7 ms·

A Clausewitzian lens on modern urban warfare

iammjm 1y ago
The author seems to be more interested in the past than in the present or the future. They must've been rereading Clausewitz as Russia was turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble. They speak of some abstract "urban warfare", where "Every strike is a message, every misstep a liability", where the reality is basically a grid-like approach of how to deliver as much kinetic energy per square kilometer as efficiently as possible. I have a sense that articles like these is why a lot of people think the "academics" are completely disconnected from the reality.
- falcor84 1y ago
  What? The latter part discusses the current battles of Kyiv and Gaza in some depth.
  - iammjm 1y ago
    Choosing Kyiv as an example of a modern urban warfare is really weird, as there wasn't really much urban fighting at all (with the exception of some Russian saboteur groups in Kyiv), since the main Russian army didn't even make it into the city because their logistics got blown up in the outskirts. Also, we are talking about the most technologically advanced war that ever took place, where the iteration cycles are measured with weeks. The Russo-Ukrainian war of the beginning of 2022 looked very different from what it currently is. For the actual modern urban warfare see the cities I mentioned.
    - falcor84 1y ago
      Thanks for the clarification. Yes, I absolutely agree that this analysis was lacking. I would then ask you about your mention of: > turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble Leaving aside the horrible ethics. Would you say that this was an intentional strategic approach by the Russian leaders, as a mechanism of avoiding the difficulty of urban warfare, or an unintended side-effect of trying to conduct urban warfare?
      - iammjm 1y ago
        I think they just lack the sophistication to do it any other way. According to their own doctrine, they should be trying to flank and encircle a city, cut off enemy logistics and reinforcements, and suffocate the defenders. But in most cases they were unable to to do, so they just default to pure destruction. It's just simpler to bomb everything that could shelter Ukrainian defenders. Russian artillery and aviation is not really known for their precision. There is nothing surgical about their approach. They are just throwing tons and tons of explosives at urban centers until they are stopped or there is nothing left to bomb. I think the siege of Mariupol was the only somewhat successful Russian urban operation in this war.
- jcranmer 1y ago
  Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the mini-case studies analyzed in the piece, specifically for its note that Russia's disregard for Clausewitzian principles has failed to bring it meaningful success. It should also be noted that, objectively, Russia's war has not been a success. It also has not been a failure, except in the grand strategic sense of provoking the realignment and reinvigorating of NATO it was meant to prevent.
  - rzwitserloot 1y ago
    That sounds like "the leg amputation operation was a success, other than the fact that the patient died on the operating table". That "except" is doing rather a lot of heavy lifting. I have absolutely no idea what Russia was expecting from their three day special military operation, currently on 3 years, 7 months, and 2 weeks. But surely whatever they were thinking, if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window (or be 'helped' out of them, as appears to be a popular pastime in Moscow this decade). This has to be on the levels quite near 'worst than our worst case scenario'. I think Von clausewitz's revenge on the russian plan for Ukraine hasn't even begun yet. If Russia ends up wanting to turn lands they currently occupy in lands they annexed (a land that is productive and well on its way to just being culturally subsumed), the cost of that operation will be even larger than the astronomical cost they are paying to gain them: Their utter disregard for Clausewitzian planning means it'll be one heck of an insurgency. Unfortunately, Russia is one of the most ruthless countries in this regard and will simply massively replace the population, starve it out, or otherwise eliminate any odds of low morale amongst the populace or active insurgency by simply replacing the entire population. But that also destroys all inherent economic productivity other than natural resources. Russia already has plenty of land and plenty of resources; what they need is more people in general and productive, creative members of society in particular, neither of which you can make happen by starving a population that hates you for how you fought that war and still holds out hope they can drive you out.
    - mamonster 1y ago
