4 ms·

Just add code cert generation to letsencrypt, it's not like MS validates the code that you sign used certs from them anyway

mr_mitm 7mo ago
What would be the point? How would you prevent malware from being signed? Currently, code signatures are used as a signal for trustworthiness of the code.
- Eldt 7mo ago
  Misplaced trustworthiness?
- duskdozer 7mo ago
  Is it some entirely different process than providing hashes and a GPG signature?
  - mr_mitm 7mo ago
    Well, yes. Just look at OP and Jason struggling to get their code signed.
- sidewndr46 7mo ago
  Microsoft signed the Crowdstrike updates. I don't think a CA signing a piece of malware is a realistic thing to be concerned about.
- megous 7mo ago
  Only signal is that whoever is in the subject DN (highly) probably signed the code. There's 0 signal about trustworthiness of the code in the signature. Thrustworthiness signal is in the behavior/reputation of the signer. Pretty sure there were historically a lot of apps that stole peoples contact lists and were signed properly. Certainly in the Android world.
deleted 7mo ago
[deleted]
kbolino 7mo ago
Actually, Windows by default will not trust code signed by CAs that issue certificates to websites. It will only trust code signed by CAs that are approved for code-signing, which isn't a very large set anymore. Moreover, recent CA/Browser Forum policies forbid dual-use CAs anyway. If Let's Encrypt issues you a certificate for a web site, it cannot be used for code signing. It's possible that they could start issuing separate certificates upon specific request for code signing purposes, but it's doubtful they would be willing to meet Microsoft's requirements for such certificates, so their code-signing CA would not be added to Windows's trust store, rendering the certificates it issues useless. The ACME protocol, the key automation technology that makes Let's Encrypt possible, performs domain validation only. It verifies that you, the person (or bot) making the request, are an authorized administrator of the DNS records, or port-80 HTTP server, for that domain. This is directly relevant to, and generally considered sufficient for, HTTPS. However, domain validation is almost completely irrelevant to, and insufficient for, code signing. Microsoft's rules (and Apple's, incidentally) require establishing the identity of a legal person (individual, or preferably, company). There is no way the ACME protocol can do this, which means that the process is totally out of Let's Encrypt's wheelhouse.
- account42 7mo ago
  > However, domain validation is almost completely irrelevant to, and insufficient for, code signing. It's actually the only thing that provides any kind of assurance to users. It's not like end users know if FuzzCo is the correct developer for FooApp but they know fooapp.com.
  - deleted 7mo ago
    [deleted]
  - kbolino 7mo ago
    A web site is identified by its URL, which contains its domain. Any good HTTPS implementation cross-checks the requested domain against the SANs of the cert, and does so automatically. There is nothing in a piece of random software obtained from some random source that authoritatively connects it with a particular domain. Without bringing an App Store or other walled garden into the picture, the operating system must evaluate an executable file according to the contents of the file itself. On cold launch, the information in the certificate can be presented to the user, and the certificate issuer can be checked against the O/S trust store, but nothing equivalent to the HTTPS domain check can be done. DV certs work for the web because of that intrinsic connection between web site and domain. They fail for arbitrary software because of the lack of such a connection. The trustworthiness of code-signing certs comes from the relatively difficult process necessary to obtain them, and not the name attached to them. The identifiable legal entity to which the certificate was issued is more useful to the O/S vendor, as a harder-to-evade ban target, than it is to the end user.
account42 7mo ago
The same let's encrypt that recently removed support for using their certificates in clients because Google told them to?

mr_mitm 7mo ago

What would be the point? How would you prevent malware from being signed? Currently, code signatures are used as a signal for trustworthiness of the code.

Eldt 7mo ago
Misplaced trustworthiness?
duskdozer 7mo ago
Is it some entirely different process than providing hashes and a GPG signature?
- mr_mitm 7mo ago
  Well, yes. Just look at OP and Jason struggling to get their code signed.
sidewndr46 7mo ago
Microsoft signed the Crowdstrike updates. I don't think a CA signing a piece of malware is a realistic thing to be concerned about.
megous 7mo ago
Only signal is that whoever is in the subject DN (highly) probably signed the code. There's 0 signal about trustworthiness of the code in the signature. Thrustworthiness signal is in the behavior/reputation of the signer. Pretty sure there were historically a lot of apps that stole peoples contact lists and were signed properly. Certainly in the Android world.

deleted 7mo ago

[deleted]

kbolino 7mo ago

Actually, Windows by default will not trust code signed by CAs that issue certificates to websites. It will only trust code signed by CAs that are approved for code-signing, which isn't a very large set anymore. Moreover, recent CA/Browser Forum policies forbid dual-use CAs anyway. If Let's Encrypt issues you a certificate for a web site, it cannot be used for code signing. It's possible that they could start issuing separate certificates upon specific request for code signing purposes, but it's doubtful they would be willing to meet Microsoft's requirements for such certificates, so their code-signing CA would not be added to Windows's trust store, rendering the certificates it issues useless. The ACME protocol, the key automation technology that makes Let's Encrypt possible, performs domain validation only. It verifies that you, the person (or bot) making the request, are an authorized administrator of the DNS records, or port-80 HTTP server, for that domain. This is directly relevant to, and generally considered sufficient for, HTTPS. However, domain validation is almost completely irrelevant to, and insufficient for, code signing. Microsoft's rules (and Apple's, incidentally) require establishing the identity of a legal person (individual, or preferably, company). There is no way the ACME protocol can do this, which means that the process is totally out of Let's Encrypt's wheelhouse.

account42 7mo ago
> However, domain validation is almost completely irrelevant to, and insufficient for, code signing. It's actually the only thing that provides any kind of assurance to users. It's not like end users know if FuzzCo is the correct developer for FooApp but they know fooapp.com.
- deleted 7mo ago
  [deleted]
- kbolino 7mo ago
  A web site is identified by its URL, which contains its domain. Any good HTTPS implementation cross-checks the requested domain against the SANs of the cert, and does so automatically. There is nothing in a piece of random software obtained from some random source that authoritatively connects it with a particular domain. Without bringing an App Store or other walled garden into the picture, the operating system must evaluate an executable file according to the contents of the file itself. On cold launch, the information in the certificate can be presented to the user, and the certificate issuer can be checked against the O/S trust store, but nothing equivalent to the HTTPS domain check can be done. DV certs work for the web because of that intrinsic connection between web site and domain. They fail for arbitrary software because of the lack of such a connection. The trustworthiness of code-signing certs comes from the relatively difficult process necessary to obtain them, and not the name attached to them. The identifiable legal entity to which the certificate was issued is more useful to the O/S vendor, as a harder-to-evade ban target, than it is to the end user.

account42 7mo ago

The same let's encrypt that recently removed support for using their certificates in clients because Google told them to?