3 ms·
Reminder that Telegram has "end to end" encryption only for direct messages; the rest is client-server, which they seem to believe is just as good as end-to-end
by tptacek 1y ago
Reminder that Telegram has "end to end" encryption only for direct messages; the rest is client-server, which they seem to believe is just as good as end-to-end.
- ynoxinul 1y ago*for direct messages in secret chats, which you have to enable explicitly and which reduces user expericence in comparison to normal chats.
- fsflover 1y ago*only on non-GNU/Linux systems.
- dijit 1y agoYou've said this a lot in this thread, but my client on Arch seems to have secret chats. https://i.imgur.com/Pft8r3B.png https://i.imgur.com/Pft8r3B.png
- fsflover 1y agoYou screenshot doesn't show how you achieved this or that you're even using Linux. There is no option to start a secret chat for me on a right click. Where did you download your client? This ticket suggests that there's no such option: https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/issues/871 https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/issues/871 See also: https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/issues/6491 https://github.com/telegramdesktop/tdesktop/issues/6491
- dijit 1y agoThose are the same link and they’re 10 years old. I am using telegram-desktop from aur, I clicked the three dots (…) at the top next to the magnifying glass, then info (i) to get to the profile, then there is a “more” (…) button where there was a “Secret” option.
- fsflover 1y ago> telegram-desktop from aur Thanks, this looks interesting. However, it seems unofficial. There's no such option in the official client from telegram.org. > Those are the same link Thanks, I fixed that.
- dijit 1y agoI’m not aware if it’s official or not, but to be clear, I like that telegram allows open source and alternative clients.
- dijit 1y agoclient-server is good enough, if you trust the server. If you don't trust the server, then you shouldn't trust them to supply you a client either. Since a client is basically "whatever code they decided". Very few people are building from FOSS, and those that do will include binary blobs too. It's theatre.
- tptacek 1y agoThere are basically zero practicing cryptography engineers who would agree with the logic you've used here, but I acknowledge this is also someting Durov believes.
- dijit 1y agoI know it's trite to bring in logical fallacies, but you're hinging a response on an appeal to authority without tackling the logic head on. Worse so, you're also engaging in a bit of hyperbole. E2EE provides strong theoretical guarantee's, but not so if the client is under the network providers control. Governments have already pressured companies to alter clients (Australia's "Assistance and Access Act" allows compelling backdoors in software). If you don't trust the operator, it's irrational to trust the client they supply, they can do anything before E2EE even kicks in. I'm not saying E2EE is useless technology, it's just useless in cases where the provider and the network are the same thing. You are gaining very little over TLS in those cases. You can configure "self-deleting" messages if you're worried about other clients logging in. Regardless, most reasonable security researches I know are actually more concerned with supply chain attacks than ensuring E2EE everywhere, which is precisely what I'm arguing.
- tptacek 1y agoAn adversary in the client/server cryptography model doesn't need a supply chain attack. They already have the cleartext.
- dijit 1y agoThat’s fair for a purely malicious provider in client/server mode (they’ve got the plaintext on the server, no fancy footwork needed), but that’s missing the forest: if the provider is adversarial, E2EE doesn’t magically fix it either. They control the client codebase and distribution (app stores, updates), so backdooring it to snag plaintext pre-encryption is trivial—it’s basically a built-in supply chain vuln they own. Point is, E2EE only “protects” against server-side compromise if you assume the client is golden, which loops back to trusting the provider not to mess with it. If they’re bad actors, they can (and govts do compel them to) inject client-side leaks (again, see Australia’s TOLA Act forcing software mods), or historical cases like Lavabit’s key handover pressure. In trusted-provider scenarios (which is most users’ reality), client/server + TLS + encrypted storage suffices against external threats, with less complexity than E2EE’s multi-device key mgmt headaches. If distrust is total, bail! Because neither model’s your friend. Supply chain worries aren’t a distraction; they’re the real vector, as SolarWinds and Jia Tanning of xz remind us. E2EE’s great tech, but you are pretending that it is a cure-all, which ignores practical realities.
- j45 1y agoIt's weird that you can delete a message for you and for the other person too. I doubt client-server is the only way to accomplish this.