      >if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window Debatable. The war itself is basically a massively failure, but it completely stabilized the regime. Whereas 5 years ago there were clear questions about what would happen after Putin died, ZOV-logic is enough to power the regime for the next 10 years. 20 years of careful building of liberal oppositions by highlighting corruption is now out of the window. FBK, Kats, Volkov, etc are now all abroad with no chance to return; literally no one gives a fuck about corruption that's not military related. The new "liberal" party that replaced Navalniy & Co (Noviye Lyudi) is basically only liberal in economics. The only thing that will decide if Russia ends up winning or losing in the long term is whether the "Pivot to Asia" strategy that they basically were forced to take will end up working.
- jimbohn 1y ago
  The reality of Bakhmut is one of failure, massive time and resources used, which led to an attempted coup
WillAdams 1y ago
This line: >Tactical brilliance could not guarantee strategic clarity—and each gain came at political and moral cost. sums up what is wrong with modern conflict --- the abandonment of the moral high ground and a failure to take into account the will of people and their right to self-determination which Jomini (who had displaced Clausewitz after his inculcation at West Point as part of the brutal lessens the U.S. learned in Vietnam) failed to consider, and which Clausewitz took to heart and studied deeply, and thought long on. It wasn't that long ago that the collapse of the Soviet Union was viewed as "the end of history" and a global acknowledgement that liberal democracy was the means of government most widely accepted --- hopefully articles such as this will be a guidepost to getting back on that track --- every moral failure simply recruits others to fight on the opposite side.
- lazide 1y ago
  [flagged]
  - WillAdams 1y ago
    An Islamic belief which can be worked with would be the mainstream liberal views which were gaining currency in Iran and Iraq back before the Shah and the Ba'athists. Regimes which do not accord basic rights to all citizens, including women should simply be ignored until such time as they do, no matter how much oil they have.
    - lazide 1y ago
      [flagged]
      - snapcaster 1y ago
        So is the vast majority of secular western society according to hardline christian religion. I think what poster you're replying to is implicitly saying is just that religious institutions have to weakened and "tamed"
falcor84 1y ago
I appreciated the historical context, but was disappointed that it seemed to fizzle to nothing at the end, just circling around "Urban warfare is messy; bummer". I mean, I was hoping that it could offer at least the basics of a strategy for any of Russia, Ukraine, Hamas or Israel to achieve a decisive victory, but couldn't find any. My mind kept yelling "What would Clausewitz do in this situation?" but left at empty-handed as I was at the start. It actually had the gall to finish with: > Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly ... I'm pretty sure that a checklist for success would have been more valuable.
- KnuthIsGod 1y ago
  A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves.
  - falcor84 1y ago
    Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ..."). Quoting again from the author's closing remarks: > Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.
    - lukan 1y ago
      "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?" It simply depends. No situation is unique. Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.
deleted 1y ago
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ckemere 1y ago
In the case of the active conflicts (Gaza, Ukraine), it seems that there is a strong disconnect between internal-facing media and political will and external facing media on potential allies. I would have liked some more unpacking of how this disconnect would have been interpreted by Clausewitz. It also struck me that as an outsider to these conflicts, I assume that the combatants are acting rationally from the perspective of the adage (“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it“) and I judge the morality based on the inferred intent. That would also have been interesting to unpack…
Jimmy-Corleone 1y ago
Our "government" ( who ever "our" pertains to within the US) has been lied always lied and will continuing on lying to the people within the American society.... But so long as the people accept They will continuing on doing
mamonster 1y ago
> Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. If I learned anything from both Gaza and Ukraine, it's that its the complete opposite that's true. You go clearing from house to house, some AQB fighter is gonna pop-out of a tunnel and pop an IED into your Merkava tank. You do that enough times and your army's morale is going to be shot. You wanna win, you have to bomb dual use assets and only fight when its needed. If you can do a hunger siege, flood by bombing a dam or something else, then do that.
