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So, if I understand this article correctly, if a single terminal private key ever leaks, all the protections preventing any random passer-by from reading your b

So, if I understand this article correctly, if a single terminal private key ever leaks, all the protections preventing any random passer-by from reading your biometric data go out the window[1]. You could partially mitigate such a weakness by including "not valid before" and "not valid after" timestamps in the certificates, which would have to be short-lived. Passports would then verify that the timestamp supplied by the terminal is in the correct range, as well as that it is greater than any previous timestamp this passport has ever recorded.

salviati 1y ago
This would also add the requirement of an accurate internal clock.
- Scoundreller 1y ago
  Driveby bricking of passports, coming to an airport near you!
  - namibj 1y ago
    German id cards essentially record the newest issuance timestamp seen; then they block certificates that expired prior to this recorded value.
    - cperciva 1y ago
      So one erroneously issued certificate can brick every ID card in the country?
      - ACCount37 1y ago
        Pretty much. But you would need, first, to issue a valid certificate with a timestamp far ahead in the future. And then expose every ID card in the country to it.
- throwaway89201 1y ago
  In theory, you can add some more complexity/fragility and have 'time notaries' sign the current time together with a challenge from the passport, verifiable against embedded public keys.
commandersaki 1y ago
I think this is a similar situation with Felica IC cards in Japan.
noodlesUK 1y ago
U.S. passports have a unique shielding which prevents them from being read whilst closed. It’s a low tech solution but I think it’s an amazing example of clever mitigations.
iancarroll 1y ago
Not an expert but my understanding is that active authentication only occurs after the basic “I can see the MRZ data” authentication passes first. You can’t skip proving you can read the MRZ in any scenario.

salviati 1y ago

This would also add the requirement of an accurate internal clock.

Scoundreller 1y ago
Driveby bricking of passports, coming to an airport near you!
- namibj 1y ago
  German id cards essentially record the newest issuance timestamp seen; then they block certificates that expired prior to this recorded value.
  - cperciva 1y ago
    So one erroneously issued certificate can brick every ID card in the country?
    - ACCount37 1y ago
      Pretty much. But you would need, first, to issue a valid certificate with a timestamp far ahead in the future. And then expose every ID card in the country to it.
throwaway89201 1y ago
In theory, you can add some more complexity/fragility and have 'time notaries' sign the current time together with a challenge from the passport, verifiable against embedded public keys.

commandersaki 1y ago

I think this is a similar situation with Felica IC cards in Japan.

noodlesUK 1y ago

U.S. passports have a unique shielding which prevents them from being read whilst closed. It’s a low tech solution but I think it’s an amazing example of clever mitigations.

iancarroll 1y ago

Not an expert but my understanding is that active authentication only occurs after the basic “I can see the MRZ data” authentication passes first. You can’t skip proving you can read the MRZ in any scenario.