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This is a good, but flawed argument. Intelligence is fundamentally an information processing function. [Simplistically,] your brain receives bits of information
by jey 19y ago
This is a good, but flawed argument. Intelligence is fundamentally an information processing function. [Simplistically,] your brain receives bits of information from its sensory inputs, crunches on them, and outputs some bits of information. It also stores some bits, to create what we call memory.
The bits don't care if they're processed in a silicon-based computer or a meat-based computer. The computations and transformations are what matter. Again, this "simulations aren't wet" is relying on a hidden assumption of a false distinction created by Searle. He distinguishes between the "real thinking" and "fake thinking", then with that assumption in hand, creates an example in which the "real" vs "fake" distinction is clear.
Here's the real question:
When you run a simulation of a Turing machine, does any computation happen?
The answer is obviously "yes".
NOTE: I mean "information" here in the sense of Claude Shannon's Information Theory. I'm not saying that literal 1 and 0 bits like in a computer are used by the human brain. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory
And I'm really curious: what, in general terms, is so special about brains? Do they contain souls? Do they tap into some mystical forces of Consciousness as in Cartesian dualism? As far as I'm aware, brains are intelligent systems built out of matter. So let's figure out how to build intelligent systems out of matter, and build one.
- jimbokun 19y ago"Intelligence is fundamentally an information processing function." You can certainly define "intelligence" this way. But does it make sense to say "the human brain is an information processing function"? It's a non-sequitur. A brain can process information. A machine can process information. Does that make the brain and an information processing machine QUALITATIVELY the same thing? "Here's the real question: When you run a simulation of a Turing machine, does any computation happen?" If a simulation of a human brain receives a simulated stimulation of the appearance of his beloved, does the simulation's heart beat faster? Does the simulation maybe start sweating a little? Does the simulation experience all the little physiological changes that the non-simulated human experiences? A human brain is part of an organism, and I don't think it's a useful metaphor to call a human being a computation engine. I suppose you could theoretically simulate everything about the world in which real human beings exist and then at that point claim the simulation is qualitatively the same as what is simulated. But just how exact does your simulation have to be to make that claim? Down to the quantum level? Will even the singularity produce that kind of computing power in the near future? Even then, are the things in the simulation qualitatively the same as the things in our world? Notice all the question marks? Searle is engaging in philosophy, and I think many quantitative types have a hard time accepting that there may be questions that do not have easy quantitative answers. Which is my point. I don't have the answers, but find Searle's objections worth pondering.
- jimbokun 19y agoLeave it to news.ycombinator to post the answer to my rhetorical question before I finished typing it: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0110/0110141v1.pdf http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0110/0110141v1.pdf Answering: "But just how exact does your simulation have to be to make that claim? Down to the quantum level? Will even the singularity produce that kind of computing power in the near future? Even then, are the things in the simulation qualitatively the same as the things in our world?"