- pjc50 1y ago
  "make a desert and call it peace". There's still two million people in Gaza.
  - jedimind 1y ago
    [flagged]
- TheCoelacanth 1y ago
  You are just giving an example of how lack of "coherence between means and ends" leads to failure. A military occupation (means) is not an effective way to achieve lasting control over the civilian population (ends) unless much of the population is already on your side, so it is foolish to try to use those means to achieve those ends. Russia has also been hurt quite badly by lack of moral restraint in the war against Ukraine (which in the context Clausewitz used it I believe means more whether you have rational control of your actions than whether your actions are "good" or "bad"). Attacking civilians is usually extremely ineffective at achieving anything other than making leaders feel good that they are hurting their enemies and usually just hardens the enemy's resolve to continue fighting.
  - aerostable_slug 1y ago
    I think Russia has been quite restrained. I'm not defending them in any way, but many Ukrainians still have electric power, running water, and other trappings of modern society. If the present Russian regime chose otherwise I'm not sure that they would. It doesn't take a great deal of precision to mission-kill water works and other civil infrastructure that has survived in rear areas. It seems to me both sides have been sending signals with their respective attacks on 'homeland' targets, rather than going fully gloves-off. Agreed that it's not working out for the Russians.
vonnik 1y ago
I found this to be a remarkably uninsightful work. He somehow negates the inherent drama of war with the milquetoast prose and myopia of an academic. Much of what he says is in fact false, presumably because he is far from the action and relies on Clausewitz as a crutch for thought. The key nodes to control have to do with supply chain, energy and information; ie depots, road and rail, bridges, factories, substations and data centers or satellites. Ukraine has severely weakened Russia by attacking those points, as Russia has Ukraine. Beijing could well defeat Taiwan (and the US by proxy) by controlling its sea lanes, cutting its cables, and jamming its radio spectrum.
- deleted 1y ago
  [deleted]
- nradov 1y ago
  China might be able to blockade Taiwan for a while but China's own SLOC are far more vulnerable. They are dependent on critical food, energy, and mineral imports — most of which pass through a few choke points where they are still unable to project sustained naval power. The US and its allies could cut those off at any time and China lacks the internal reserves to survive a long blockade.
  - vonnik 1y ago
    It sounds like we agree on the larger strategic point. The PRC seems to be doing a good job building out its energy infra, fwiw. And it shares a massive land border with an ally and energy producer.
- red-iron-pine 1y ago
  > I found this to be a remarkably uninsightful work. aye. it read like 2008 "hearts and minds" claptrap about capturing but also protecting a population. it would be totally ignorable if it didn't have whiffs of "we're going to occupy American cities now, too"
maxglute 1y ago
Manufacturing consent for war is important, news at 11. Snark aside, it's getting harder to generate moral high ground to maintain the facade of LIO supremecy. The problem with modern American imperialism (and European colonialism) is it's hard to sell to your (multicultural) people we need to to sacrifice blood and treasure to remove/occupy bad/inferior people on the other side of the world. More after decades of mass media recognizing you're actually sacrificing blood and treasure to collateral damage a bunch of civilians. More so when the spoils of war seems meagre relative to cost, and all the resources prosecuting one could have been focused on domestic serenity. Clausewitz (mostly) lived in a context of fighting for survival/dominance against neighbours, which I guess is apt for RU/UK, ISR/GAZA discussed in this article but the actual belligerants in either war are less sustained by morality / or need moral cover as realist interest. Who needs moral cover is however their sponsors, and really we're talking about US+co who needs to convince constitutents of the moral cause to support proxy wars, instead of just admitting: we get to cripple RU by sacrificing UKR, or keeping MENA influence is worth starving and killing tons of kids.
- intensevaulter 1y ago
