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> Regulatory capture is an intrinsically hard problem. What's beginning to bug me about regulatory capture is that it's a two party system: subject and observe
by specialist 14y ago
> Regulatory capture is an intrinsically hard problem.
What's beginning to bug me about regulatory capture is that it's a two party system: subject and observer. Seems to frail.
The brilliance of the US constitution is the balance of power between executive, legislative, and judicial. Over the long term, it seems to be largely self-correcting. Or at least correctable.
That the players are fighting each other is the only thing that's keeps everyone honest. There's some cliche about mutual distrust guaranteeing trust in a system
For all the belly aching about over bearing government and onerous regulation, it seems to me the regulators are way too cozy with the entities they regulate. In general.
Oh well. I haven't been able to imagine a system other than subject and observer. So I can't imagine a persistent system resistant to regulatory capture.
Maybe there's some novel market-based solutions which build in the right incentives. Kind of like the capitation model for healthcare, which rewards wellness (vs the USA's current fee-for-service model which rewards treating disease.).
Or maybe one of those self-managed collectives, like the managed fisheries of the north east, who's mission is to prevent the tragedy of the commons (destroying a common resource).
- chii 14y agoi dont believe the three prongs of the gov't really ensures that none is doing "sus" things. I think its just that judges are help up as people with integrity and societal pressure forces them to behave, where as the SEC regulators are less well known, and the average joe won't really have a clue as to how he/she is being fucked over (indirectly of course). What you need is a incentivization system in which the players are rewarded properly for the tasks that benefit the whole. May be one way is to have the pay bonus of SEC directly related to the amount of fines/corruption/bad behaviour that exists in the corporations they regulate. I m not sure if this will work, as the real cause of the problem is that those with financial power can translate it into political power.
- specialist 14y agoI'm totally onboard with aligning incentives with desired (societal) outcomes.
- Evbn 14y agoTo be clear, are you proposing the SEC be incentivized to imprison innocents to boost conviction rates, or be incentivized to ignore criminals to surpress corruption rates?
- btilly 14y agoWhat makes you think that the US Constitution is working as planned without regulatory capture? The purpose of the Constitution is to provide for a working federal government, but to limit the scope and power of that government as much as possible. But does it seem to you that the scope of the government has actually been limited as intended? The problem is that all three branches gain when you increase the scope and power of government. Therefore there is a small but consistent error on the side of expanding the government among all three groups. The result is a government that is far larger than anything that the Founders envisioned. Individually we may or may not think that this is a good change, but there is no question that it is not as intended by the original Constitution. The place that you can see this most clearly is in the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commerce_Clause http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commerce_Clause. This gives Congress the power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. Until the 1930s, this was interpreted as written. If an act of commerce didn't involve Indian tribes, multiple states, or foreign governments, then Congress couldn't justify laws about it under the Commerce Clause. Then FDR wanted to pass the New Deal. The courts struck down key provisions. FDR threatened to appoint pliant judges until he got what he wanted. A key vote switched, FDR got the decision he wanted, and the Commerce Clause began to expand to cover any activity that might possibly, some day, affect interstate commerce. No matter how tangentially. We went from, "If it doesn't cross a boundary, Congress can't say anything" to "Even if you, your business, your employees, and most of your likely customers all exist in one state, Congress can still pass regulations about who you can hire." (Yes, I like the Civil Rights Act. I'm just saying that it would not be constitutional under the Constitution as understood by Thomas Jefferson.) From the first strong-arming of the Supreme Court to the next decision where the Commerce Clause was not upheld to cover whatever Congress asked for it to cover took 60 years. (The Court finally hit its limit with an attempt to regulate the possession of handguns in the neighborhood of a school.) Every expansive decision increased the scope of what the President could ask for, Congress could pass, and the potential impact of the corresponding cases that the Supreme Court had to judge.
- specialist 14y agoWorking as planned? I wouldn't know. I'm not talking about the pathology of the USA govt. What I'm trying to do is talk about systems more resistant to regulatory capture. What marvels me is the three-way fight. It just seems much more self-balancing. And great things happen when people have to hash things out. Back when I was a product manager, I structured the team to mimic the balance of powers. (That particular company was engineering dominated, which got fairly pathological.) Marketing was in charge of price and scope. Engineering was in charge of cost and schedule. QA was in charge of testing and shipping. Give and take. Creative tension. The outcome was brilliant. After a storming period, the team settled into a tempo and always made our dates and sales numbers. I don't know if setting up a three-way fight is a repeatable organizational structure. But it's the best idea I've come across to date. The only other idea I have is increased transparency. (PS- All big decision were made democratically, with various kinds of voting systems. eg Go/NoGo was roman evaluation, triage was risk management style, etc.)