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If you genuinely want the strongest statement of it, read The Emperor's New Mind followed by Shadows of the Mind, both by Roger Penrose. These books often get
by omnicognate 1y ago
If you genuinely want the strongest statement of it, read The Emperor's New Mind followed by Shadows of the Mind, both by Roger Penrose.
These books often get shallowly dismissed in terms that imply he made some elementary error in his reasoning, but that's not the case. The dispute is more about the assumptions on which his argument rests, which go beyond mathematical axioms and include statements about the nature of human perception of mathematical truth. That makes it a philosophical debate more than a mathematical one.
Personally, I strongly agree with the non-mathematical assumptions he makes, and am therefore persuaded by his argument. It leads to a very different way of thinking about many aspects of maths, physics and computing than the one I acquired by default from my schooling. It's a perspective that I've become increasingly convinced by over the 30+
years since I first read his books, and one that I think acquires greater urgency as computing becomes an ever larger part of our lives.
- Chance-Device 1y agoTo be honest, the core of Penrose’s idea is pretty stupid. That we can understand mathematics despite incompleteness theorem being a thing, therefore our brains use quantum effects allowing us to understand it. Instead of just saying, you know, we use a heuristic instead and just guess that it’s true. I’m pretty sure a classical system can do that.
- omnicognate 1y agoI'm sure if you email him explaining how stupid he is he'll send you his Nobel prize. Less flippantly, Penrose has always been extremely clear about which things he's sure of, such as that human intelligence involves processes that algorithms cannot emulate, and which things he puts forward as speculative ideas that might help answer the questions he has raised. His ideas about quantum mechanical processes in the brain are very much on the speculative side, and after a career like his I think he has more than earned the right to explore those speculations. It sounds like you probably would disagree with his assumptions about human perception of mathematical truth, and it's perfectly valid to do so. Nothing about your comment suggests you've made any attempt to understand them, though.
- Chance-Device 1y agoYou realise that this isn’t even a reply so much as a series of insults dressed up in formal language? Yes, of course you do.
- omnicognate 1y agoIt wasn't intended as an insult and I apologise if it comes across as such. It's easy to say things on the internet that we wouldn't say in person. It did come from a place of annoyance, after your middlebrow dismissal of Penrose' argument as "stupid".
- Chance-Device 1y agoAnd you do it again, you apologise while insulting me. When challenged you refuse to defend the points you brought up, so that you can pretend to be right rather than be proved wrong. Incompleteness theorem is where the idea came from, but you don’t want to discuss that, you just want to drop the name, condescend to people and run away.
- omnicognate 1y agoHere are the substantive things you've said so far (i.e. the bits that aren't calling things "stupid" and taking umbridge at imagined slights): 1. You think that instead of actually perceiving mathematical truth we use heuristics and "just guess that it's true". This, as I've already said, is a valid viewpoint. You disagree with one of Penrose' assumptions. I don't think you're right but there is certainly no hard proof available that you're not. It's something that (for now, at least) it's possible to agree to disagree on, which is why, as I said, this is a philosophical debate more than a mathematical one. 2. You strongly imply that Penrose simply didn't think of this objection. This is categorically false. He discusses it at great length in both books. (I mentioned such shallow dismissals, assuming some obvious oversight on his part, in my original comment.) 3 (In your latest reply). You think that Godel's incompleteness theorem is "where the idea came from". This is obviously true. Penrose' argument is absolutely based on Godel's theorem. 4. You think that somehow I don't agree with point 3. I have no idea where you got that idea from. That, as far as I can see, is it. There isn't any substantive point made that I haven't already responded to in my previous replies, and I think it's now rather too late to add any and expect any sort of response. As for communication style, you seem to think that writing in a formal tone, which I find necessary when I want to convey information clearly, is condescending and insulting, whereas dismissing things you disagree with as "stupid" on the flimsiest possible basis (and inferring dishonest motives on the part of the person you're discussing all this with) is, presumably, fine. This is another point on which we will have to agree to disagree.
- nemo1618 1y agoAI does not need to be conscious for it to harm us.
- nonethewiser 1y agoIsnt the question more if it needs to be conscious to actually be intelligent?