  Are we now seeing belligerents changing military strategies to ones that will make manufacturing consent difficult? As in, traditionally adopting tactics that lead to civilian casualties is a trade-off between increased effectiveness and damage to the populous. However can we say that now both aspects are positive because sympathetic victimhood makes it difficult to support a proxy war? Is this the way both fronts are fought at once in modern war?
  - maxglute 1y ago
    Are you asking if deliberately dialing up collateral damage to make politically supporting proxy wars more difficult? I think that has always happened, i.e. battle of shanghai when chinese fought japanese in international quarters to influence global sentiment. TBH I don't know how well that works as primary effect, most don't care enough to object to proxy wars unless it effects their material conditions, as long as they're not suffering direct casualties hence US optmize force structure to reduce casualities for direct interventions. Every political structure pretty good at placating restive antiwar voices by now, i.e. GOTW lasted forever despite protests, and GAZA could too. The most vocal reason plebs repeat for pulling UKR support is strategic stockpile/$$$. Arguably IMO same with GOTW, all the protests didn't matter until planners realized COIN was taking too much resource from highend IndoPac fight (China). TLDR sympathetic victim hood is a wedge that raises costs of manufacturing consent. But at end of the day it's actual, material and strategic costs that change support. And yes while modern media increase velocity and volume of dead baby pictures, what we see is countries would rather burn their reputation / moral standing first.
wolvesechoes 1y ago
There is quite obvious reason that Israel does what it does - commiting an equivalent of mass child sacrifice is quite good at uniting Israelis even if lot of them protest against that. If you are hated by everyone outside your tribe, you will stick with your tribe, because you have lost other options.
themafia 1y ago
> “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.” If _and only if_ War is utilized as a last resort. Otherwise this is self serving nonsense used by the political class which utilizes war to orient the population and to maintain a dark and grotesque part of our economy. It's 2025. Institutions like the "Modern War Institute" not just existing but also pumping out this outdated amoral claptrap is obscenely depressing.
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago
  > If _and only if_ War is utilized as a last resort Nope, always. War is politics by violent memes. Pretending it is only used in the last case is incredibly dangerous, since it ignores both provocation and deterrence.
  - themafia 1y ago
    Then that's not "political intercourse." I understand that war is not actually used as described in the quote. Which is the point. These military ideas of war are romantic fantasies. Although I'm sure the victims of all the holocausts in human history will be heartened to know that it was just politics by a different means.
    - JumpCrisscross 1y ago
      > that's not "political intercourse" The full phrase is "the political intercourse of Governments and nations" [1]. Clausewitz's point is that if "such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own," then not only does international law become irrelevant, but diplomatic resolutions to war impossible. Rejecting that war is a continuation of politics underwrites atrocity. (If war only happens as a last resort, and you are at war, it follows that you've exhasuted all non-military avenues to ending the war.) > These military ideas of war are romantic fantasies Clausewitz wasn't a military romanticist. To the extent here are romantic ideals at play, it's in pretending war isn't a continuation of politics. > I'm sure the victims of all the holocausts in human history will be heartened Why is this relevant to the correctness of the theory? Should we reject the heat-death hypothsis because it's uncomfortable? I've already argued why rejecting war as a continuation of politics rejects diplomacy as a way to end wars. The Third Reich is a good demonstrator for why rejecting the political component of war is dangerous on the other end. Appeasing Hitler makes sense if parties will only pursue war as a last resort. Acknowledging his political interests, on the other hand, would have shown why--in that case--appeasement was destabilising. [1] https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK8ch06.html https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK8ch06...
golem14 1y ago
<snark> Well, according to this, maybe the US cities have nothing to fear from the troops sicked onto them by the current administration. Seeing that a clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint are a sine qua non for success here. </snark>
unraveller 1y ago
Take a city. Take two.
themadturk 1y ago
So much Clausewitz, so little drinking.

