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The entire existence of CAs is a pointless and mystical venture to ensure centralized control of the Internet that, since now entirely domain-validated, provide

The entire existence of CAs is a pointless and mystical venture to ensure centralized control of the Internet that, since now entirely domain-validated, provides absolutely no security benefits over DNS. If your domain register/name server provider is compromised, CAs are already a lost cause.

tptacek 1y ago
The DNS is more centralized than the WebPKI.
- ocdtrekkie 1y ago
  Three browser companies on the west coast of the US effectively control all decisionmaking for WebPKI. The entire membership of the CA/B is what, a few dozen? Mostly companies which have no reason to exist except serving math equations for rent. How many companies now run TLDs? Yeah, .com is centralized, but between ccTLDs, new TLDs, etc., tons. And domain registrars and web hosts which provide DNS services? Thousands. And importantly, hosting companies and DNS providers are trivially easy to change between. The idea Apple or Google can unilaterally decide what the baseline requirements should be needs to be understood as an existential threat to the Internet. And again, every single requirement CAs implement is irrelevant if someone can log into your web host. The entire thing is an emperor has no clothes thing.
  - tptacek 1y ago
    Incoherent. Browser vendors exert control by dint of controlling the browsers themselves, and are in the picture regardless of the trust system used for TLS. The question is, which is more centralized: the current WebPKI, which you say is also completely dependent on the DNS but involves more companies, or the DNS itself, which is axiomatically fewer companies? I always love when people bring the ccTLDs into these discussions, as if Google could leave .COM when .COM's utterly unaccountable ownership manipulates the DNS to intercept Google Mail.
    - teddyh 1y ago
      > when .COM's utterly unaccountable ownership manipulates the DNS to intercept Google Mail. Why is this more likely to happen than a rogue CA issuing a false certificate? Also, Google has chosen to trust .com instead of using one of their eleven TLDs that they own for their own exclusive use, or any of the additional 22 TLDs that they also operate.
      - akerl_ 1y ago
        When a rogue CA issues a bad cert, they get delisted from all major browsers and are effectively destroyed. That isn’t possible with .com
        teddyh 1y ago
        The DNS is federated and hierarchical. A domain name (including top-level domains) is controlled by a single entity. If you do not trust that entity, you cannot trust that domain or top-level domain, or anything beneath that in the tree. But given that you trust the root zone, you can still (potentially) trust other subtrees in the DNS, like other top-level domains. This is not the case with a CA, however; you are forced to trust all of them, and hope that when fradulent certificates are issued (as has happened several times, IIUC), that they will not affect you.
        akerl_ 1y ago
        In fact you don't have to trust any of them, since browser root stores enforce certificate transparency. But also the issues of segmentation are pretty much a total shift of the goalposts from what we were discussing, which is what actually happens when malicious activity occurs. In DNS, your only option is to stop trusting that slice of the tree and for every site operator to lift and shift to another TLD, inclusive of teaching all their users to use the new site. In WebPKI, the CA gets delisted for new certificate issuance and site operators get new certificates before the current ones expire. One of those is insane, and the other has successfully happened several times in response to bad/rogue CAs.
- teddyh 1y ago
  DNS isn’t centralized; it’s federated. I mean, just because there’s an ISO and a UN does not mean there is a single world government. (Repost: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38695674 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38695674>)
  - tptacek 1y ago
    The distinction you're trying to draw here isn't relevant to the argument on the thread. "Centralization" is the other commenter's metric of concern, not mine.
- otabdeveloper4 1y ago
  No. You can host your own DNS. It's easy and practically free.
  - peanut-walrus 1y ago
    Your TLD registry operator still technically remains fully in control of your records. I am actually surprised more of them have not abused their power so far.
    - crote 1y ago
      Most TLD operators are non-profit foundations set up by nerds in the early days of the internet, well before the lawyers, politicians, and MBAs could get their hands on it. If you want to see what happens otherwise, just look at the gTLD landscape. Still, genuine power abuse is relatively rare, because to a large extent they are selling trust. If you start randomly taking down domains, nobody will ever risk registering a domain with you again.
      - tptacek 1y ago
        The most important TLDs are decidedly not non-profit foundations run by the nerds who set them up in the 1980s, and governments routinely manipulate the DNS for policy reasons.
        otabdeveloper4 1y ago
        You don't actually need a domain with an ""important"" TLD. True story.
        akerl_ 1y ago
        What TLDs are today operated by non-profits? Looking at the list, I see a mix of commercial entities running them for profit and governments.
        1y ago
ekr____ 1y ago
This isn't correct, because your domain name server may be insecure even while the one used by the CA is secure. Moreover, CT helps detect misissuance but does not detect incorrect responses by your resolver.
- ocdtrekkie 1y ago
  If someone can log into your domain registrar account or your web host, they can issue themselves a complete valid certificate. It won't matter if the CA resolver is secure, because the attacker can successfully validate domain control.
  - ekr____ 1y ago
    Yes, that's correct. The purpose of the WebPKI and TLS is not to protect against this form of attack but rather to protect against compromise of the network between the client and the server.
- PunchyHamster 1y ago
  but if your domain server is insecure attacker can get a cert for it

tptacek 1y ago

The DNS is more centralized than the WebPKI.