- nonethewiser 1y agoCan you critique my understanding of his argument? 1. Any formal mathematical system (including computers) have true statements that cannot be proven within that system. 2. Humans can see the truth of some such unprovable statements. Which is basically Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_... Maybe a more ELI5 1. Computers follow set rules 2. Humans can create rules outside the system of rules in which they follow Is number 2 an accurate portrayal? It seems rather suspicious. It seems more likely that we just havent been able to fully express the rules under which humans operate.
- zeroonetwothree 1y agoNotably, those true statements can be proven in a higher level mathematical system. So why wouldn’t we say that humans are likewise operating in a certain system ourselves and likewise we have true statements that we can’t prove. We just wouldn’t be aware of them.
- nonethewiser 1y ago>likewise we have true statements that we can’t prove Yes, and "can't" as in it is absolutely impossible. Not that we simple haven't been able to due to information or tech constraints. Which is an interesting implication. That there are (or may be) things that are true which cannot be proved. I guess it kinda defies an instinct I have that at least in theory, everything that is true is provable.
- omnicognate 1y agoThat's too brief to capture it, and I'm not going to try to summarise(*). The books are well worth a read regardless of whether you agree with Penrose. (The Emperor's New Mind is a lovely, wide-ranging book on many topics, but Shadows of the Mind is only worth it if you want to go into extreme detail on the AI argument and its counterarguments.) * I will mention though that "some" should be "all" in 2, but that doesn't make it a correct statement of the argument.
- myrmidon 1y agoGonna grab those, thanks for the recommendation. If you are interested in the opposite point of view, I can really recommend "Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology" by V. Braitenberg. Basically builds up to "consciousness as emergent property" in small steps.
- omnicognate 1y agoThanks, I will have a read of that. The strongest I've seen before on the opposing view to Penrose was Daniel Dennett.
- irickt 1y agoDennett, Darwins Dangerous Idea, p448 ... No wonder Penrose has his doubts about the algorithmic nature of natural selection. If it were, truly, just an algorithmic process at all levels, all its products should be algorithmic as well. So far as I can see, this isn't an inescapable formal contradiction; Penrose could just shrug and propose that the universe contains these basic nuggets of nonalgorithmic power, not themselves created by natural selection in any of its guises, but incorporatable by algorithmic devices as found objects whenever they are encountered (like the oracles on the toadstools). Those would be truly nonreducible skyhooks. Skyhook is Dennett's term for an appeal to the supernatural.
- slow_typist 1y agoBraitenberg emphasised the importance of analog circuits though.
- ACCount37 1y agoThe dismissal is on point. The whole category of ideas of "Magic Fairy Dust is required for intelligence, and thus, a computer can never be intelligent" is extremely unsound. It should, by now, just get thrown out into the garbage bin, where it rightfully belongs.
- omnicognate 1y agoIn what way is it unsound? To be clear, any claim that we have mathematical proof that something beyond algorithms is required is unsound, because the argument is not mathematical. It rests on assumptions about human perception of mathematical truth that may or may not be correct. So if that's the point you're making I don't dispute it, although to say an internally consistent alternative viewpoint should be "thrown out into the garbage" on that basis is unwarranted. The objection is just that it doesn't have the status of a mathematical theorem, not that it is necessarily wrong. If, on the other hand you think that it is impossible for anything more than algorithms to be required, that the idea that the human mind must be equivalent to an algorithm is itself mathematically proven, then you are simply wrong. Any claim that the human mind has to be an algorithm rests on exactly the same kind of validly challengable, philosophical assumptions (specifically the physical Church-Turing thesis) that Penrose' argument does. Given two competing, internally consistent world-views that have not yet been conclusively separated by evidence, the debate about which is more likely to be true is not one where either "side" can claim absolute victory in the way that so many people seem to want to on this issue, and talk of tossing things in the garbage isn't going to persuade anybody that's leaning in a different direction.
- ACCount37 1y agoIt is unsound because: not only it demands an existence of a physical process that cannot be computed (so far, none found, and not for the lack of searching), but it also demands that such a physical process would conveniently be found to be involved in the functioning of a human brain, and also that it would be vital enough that you can't just replace it with something amenable to computation at a negligible loss of function. It needs too many unlikely convenient coincidences. The telltale sign of wishful thinking. At the same time: we have a mounting pile of functions that were once considered "exclusive to human mind" and are now implemented in modern AIs. So the case for "human brain must be doing something Truly Magical" is growing weaker and weaker with each passing day.