The author seems to be more interested in the past than in the present or the future. They must've been rereading Clausewitz as Russia was turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble. They speak of some abstract "urban warfare", where "Every strike is a message, every misstep a liability", where the reality is basically a grid-like approach of how to deliver as much kinetic energy per square kilometer as efficiently as possible. I have a sense that articles like these is why a lot of people think the "academics" are completely disconnected from the reality.

falcor84 1y ago
What? The latter part discusses the current battles of Kyiv and Gaza in some depth.
- iammjm 1y ago
  Choosing Kyiv as an example of a modern urban warfare is really weird, as there wasn't really much urban fighting at all (with the exception of some Russian saboteur groups in Kyiv), since the main Russian army didn't even make it into the city because their logistics got blown up in the outskirts. Also, we are talking about the most technologically advanced war that ever took place, where the iteration cycles are measured with weeks. The Russo-Ukrainian war of the beginning of 2022 looked very different from what it currently is. For the actual modern urban warfare see the cities I mentioned.
  - falcor84 1y ago
    Thanks for the clarification. Yes, I absolutely agree that this analysis was lacking. I would then ask you about your mention of: > turning Bakhmut, Vovchansk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar et al. to _literal_ rubble Leaving aside the horrible ethics. Would you say that this was an intentional strategic approach by the Russian leaders, as a mechanism of avoiding the difficulty of urban warfare, or an unintended side-effect of trying to conduct urban warfare?
    - iammjm 1y ago
      I think they just lack the sophistication to do it any other way. According to their own doctrine, they should be trying to flank and encircle a city, cut off enemy logistics and reinforcements, and suffocate the defenders. But in most cases they were unable to to do, so they just default to pure destruction. It's just simpler to bomb everything that could shelter Ukrainian defenders. Russian artillery and aviation is not really known for their precision. There is nothing surgical about their approach. They are just throwing tons and tons of explosives at urban centers until they are stopped or there is nothing left to bomb. I think the siege of Mariupol was the only somewhat successful Russian urban operation in this war.
jcranmer 1y ago
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is one of the mini-case studies analyzed in the piece, specifically for its note that Russia's disregard for Clausewitzian principles has failed to bring it meaningful success. It should also be noted that, objectively, Russia's war has not been a success. It also has not been a failure, except in the grand strategic sense of provoking the realignment and reinvigorating of NATO it was meant to prevent.
- rzwitserloot 1y ago
  That sounds like "the leg amputation operation was a success, other than the fact that the patient died on the operating table". That "except" is doing rather a lot of heavy lifting. I have absolutely no idea what Russia was expecting from their three day special military operation, currently on 3 years, 7 months, and 2 weeks. But surely whatever they were thinking, if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window (or be 'helped' out of them, as appears to be a popular pastime in Moscow this decade). This has to be on the levels quite near 'worst than our worst case scenario'. I think Von clausewitz's revenge on the russian plan for Ukraine hasn't even begun yet. If Russia ends up wanting to turn lands they currently occupy in lands they annexed (a land that is productive and well on its way to just being culturally subsumed), the cost of that operation will be even larger than the astronomical cost they are paying to gain them: Their utter disregard for Clausewitzian planning means it'll be one heck of an insurgency. Unfortunately, Russia is one of the most ruthless countries in this regard and will simply massively replace the population, starve it out, or otherwise eliminate any odds of low morale amongst the populace or active insurgency by simply replacing the entire population. But that also destroys all inherent economic productivity other than natural resources. Russia already has plenty of land and plenty of resources; what they need is more people in general and productive, creative members of society in particular, neither of which you can make happen by starving a population that hates you for how you fought that war and still holds out hope they can drive you out.
  - mamonster 1y ago
    >if I could go back in time and paint them a picture of how the situation is today, they'd jump out the window Debatable. The war itself is basically a massively failure, but it completely stabilized the regime. Whereas 5 years ago there were clear questions about what would happen after Putin died, ZOV-logic is enough to power the regime for the next 10 years. 20 years of careful building of liberal oppositions by highlighting corruption is now out of the window. FBK, Kats, Volkov, etc are now all abroad with no chance to return; literally no one gives a fuck about corruption that's not military related. The new "liberal" party that replaced Navalniy & Co (Noviye Lyudi) is basically only liberal in economics. The only thing that will decide if Russia ends up winning or losing in the long term is whether the "Pivot to Asia" strategy that they basically were forced to take will end up working.
jimbohn 1y ago
The reality of Bakhmut is one of failure, massive time and resources used, which led to an attempted coup

