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> are they really learning to reason, or are they just learning to pattern match to steer generation in the direction of problem-specific reasoning steps that t

> are they really learning to reason, or are they just learning to pattern match to steer generation in the direction of problem-specific reasoning steps that they had been trained on? Are you sure there's a real difference? Do you have a definition of "reasoning" that excludes this?

freejazz 1y ago
It seems readily apparent there is a difference given their inability to do tasks we would otherwise reasonably describe as achievable via basic reasoning on the same facts.
- naasking 1y ago
  I agree LLMs have many differences in abilities relative to humans. I'm not sure what this implies for their ability to reason though. I'm not even sure what examples about their bad reasoning can prove about the presence or absence of any kind of "reasoning", which is why I keep asking for definitions to remove the ambiguity. If examples of bad reasoning sufficed, then this would prove that humans can't reason either, which is silly. A rigourous definition of "reasoning" is challenging though, which is why people consistently can't provide a general one that's satisfactory when I ask, and this is why I'm skeptical that pattern matching isn't a big part of it. Arguments that LLMs are "just pattern matching" are thus not persuasive arguments that they are not "reasoning" at some cruder level. Maybe humans are just higher order pattern matchers and LLMs are only first or second-order pattern matchers. Maybe first-order pattern matching shouldn't count as "reasoning", but should second-order? Third-order? Is there evidence or some proof that LLMs couldn't be trained to be higher order pattern matchers, even in principle? None of the arguments or evidence I've seen about LLMs and reasoning is rigourous or persuasive on these questions.
  - freejazz 1y ago
    Nothing about the uncertainty of the definition for 'reasoning' requires that pattern matching be part of the definition.
    - naasking 1y ago
      Did someone in this thread claim that?
gwd 1y ago
So I do think there are two distinct types of activities involved in knowledge work: 1. Taking established techniques or concepts and appropriately applying them to novel situations. 2. Inventing or synthesizing new, never-before-seen techniques or concepts The vast majority of the time, humans do #1. LLMs certainly do this in some contexts as well, as demonstrated by my example above. This to me counts as "understanding" and "thinking". Some people define "understanding" such that it's something only humans can do; to which I respond, I don't care what you call it, it's useful. Can LLMs do #2? I don't know. They've got such extensive experience that how would you know if they'd invented a technique vs had seen it somewhere? But I'd venture to argue that most humans never or rarely do #2.
- HarHarVeryFunny 1y ago
  > But I'd venture to argue that most humans never or rarely do #2. That seems fair, although the distinction between synthesizing something new and combining existing techniques is a bit blurry. What's missing from LLMs though is really part of 1). If techniques A, B, C & D are all the tools you need to solve a novel problem, then a human has the capability of learning WHEN to use each of these tools, and in what order/combination, to solve that problem - a process of trial and error, generalization and exception, etc. It's not just the techniques (bag of tools) you need, but also the rules (acquired knowledge) of how they can be used to solve different problems. LLMs aren't able to learn at runtime from their own experience, so the only way they can learn these rules of when to apply given tools (aka reasoning steps) - is by RL training on how they have been successfully used to solve a range of problems in the training data. So, the LLM may have learnt that in specific context it should first apply tool A (generate that reasoning step), etc, etc, but that doesn't help it to solve a novel problem where the same solution step selection process doesn't apply, even if the tools A-D are all it needs (if only it could learn how to apply them to this novel problem).
HarHarVeryFunny 1y ago
I define intelligence as prediction (degree of ability to use past experience to correctly predict future action outcomes), and reasoning/planning as multi-step what-if prediction. Certainly if a human (or some AI) has learned to predict/reason over some domain, then what they will be doing is pattern matching to determine the generalizations and exceptions that apply in a given context (including a hypothetical context in a what-if reasoning chain), in order to be able to select a next step that worked before. However, I think what we're really talking about here isn't the mechanics of applying learnt reasoning (context pattern matching), but rather the ability to reason in the general case, which requires the ability to LEARN to solve novel problems, which is what is missing from LLMs. A system that has a fixed set of (reasoning/prediction) rules, but can't learn new ones for itself, seems better regarded as an expert system. We need to make the distinction between a system that can only apply rules, and one that can actually figure out the rules in the first place. In terms of my definitions of intelligence and reasoning, based around ability to use past experience to learn to predict, then any system that can't learn from fresh experience doesn't meet that definition. Of course in humans and other intelligent animals the distinction between past and ongoing experience doesn't apply since they can learn continually and incrementally (something that is lacking from LLMs), so for AI we need to use a different vocabulary, and "expert system" seems the obvious label for something that can use rules, but not discover them for itself.
