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Complexity of a single neuron is out of reach for all of the world's super computers. So we have to conclude that if the authors believe in a computational/func

Complexity of a single neuron is out of reach for all of the world's super computers. So we have to conclude that if the authors believe in a computational/functionalist instantiation of consciousness or self-awareness then they must also believe that the complexity of neurons is not necessary & is in fact some kind of accident that could be greatly simplified but still be capable of carrying out the functions in the relational/functionalist structure of conscious phenomenology. Hence, the digital neuron & unjustified belief that a properly designed boolean circuit & setting of inputs will instantiate conscious experience. I have yet to see any coherent account of consciousness that manages to explain away the obvious obstructions & close the gap between lifeless boolean circuits & the resulting intentional subjectivity. There is something fundamentally irreducible about what is meant by conscious self-awareness that can not be explained in terms of any sequence of arithmetic/boolean operations which is what all functionalist specifications ultimately come down to, it's all just arithmetic & all one needs to do is figure out the right sequence of operations.

the_gipsy 11mo ago
> irreducible It seems like the opposite is true.
- measurablefunc 11mo ago
  Only if you agree with the standard extensional & reductive logic of modern science but even then it is known that all current explanations of reality are incomplete, e.g. the quantum mechanical conception of reality consists of incessant activity that we can never be sure about. It's not obvious at all why computer scientists & especially those doing work in artificial intelligence are convinced that they are going to eventually figure out how the mind works & then supply a sufficient explanation for conscious phenomenology in terms of their theories b/c there are lots of theorems in CS that should convince them of the contrary case, e.g. Rice's theorem. So even if we assume that consciousness has a functional/computable specification then it's not at all obvious why there would be a decidable test that could take the specification & tell you that the given specification was indeed capable of instantiating conscious experience.
  - dist-epoch 11mo ago
    Rice's theorem also applies to the human/brain. Take whatever specification you want of the human, at the cell level, at the subatomic level, and (an equivalent) of Rice's theorem applies. So how is that relevant then? Are you saying you are not conscious because you can't create a decidable test for proving you are conscious?
    - measurablefunc 11mo ago
      Rice's theorem only applies in formal contexts so whoever thinks they can reduce conscious phenomenology into a formal context will face the problems of incompleteness & undecidability. That is why I said it is fundamentally irreducible & can not be explained in terms of extensional & reductive constructions like boolean arithmetic. In other words, if you think the mind is simply computation then there is no way you can look at some code that purports to be the specification of a mind & determine whether it is going to instantiate conscious experience from its static/syntactic description.

the_gipsy 11mo ago

> irreducible It seems like the opposite is true.

measurablefunc 11mo ago
Only if you agree with the standard extensional & reductive logic of modern science but even then it is known that all current explanations of reality are incomplete, e.g. the quantum mechanical conception of reality consists of incessant activity that we can never be sure about. It's not obvious at all why computer scientists & especially those doing work in artificial intelligence are convinced that they are going to eventually figure out how the mind works & then supply a sufficient explanation for conscious phenomenology in terms of their theories b/c there are lots of theorems in CS that should convince them of the contrary case, e.g. Rice's theorem. So even if we assume that consciousness has a functional/computable specification then it's not at all obvious why there would be a decidable test that could take the specification & tell you that the given specification was indeed capable of instantiating conscious experience.
- dist-epoch 11mo ago
  Rice's theorem also applies to the human/brain. Take whatever specification you want of the human, at the cell level, at the subatomic level, and (an equivalent) of Rice's theorem applies. So how is that relevant then? Are you saying you are not conscious because you can't create a decidable test for proving you are conscious?
  - measurablefunc 11mo ago
    Rice's theorem only applies in formal contexts so whoever thinks they can reduce conscious phenomenology into a formal context will face the problems of incompleteness & undecidability. That is why I said it is fundamentally irreducible & can not be explained in terms of extensional & reductive constructions like boolean arithmetic. In other words, if you think the mind is simply computation then there is no way you can look at some code that purports to be the specification of a mind & determine whether it is going to instantiate conscious experience from its static/syntactic description.