WillAdams 1y ago

This line: >Tactical brilliance could not guarantee strategic clarity—and each gain came at political and moral cost. sums up what is wrong with modern conflict --- the abandonment of the moral high ground and a failure to take into account the will of people and their right to self-determination which Jomini (who had displaced Clausewitz after his inculcation at West Point as part of the brutal lessens the U.S. learned in Vietnam) failed to consider, and which Clausewitz took to heart and studied deeply, and thought long on. It wasn't that long ago that the collapse of the Soviet Union was viewed as "the end of history" and a global acknowledgement that liberal democracy was the means of government most widely accepted --- hopefully articles such as this will be a guidepost to getting back on that track --- every moral failure simply recruits others to fight on the opposite side.

lazide 1y ago
[flagged]
- WillAdams 1y ago
  An Islamic belief which can be worked with would be the mainstream liberal views which were gaining currency in Iran and Iraq back before the Shah and the Ba'athists. Regimes which do not accord basic rights to all citizens, including women should simply be ignored until such time as they do, no matter how much oil they have.
  - lazide 1y ago
    [flagged]
    - snapcaster 1y ago
      So is the vast majority of secular western society according to hardline christian religion. I think what poster you're replying to is implicitly saying is just that religious institutions have to weakened and "tamed"

falcor84 1y ago

I appreciated the historical context, but was disappointed that it seemed to fizzle to nothing at the end, just circling around "Urban warfare is messy; bummer". I mean, I was hoping that it could offer at least the basics of a strategy for any of Russia, Ukraine, Hamas or Israel to achieve a decisive victory, but couldn't find any. My mind kept yelling "What would Clausewitz do in this situation?" but left at empty-handed as I was at the start. It actually had the gall to finish with: > Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly ... I'm pretty sure that a checklist for success would have been more valuable.

KnuthIsGod 1y ago
A checklist approach to strategy is only useful if your adversaries are foolish enough to use a checklist themselves.
- falcor84 1y ago
  Well, yes, a "checklist" (his word) might be too much of a strawman, but what would be useful would be a strategy in the game theoretical sense - a decision mechanism of actions conditional on different situations (e.g. "If the enemy is hiding in a network of tunnel under civilian population, you should wait until ... and then randomly ..., but if they ... then reverse course and instead ..."). Quoting again from the author's closing remarks: > Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. But that's so vague that I can't help but again yell "But what is decisive?!", "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?". It's almost astrology in how it doesn't say anything objectionable.
  - lukan 1y ago
    "What should the commanders/politicians do in practice?" It simply depends. No situation is unique. Israels strategy towards tunnels for example is to blow up and level everything. Ukraine does not deem that acceptable to the russian tunnels inside Ukraine.

deleted 1y ago

[deleted]

ckemere 1y ago

In the case of the active conflicts (Gaza, Ukraine), it seems that there is a strong disconnect between internal-facing media and political will and external facing media on potential allies. I would have liked some more unpacking of how this disconnect would have been interpreted by Clausewitz. It also struck me that as an outsider to these conflicts, I assume that the combatants are acting rationally from the perspective of the adage (“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it“) and I judge the morality based on the inferred intent. That would also have been interesting to unpack…

Jimmy-Corleone 1y ago

Our "government" ( who ever "our" pertains to within the US) has been lied always lied and will continuing on lying to the people within the American society.... But so long as the people accept They will continuing on doing

mamonster 1y ago

> Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive. If I learned anything from both Gaza and Ukraine, it's that its the complete opposite that's true. You go clearing from house to house, some AQB fighter is gonna pop-out of a tunnel and pop an IED into your Merkava tank. You do that enough times and your army's morale is going to be shot. You wanna win, you have to bomb dual use assets and only fight when its needed. If you can do a hunger siege, flood by bombing a dam or something else, then do that.