- naasking 1y ago
  > but rather the ability to reason in the general case, which requires the ability to LEARN to solve novel problems, which is what is missing from LLMs. I don't think it's missing, zero shot prompting is quite successful in many cases. Maybe you find the extent that LLMs can do this to be too limited, but I'm not sure that means they don't reason at all. > A system that has a fixed set of (reasoning/prediction) rules, but can't learn new ones for itself, seems better regarded as an expert system. I think expert systems are a lot more limited than LLMs, so I don't agree with that classification. LLMs can generate output that's out of distribution, for instance, which is not something that's classic expert systems can do (even if you think LLM OOD is still limited compared to humans). I've elaborated in another comment [1] what I think part of the real issue is, and why people keep getting tripped up by saying that pattern matching is not reasoning. I think it's perfectly fine to say that pattern matching is reasoning, but pattern matching has levels of expressive power. First-order pattern matching is limited (and so reasoning is limited), and clearly humans are capable of higher order pattern matching which is Turing complete. Transformers are also Turing complete, and neural networks can learn any function, so it's not a matter of expressive power, in principle. Aside from issues stemming from tokenization, I think many of these LLM failures are because they aren't trained in higher order pattern matching. Thinking models and the generalization seen from grokking are the first steps on this path, but it's not quite there yet. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45277098 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45277098
mjr00 1y ago
It's trivial to demonstrate that LLMs are pattern matching rather than reasoning. A good way is to provide modified riddles-that-aren't. As an example: > Prompt: A man working at some white collar job gets an interview scheduled with an MBA candidate. The man says "I can't interview this candidate, he's my son." How is this possible? > ChatGPT: Because the interviewer is the candidate’s mother. (The riddle plays on the assumption that the interviewer must be a man.) This is clearly pattern matching and overfitting to the "doctor riddle" and a good demonstration of how there's no actual reasoning going on. A human would read the prompt and initially demonstrate confusion, which LLMs don't demonstrate because they don't actually reason.
- naasking 1y ago
  > It's trivial to demonstrate that LLMs are pattern matching rather than reasoning. Again, this is just asserting the premise that reasoning cannot include pattern matching, but this has never been justified. What is your definition for "reasoning"? > This is clearly pattern matching and overfitting to the "doctor riddle" and a good demonstration of how there's no actual reasoning going on. Not really, no. "Bad reasoning" does not entail "no reasoning". Your conclusion is simply too strong for the evidence available, which is why I'm asking for a rigourous definition of reasoning that doesn't leave room for disagreement about whether pattern matching counts.
  - mjr00 1y ago
    If your assertion is that you can't prove reasoning isn't just pattern matching, then I counter by saying you can't prove reasoning isn't just chaining a large number of IF/THEN/ELSE logic statements and therefore computers have been generally intelligent since ~1960.
    - naasking 1y ago
      The difference between ML models and computers since the 1960s is that the ML models weren't programmed with predicates, they "learned" them from analyzing data, and can continue to learn in various ways from further data. That's a meaningful difference, and why the former may qualify as intelligent and the latter cannot. But I agree in principle that LLMs can be distilled into large IF/THEN/ELSE trees, that's the lesson of BitNet 1-bit LLMs. The predicate tree being learned from data is the important qualifier for intelligence though. Edit: in case I wasn't clear, I agree that a specific chain of IF/THEN/ELSE statements in a loop can be generally intelligent. How could it not, specific kinds of these chains are Turing complete after all, so unless you think the brain has some kind of magic, it too is reducible to such a program, in principle. We just haven't yet discovered what kind of chain this is, just like we didn't understand what kind of chain could produce distributed consensus before PAXOS.

