19 ms·

The author seems to be more interested in the past than in the present or the future. They must've been rereading Clausewitz as Russia was turning Bakhmut, Vovc

by iammjm 1y ago

The author seems to be more interested in the past than in the present or the future. They must've been rereading Clausewitz as Russia was turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble. They speak of some abstract "urban warfare", where "Every strike is a message, every misstep a liability", where the reality is basically a grid-like approach of how to deliver as much kinetic energy per square kilometer as efficiently as possible. I have a sense that articles like these is why a lot of people think the "academics" are completely disconnected from the reality.

falcor84 1y ago
What? The latter part discusses the current battles of Kyiv and Gaza in some depth.
- iammjm 1y ago
  Choosing Kyiv as an example of a modern urban warfare is really weird, as there wasn't really much urban fighting at all (with the exception of some Russian saboteur groups in Kyiv), since the main Russian army didn't even make it into the city because their logistics got blown up in the outskirts. Also, we are talking about the most technologically advanced war that ever took place, where the iteration cycles are measured with weeks. The Russo-Ukrainian war of the beginning of 2022 looked very different from what it currently is. For the actual modern urban warfare see the cities I mentioned.
  - falcor84 1y ago
    Thanks for the clarification. Yes, I absolutely agree that this analysis was lacking. I would then ask you about your mention of: > turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble Leaving aside the horrible ethics. Would you say that this was an intentional strategic approach by the Russian leaders, as a mechanism of avoiding the difficulty of urban warfare, or an unintended side-effect of trying to conduct urban warfare?
    - iammjm 1y ago
      I think they just lack the sophistication to do it any other way. According to their own doctrine, they should be trying to flank and encircle a city, cut off enemy logistics and reinforcements, and suffocate the defenders. But in most cases they were unable to to do, so they just default to pure destruction. It's just simpler to bomb everything that could shelter Ukrainian defenders. Russian artillery and aviation is not really known for their precision. There is nothing surgical about their approach. They are just throwing tons and tons of explosives at urban centers until they are stopped or there is nothing left to bomb. I think the siege of Mariupol was the only somewhat successful Russian urban operation in this war.
jcranmer 1y ago
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the mini-case studies analyzed in the piece, specifically for its note that Russia's disregard for Clausewitzian principles has failed to bring it meaningful success. It should also be noted that, objectively, Russia's war has not been a success. It also has not been a failure, except in the grand strategic sense of provoking the realignment and reinvigorating of NATO it was meant to prevent.
- rzwitserloot 1y ago
  That sounds like "the leg amputation operation was a success, other than the fact that the patient died on the operating table". That "except" is doing rather a lot of heavy lifting. I have absolutely no idea what Russia was expecting from their three day special military operation, currently on 3 years, 7 months, and 2 weeks. But surely whatever they were thinking, if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window (or be 'helped' out of them, as appears to be a popular pastime in Moscow this decade). This has to be on the levels quite near 'worst than our worst case scenario'. I think Von clausewitz's revenge on the russian plan for Ukraine hasn't even begun yet. If Russia ends up wanting to turn lands they currently occupy in lands they annexed (a land that is productive and well on its way to just being culturally subsumed), the cost of that operation will be even larger than the astronomical cost they are paying to gain them: Their utter disregard for Clausewitzian planning means it'll be one heck of an insurgency. Unfortunately, Russia is one of the most ruthless countries in this regard and will simply massively replace the population, starve it out, or otherwise eliminate any odds of low morale amongst the populace or active insurgency by simply replacing the entire population. But that also destroys all inherent economic productivity other than natural resources. Russia already has plenty of land and plenty of resources; what they need is more people in general and productive, creative members of society in particular, neither of which you can make happen by starving a population that hates you for how you fought that war and still holds out hope they can drive you out.
  - mamonster 1y ago
    >if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window Debatable. The war itself is basically a massively failure, but it completely stabilized the regime. Whereas 5 years ago there were clear questions about what would happen after Putin died, ZOV-logic is enough to power the regime for the next 10 years. 20 years of careful building of liberal oppositions by highlighting corruption is now out of the window. FBK, Kats, Volkov, etc are now all abroad with no chance to return; literally no one gives a fuck about corruption that's not military related. The new "liberal" party that replaced Navalniy & Co (Noviye Lyudi) is basically only liberal in economics. The only thing that will decide if Russia ends up winning or losing in the long term is whether the "Pivot to Asia" strategy that they basically were forced to take will end up working.
jimbohn 1y ago
The reality of Bakhmut is one of failure, massive time and resources used, which led to an attempted coup

by iammjm 1y ago

falcor84 1y ago

What? The latter part discusses the current battles of Kyiv and Gaza in some depth.