pjc50 1y ago
"make a desert and call it peace". There's still two million people in Gaza.
- jedimind 1y ago
  [flagged]
TheCoelacanth 1y ago
You are just giving an example of how lack of "coherence between means and ends" leads to failure. A military occupation (means) is not an effective way to achieve lasting control over the civilian population (ends) unless much of the population is already on your side, so it is foolish to try to use those means to achieve those ends. Russia has also been hurt quite badly by lack of moral restraint in the war against Ukraine (which in the context Clausewitz used it I believe means more whether you have rational control of your actions than whether your actions are "good" or "bad"). Attacking civilians is usually extremely ineffective at achieving anything other than making leaders feel good that they are hurting their enemies and usually just hardens the enemy's resolve to continue fighting.
- aerostable_slug 1y ago
  I think Russia has been quite restrained. I'm not defending them in any way, but many Ukrainians still have electric power, running water, and other trappings of modern society. If the present Russian regime chose otherwise I'm not sure that they would. It doesn't take a great deal of precision to mission-kill water works and other civil infrastructure that has survived in rear areas. It seems to me both sides have been sending signals with their respective attacks on 'homeland' targets, rather than going fully gloves-off. Agreed that it's not working out for the Russians.

vonnik 1y ago

I found this to be a remarkably uninsightful work. He somehow negates the inherent drama of war with the milquetoast prose and myopia of an academic. Much of what he says is in fact false, presumably because he is far from the action and relies on Clausewitz as a crutch for thought. The key nodes to control have to do with supply chain, energy and information; ie depots, road and rail, bridges, factories, substations and data centers or satellites. Ukraine has severely weakened Russia by attacking those points, as Russia has Ukraine. Beijing could well defeat Taiwan (and the US by proxy) by controlling its sea lanes, cutting its cables, and jamming its radio spectrum.

deleted 1y ago
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nradov 1y ago
China might be able to blockade Taiwan for a while but China's own SLOC are far more vulnerable. They are dependent on critical food, energy, and mineral imports — most of which pass through a few choke points where they are still unable to project sustained naval power. The US and its allies could cut those off at any time and China lacks the internal reserves to survive a long blockade.
- vonnik 1y ago
  It sounds like we agree on the larger strategic point. The PRC seems to be doing a good job building out its energy infra, fwiw. And it shares a massive land border with an ally and energy producer.
red-iron-pine 1y ago
> I found this to be a remarkably uninsightful work. aye. it read like 2008 "hearts and minds" claptrap about capturing but also protecting a population. it would be totally ignorable if it didn't have whiffs of "we're going to occupy American cities now, too"

maxglute 1y ago

Manufacturing consent for war is important, news at 11. Snark aside, it's getting harder to generate moral high ground to maintain the facade of LIO supremecy. The problem with modern American imperialism (and European colonialism) is it's hard to sell to your (multicultural) people we need to to sacrifice blood and treasure to remove/occupy bad/inferior people on the other side of the world. More after decades of mass media recognizing you're actually sacrificing blood and treasure to collateral damage a bunch of civilians. More so when the spoils of war seems meagre relative to cost, and all the resources prosecuting one could have been focused on domestic serenity. Clausewitz (mostly) lived in a context of fighting for survival/dominance against neighbours, which I guess is apt for RU/UK, ISR/GAZA discussed in this article but the actual belligerants in either war are less sustained by morality / or need moral cover as realist interest. Who needs moral cover is however their sponsors, and really we're talking about US+co who needs to convince constitutents of the moral cause to support proxy wars, instead of just admitting: we get to cripple RU by sacrificing UKR, or keeping MENA influence is worth starving and killing tons of kids.

