that other hot garbage. Best part of Wave Systems was their horrid support organization. I loved being the tier 0 rep they contracted and trained with zero software knowledge and being a catch-and-throw for all the angry people that locked themselves out of their laptops. "Sorry, buddy, all I can do is make you a Dynamics CRM ticket."
dijit 5mo ago
> Microsoft quietly dropped support for encryption offload support ("OPAL") in SSD drives because the hardware vendors were doing absolute clown-shoes things like a single static hard-coded key or the key was literally empty / all zeroes! That's just the default OPAL key. The idea was that you are supposed to SET the key... they made all paths go through the encryptor, so "unencrypted" was just a key with zeroes.