iammjm 1y ago
Choosing Kyiv as an example of a modern urban warfare is really weird, as there wasn't really much urban fighting at all (with the exception of some Russian saboteur groups in Kyiv), since the main Russian army didn't even make it into the city because their logistics got blown up in the outskirts. Also, we are talking about the most technologically advanced war that ever took place, where the iteration cycles are measured with weeks. The Russo-Ukrainian war of the beginning of 2022 looked very different from what it currently is. For the actual modern urban warfare see the cities I mentioned.
- falcor84 1y ago
  Thanks for the clarification. Yes, I absolutely agree that this analysis was lacking. I would then ask you about your mention of: > turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble Leaving aside the horrible ethics. Would you say that this was an intentional strategic approach by the Russian leaders, as a mechanism of avoiding the difficulty of urban warfare, or an unintended side-effect of trying to conduct urban warfare?
  - iammjm 1y ago
    I think they just lack the sophistication to do it any other way. According to their own doctrine, they should be trying to flank and encircle a city, cut off enemy logistics and reinforcements, and suffocate the defenders. But in most cases they were unable to to do, so they just default to pure destruction. It's just simpler to bomb everything that could shelter Ukrainian defenders. Russian artillery and aviation is not really known for their precision. There is nothing surgical about their approach. They are just throwing tons and tons of explosives at urban centers until they are stopped or there is nothing left to bomb. I think the siege of Mariupol was the only somewhat successful Russian urban operation in this war.

jcranmer 1y ago

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the mini-case studies analyzed in the piece, specifically for its note that Russia's disregard for Clausewitzian principles has failed to bring it meaningful success. It should also be noted that, objectively, Russia's war has not been a success. It also has not been a failure, except in the grand strategic sense of provoking the realignment and reinvigorating of NATO it was meant to prevent.

rzwitserloot 1y ago
That sounds like "the leg amputation operation was a success, other than the fact that the patient died on the operating table". That "except" is doing rather a lot of heavy lifting. I have absolutely no idea what Russia was expecting from their three day special military operation, currently on 3 years, 7 months, and 2 weeks. But surely whatever they were thinking, if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window (or be 'helped' out of them, as appears to be a popular pastime in Moscow this decade). This has to be on the levels quite near 'worst than our worst case scenario'. I think Von clausewitz's revenge on the russian plan for Ukraine hasn't even begun yet. If Russia ends up wanting to turn lands they currently occupy in lands they annexed (a land that is productive and well on its way to just being culturally subsumed), the cost of that operation will be even larger than the astronomical cost they are paying to gain them: Their utter disregard for Clausewitzian planning means it'll be one heck of an insurgency. Unfortunately, Russia is one of the most ruthless countries in this regard and will simply massively replace the population, starve it out, or otherwise eliminate any odds of low morale amongst the populace or active insurgency by simply replacing the entire population. But that also destroys all inherent economic productivity other than natural resources. Russia already has plenty of land and plenty of resources; what they need is more people in general and productive, creative members of society in particular, neither of which you can make happen by starving a population that hates you for how you fought that war and still holds out hope they can drive you out.
- mamonster 1y ago
  >if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window Debatable. The war itself is basically a massively failure, but it completely stabilized the regime. Whereas 5 years ago there were clear questions about what would happen after Putin died, ZOV-logic is enough to power the regime for the next 10 years. 20 years of careful building of liberal oppositions by highlighting corruption is now out of the window. FBK, Kats, Volkov, etc are now all abroad with no chance to return; literally no one gives a fuck about corruption that's not military related. The new "liberal" party that replaced Navalniy & Co (Noviye Lyudi) is basically only liberal in economics. The only thing that will decide if Russia ends up winning or losing in the long term is whether the "Pivot to Asia" strategy that they basically were forced to take will end up working.

jimbohn 1y ago

The reality of Bakhmut is one of failure, massive time and resources used, which led to an attempted coup