intensevaulter 1y ago
Are we now seeing belligerents changing military strategies to ones that will make manufacturing consent difficult? As in, traditionally adopting tactics that lead to civilian casualties is a trade-off between increased effectiveness and damage to the populous. However can we say that now both aspects are positive because sympathetic victimhood makes it difficult to support a proxy war? Is this the way both fronts are fought at once in modern war?
- maxglute 1y ago
  Are you asking if deliberately dialing up collateral damage to make politically supporting proxy wars more difficult? I think that has always happened, i.e. battle of shanghai when chinese fought japanese in international quarters to influence global sentiment. TBH I don't know how well that works as primary effect, most don't care enough to object to proxy wars unless it effects their material conditions, as long as they're not suffering direct casualties hence US optmize force structure to reduce casualities for direct interventions. Every political structure pretty good at placating restive antiwar voices by now, i.e. GOTW lasted forever despite protests, and GAZA could too. The most vocal reason plebs repeat for pulling UKR support is strategic stockpile/$$$. Arguably IMO same with GOTW, all the protests didn't matter until planners realized COIN was taking too much resource from highend IndoPac fight (China). TLDR sympathetic victim hood is a wedge that raises costs of manufacturing consent. But at end of the day it's actual, material and strategic costs that change support. And yes while modern media increase velocity and volume of dead baby pictures, what we see is countries would rather burn their reputation / moral standing first.

wolvesechoes 1y ago

There is quite obvious reason that Israel does what it does - commiting an equivalent of mass child sacrifice is quite good at uniting Israelis even if lot of them protest against that. If you are hated by everyone outside your tribe, you will stick with your tribe, because you have lost other options.

themafia 1y ago

> “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.” If _and only if_ War is utilized as a last resort. Otherwise this is self serving nonsense used by the political class which utilizes war to orient the population and to maintain a dark and grotesque part of our economy. It's 2025. Institutions like the "Modern War Institute" not just existing but also pumping out this outdated amoral claptrap is obscenely depressing.

JumpCrisscross 1y ago
> If _and only if_ War is utilized as a last resort Nope, always. War is politics by violent memes. Pretending it is only used in the last case is incredibly dangerous, since it ignores both provocation and deterrence.
- themafia 1y ago
  Then that's not "political intercourse." I understand that war is not actually used as described in the quote. Which is the point. These military ideas of war are romantic fantasies. Although I'm sure the victims of all the holocausts in human history will be heartened to know that it was just politics by a different means.
  - JumpCrisscross 1y ago
    > that's not "political intercourse" The full phrase is "the political intercourse of Governments and nations" [1]. Clausewitz's point is that if "such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own," then not only does international law become irrelevant, but diplomatic resolutions to war impossible. Rejecting that war is a continuation of politics underwrites atrocity. (If war only happens as a last resort, and you are at war, it follows that you've exhasuted all non-military avenues to ending the war.) > These military ideas of war are romantic fantasies Clausewitz wasn't a military romanticist. To the extent here are romantic ideals at play, it's in pretending war isn't a continuation of politics. > I'm sure the victims of all the holocausts in human history will be heartened Why is this relevant to the correctness of the theory? Should we reject the heat-death hypothsis because it's uncomfortable? I've already argued why rejecting war as a continuation of politics rejects diplomacy as a way to end wars. The Third Reich is a good demonstrator for why rejecting the political component of war is dangerous on the other end. Appeasing Hitler makes sense if parties will only pursue war as a last resort. Acknowledging his political interests, on the other hand, would have shown why--in that case--appeasement was destabilising. [1] https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK8ch06.html https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK8ch06...

golem14 1y ago

<snark> Well, according to this, maybe the US cities have nothing to fear from the troops sicked onto them by the current administration. Seeing that a clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint are a sine qua non for success here. </snark>

unraveller 1y ago

Take a city. Take two.

themadturk 1y ago

So much Clausewitz, so little drinking.