4 ms·
Bad arguments and FUD when it was being rolled out. Sysadmins also don't want to touch working infra code, you can see that with AWS lagging on IPv6.
by indolering 7mo ago
Bad arguments and FUD when it was being rolled out. Sysadmins also don't want to touch working infra code, you can see that with AWS lagging on IPv6.
- tptacek 7mo agoWho's the most reputable cryptographer you can think of who publicly supports DNSSEC? We'd like to interview them on SCW.
- indolering 7mo agoYou are going to complain that the key sizes are too small despite the guidelines being updated a long time ago. Then you will argue adoption of larger keys sizes is to low. Then you will argue that we should just not sign domain name authority delegation records at all (i.e. DNSSEC) and that we should abandon shoring up authenticated DNS because there is no adoption. You have any cryptographers that are satisfied with unauthenticated name server checks?
- tptacek 7mo agoYes? Lots of them? But also: you didn't answer my question.
- indolering 7mo agoOkay, but after this I have to go back to work. You got a point: 1k isn't great and of course mainstream cryptographers will advocate for higher. That doesn't change that it's still acceptable within the existing security model nor that better alternatives are available. The cryptographic strength of DNSSEC isn't a limiting factor that fatally dooms the whole project. We have to upgrade the crypto used in large-scale infrastructure all the time! And yes, uptake of better crypto is poor but I find chicken-and-egg arguments disingenuous when coming from someone who zealously advocates to make it worse. Furthermore, your alternative is no signing of DNS records. Find me a cryptographer who thinks no PKI is a better alternative. I know DJB griped about DNSSEC when proposing DNSCurve, which protects the privacy of the payload but not the intergrity of the payload.
- tptacek 7mo agoSorry, but I asked who's the most reputable cryptographer you can think of who publicly supports DNSSEC? I asked because we'd like to interview them on SCW.
- indolering 7mo agoMore rhetorical dunking instead of engaging with the substantive technical issues. I'm done.
- tptacek 7mo agoThat is a weird answer to a very simple question but I'll take that as "I can't think of any". Someone else can answer instead.
- Dylan16807 7mo agoMore random complaints instead of engaging with the substantive question. You replied to a two sentence post asking for a name. What do you expect to happen when you do that? If you want to debate the merits, reply anywhere else.
- 3eb7988a1663 7mo agoIs this a bot gone rogue? Parent asked for a person, and you are shadow-boxing with unasked questions.
- gzread 7mo agoThe question was "can you find me some reputable cryptographers that support your position?" which is just ad hominem and should be ignored as such, except it does indicate that the person asking it doesn't have any better argument than ad hominem.
- Dylan16807 7mo agoIf you think tptacek has no better arguments then you're sorely mistaken. And implying that someone is unqualified is not in fact ad hominem. The desire to interview a disagreeing expert doesn't look fake either.
- 8organicbits 7mo agoCan you not check the RFCs?
- tptacek 7mo agoYou know the funny thing about this is that I have talked, relatively recently, to one of the very few cryptographers who was an author on a DNSSEC standard, and they wouldn't work for the interview I want to do --- they're not sold enough on DNSSEC anymore. The broader answer is: the relevant RFCs weren't authored by cryptography engineers. This was a major problem in the "old" IETF, before the cryptographers "took over" tls-wg and CFRG. At any rate, the reason I asked in that particular place on the thread was that the preceding comment was attempting to draw a line between "sysadmins" who hate DNSSEC and the serious technologists who like it a lot.