freejazz 1y ago

It seems readily apparent there is a difference given their inability to do tasks we would otherwise reasonably describe as achievable via basic reasoning on the same facts.

naasking 1y ago
I agree LLMs have many differences in abilities relative to humans. I'm not sure what this implies for their ability to reason though. I'm not even sure what examples about their bad reasoning can prove about the presence or absence of any kind of "reasoning", which is why I keep asking for definitions to remove the ambiguity. If examples of bad reasoning sufficed, then this would prove that humans can't reason either, which is silly. A rigourous definition of "reasoning" is challenging though, which is why people consistently can't provide a general one that's satisfactory when I ask, and this is why I'm skeptical that pattern matching isn't a big part of it. Arguments that LLMs are "just pattern matching" are thus not persuasive arguments that they are not "reasoning" at some cruder level. Maybe humans are just higher order pattern matchers and LLMs are only first or second-order pattern matchers. Maybe first-order pattern matching shouldn't count as "reasoning", but should second-order? Third-order? Is there evidence or some proof that LLMs couldn't be trained to be higher order pattern matchers, even in principle? None of the arguments or evidence I've seen about LLMs and reasoning is rigourous or persuasive on these questions.
- freejazz 1y ago
  Nothing about the uncertainty of the definition for 'reasoning' requires that pattern matching be part of the definition.
  - naasking 1y ago
    Did someone in this thread claim that?

gwd 1y ago

So I do think there are two distinct types of activities involved in knowledge work: 1. Taking established techniques or concepts and appropriately applying them to novel situations. 2. Inventing or synthesizing new, never-before-seen techniques or concepts The vast majority of the time, humans do #1. LLMs certainly do this in some contexts as well, as demonstrated by my example above. This to me counts as "understanding" and "thinking". Some people define "understanding" such that it's something only humans can do; to which I respond, I don't care what you call it, it's useful. Can LLMs do #2? I don't know. They've got such extensive experience that how would you know if they'd invented a technique vs had seen it somewhere? But I'd venture to argue that most humans never or rarely do #2.

HarHarVeryFunny 1y ago
> But I'd venture to argue that most humans never or rarely do #2. That seems fair, although the distinction between synthesizing something new and combining existing techniques is a bit blurry. What's missing from LLMs though is really part of 1). If techniques A, B, C & D are all the tools you need to solve a novel problem, then a human has the capability of learning WHEN to use each of these tools, and in what order/combination, to solve that problem - a process of trial and error, generalization and exception, etc. It's not just the techniques (bag of tools) you need, but also the rules (acquired knowledge) of how they can be used to solve different problems. LLMs aren't able to learn at runtime from their own experience, so the only way they can learn these rules of when to apply given tools (aka reasoning steps) - is by RL training on how they have been successfully used to solve a range of problems in the training data. So, the LLM may have learnt that in specific context it should first apply tool A (generate that reasoning step), etc, etc, but that doesn't help it to solve a novel problem where the same solution step selection process doesn't apply, even if the tools A-D are all it needs (if only it could learn how to apply them to this novel problem).

HarHarVeryFunny 1y ago

I define intelligence as prediction (degree of ability to use past experience to correctly predict future action outcomes), and reasoning/planning as multi-step what-if prediction. Certainly if a human (or some AI) has learned to predict/reason over some domain, then what they will be doing is pattern matching to determine the generalizations and exceptions that apply in a given context (including a hypothetical context in a what-if reasoning chain), in order to be able to select a next step that worked before. However, I think what we're really talking about here isn't the mechanics of applying learnt reasoning (context pattern matching), but rather the ability to reason in the general case, which requires the ability to LEARN to solve novel problems, which is what is missing from LLMs. A system that has a fixed set of (reasoning/prediction) rules, but can't learn new ones for itself, seems better regarded as an expert system. We need to make the distinction between a system that can only apply rules, and one that can actually figure out the rules in the first place. In terms of my definitions of intelligence and reasoning, based around ability to use past experience to learn to predict, then any system that can't learn from fresh experience doesn't meet that definition. Of course in humans and other intelligent animals the distinction between past and ongoing experience doesn't apply since they can learn continually and incrementally (something that is lacking from LLMs), so for AI we need to use a different vocabulary, and "expert system" seems the obvious label for something that can use rules, but not discover them for itself.

