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The ISP is the primary threat vector here (do you trust yours? Along with their contractors and anyone who might have compromised them?). But like I said route-
by bandrami 10mo ago
The ISP is the primary threat vector here (do you trust yours? Along with their contractors and anyone who might have compromised them?). But like I said route-poisoning attacks do exist.
- ErroneousBosh 10mo agoYes, I trust everyone who works at it, mostly because I know where they live.
- bandrami 9mo agoDo you trust the state actors who have compromised it?
- kstrauser 9mo agoOr more likely, network engineers who’ve been subpoenaed to collect the information? Your scenario is plausible for high value targets. Like, what country wouldn’t want to have a friendly tech working at the ISP most politicians use in DC? That doesn’t seem improbable. For the regular Joe Schmoe, I’d be more concerned with court-ordered monitoring.
- ErroneousBosh 9mo agoAh, that sounds like an American problem. If you're in the US, you're living in a hostile surveillance state that makes North Korea look like a hippy commune.
- kstrauser 9mo agoOh yes, subpoenas are a uniquely American problem. eyeroll.png
- ErroneousBosh 9mo agoI know all the people that work at it.
- sedawkgrep 10mo agoyeah but the likelihood of this is incredibly remote. It would shock me if ISPs didn't have alarms going off if RFC1918 space was suddenly routable within their BGP table. Not to mention the return packet would be NAT'd so the attacker would have to deal with that complication.
- bandrami 10mo agoYou're missing the part where the ISP is the one doing it
- ErroneousBosh 10mo agoMm. Can you give an example of that happening in real life?
- bandrami 10mo agoGoogle "Eagerbee"
- sedawkgrep 9mo agoNot finding anything saying that ISPs have anything to do with Eagerbee.
- bandrami 9mo agoISPs were the vector for Eagerbee. Don't trust your next-hop router.
- ErroneousBosh 9mo agoThere's nothing on Google about that.
- Dagger2 9mo agoThe return packet wouldn't be NATed, because stateful NAT tracks connections and only applies NAT to packets that belong to outbound connections. Arguing over how likely this is is missing the point. If it can happen at all when you're running NAT, then it should be clear that NAT isn't providing security.