naasking 1y ago
> but rather the ability to reason in the general case, which requires the ability to LEARN to solve novel problems, which is what is missing from LLMs. I don't think it's missing, zero shot prompting is quite successful in many cases. Maybe you find the extent that LLMs can do this to be too limited, but I'm not sure that means they don't reason at all. > A system that has a fixed set of (reasoning/prediction) rules, but can't learn new ones for itself, seems better regarded as an expert system. I think expert systems are a lot more limited than LLMs, so I don't agree with that classification. LLMs can generate output that's out of distribution, for instance, which is not something that's classic expert systems can do (even if you think LLM OOD is still limited compared to humans). I've elaborated in another comment [1] what I think part of the real issue is, and why people keep getting tripped up by saying that pattern matching is not reasoning. I think it's perfectly fine to say that pattern matching is reasoning, but pattern matching has levels of expressive power. First-order pattern matching is limited (and so reasoning is limited), and clearly humans are capable of higher order pattern matching which is Turing complete. Transformers are also Turing complete, and neural networks can learn any function, so it's not a matter of expressive power, in principle. Aside from issues stemming from tokenization, I think many of these LLM failures are because they aren't trained in higher order pattern matching. Thinking models and the generalization seen from grokking are the first steps on this path, but it's not quite there yet. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45277098 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45277098

mjr00 1y ago

It's trivial to demonstrate that LLMs are pattern matching rather than reasoning. A good way is to provide modified riddles-that-aren't. As an example: > Prompt: A man working at some white collar job gets an interview scheduled with an MBA candidate. The man says "I can't interview this candidate, he's my son." How is this possible? > ChatGPT: Because the interviewer is the candidate’s mother. (The riddle plays on the assumption that the interviewer must be a man.) This is clearly pattern matching and overfitting to the "doctor riddle" and a good demonstration of how there's no actual reasoning going on. A human would read the prompt and initially demonstrate confusion, which LLMs don't demonstrate because they don't actually reason.

naasking 1y ago
> It's trivial to demonstrate that LLMs are pattern matching rather than reasoning. Again, this is just asserting the premise that reasoning cannot include pattern matching, but this has never been justified. What is your definition for "reasoning"? > This is clearly pattern matching and overfitting to the "doctor riddle" and a good demonstration of how there's no actual reasoning going on. Not really, no. "Bad reasoning" does not entail "no reasoning". Your conclusion is simply too strong for the evidence available, which is why I'm asking for a rigourous definition of reasoning that doesn't leave room for disagreement about whether pattern matching counts.
- mjr00 1y ago
  If your assertion is that you can't prove reasoning isn't just pattern matching, then I counter by saying you can't prove reasoning isn't just chaining a large number of IF/THEN/ELSE logic statements and therefore computers have been generally intelligent since ~1960.
  - naasking 1y ago
    The difference between ML models and computers since the 1960s is that the ML models weren't programmed with predicates, they "learned" them from analyzing data, and can continue to learn in various ways from further data. That's a meaningful difference, and why the former may qualify as intelligent and the latter cannot. But I agree in principle that LLMs can be distilled into large IF/THEN/ELSE trees, that's the lesson of BitNet 1-bit LLMs. The predicate tree being learned from data is the important qualifier for intelligence though. Edit: in case I wasn't clear, I agree that a specific chain of IF/THEN/ELSE statements in a loop can be generally intelligent. How could it not, specific kinds of these chains are Turing complete after all, so unless you think the brain has some kind of magic, it too is reducible to such a program, in principle. We just haven't yet discovered what kind of chain this is, just like we didn't understand what kind of chain could produce distributed consensus before PAXOS.