ocdtrekkie 1y ago
Three browser companies on the west coast of the US effectively control all decisionmaking for WebPKI. The entire membership of the CA/B is what, a few dozen? Mostly companies which have no reason to exist except serving math equations for rent. How many companies now run TLDs? Yeah, .com is centralized, but between ccTLDs, new TLDs, etc., tons. And domain registrars and web hosts which provide DNS services? Thousands. And importantly, hosting companies and DNS providers are trivially easy to change between. The idea Apple or Google can unilaterally decide what the baseline requirements should be needs to be understood as an existential threat to the Internet. And again, every single requirement CAs implement is irrelevant if someone can log into your web host. The entire thing is an emperor has no clothes thing.
- tptacek 1y ago
  Incoherent. Browser vendors exert control by dint of controlling the browsers themselves, and are in the picture regardless of the trust system used for TLS. The question is, which is more centralized: the current WebPKI, which you say is also completely dependent on the DNS but involves more companies, or the DNS itself, which is axiomatically fewer companies? I always love when people bring the ccTLDs into these discussions, as if Google could leave .COM when .COM's utterly unaccountable ownership manipulates the DNS to intercept Google Mail.
  - teddyh 1y ago
    > when .COM's utterly unaccountable ownership manipulates the DNS to intercept Google Mail. Why is this more likely to happen than a rogue CA issuing a false certificate? Also, Google has chosen to trust .com instead of using one of their eleven TLDs that they own for their own exclusive use, or any of the additional 22 TLDs that they also operate.
    - akerl_ 1y ago
      When a rogue CA issues a bad cert, they get delisted from all major browsers and are effectively destroyed. That isn’t possible with .com
      - teddyh 1y ago
        The DNS is federated and hierarchical. A domain name (including top-level domains) is controlled by a single entity. If you do not trust that entity, you cannot trust that domain or top-level domain, or anything beneath that in the tree. But given that you trust the root zone, you can still (potentially) trust other subtrees in the DNS, like other top-level domains. This is not the case with a CA, however; you are forced to trust all of them, and hope that when fradulent certificates are issued (as has happened several times, IIUC), that they will not affect you.
        akerl_ 1y ago
        In fact you don't have to trust any of them, since browser root stores enforce certificate transparency. But also the issues of segmentation are pretty much a total shift of the goalposts from what we were discussing, which is what actually happens when malicious activity occurs. In DNS, your only option is to stop trusting that slice of the tree and for every site operator to lift and shift to another TLD, inclusive of teaching all their users to use the new site. In WebPKI, the CA gets delisted for new certificate issuance and site operators get new certificates before the current ones expire. One of those is insane, and the other has successfully happened several times in response to bad/rogue CAs.
teddyh 1y ago
DNS isn’t centralized; it’s federated. I mean, just because there’s an ISO and a UN does not mean there is a single world government. (Repost: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38695674 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38695674>)
- tptacek 1y ago
  The distinction you're trying to draw here isn't relevant to the argument on the thread. "Centralization" is the other commenter's metric of concern, not mine.
otabdeveloper4 1y ago
No. You can host your own DNS. It's easy and practically free.
- peanut-walrus 1y ago
  Your TLD registry operator still technically remains fully in control of your records. I am actually surprised more of them have not abused their power so far.
  - crote 1y ago
    Most TLD operators are non-profit foundations set up by nerds in the early days of the internet, well before the lawyers, politicians, and MBAs could get their hands on it. If you want to see what happens otherwise, just look at the gTLD landscape. Still, genuine power abuse is relatively rare, because to a large extent they are selling trust. If you start randomly taking down domains, nobody will ever risk registering a domain with you again.
    - tptacek 1y ago
      The most important TLDs are decidedly not non-profit foundations run by the nerds who set them up in the 1980s, and governments routinely manipulate the DNS for policy reasons.
      - otabdeveloper4 1y ago
        You don't actually need a domain with an ""important"" TLD. True story.
        akerl_ 1y ago
        What TLDs are today operated by non-profits? Looking at the list, I see a mix of commercial entities running them for profit and governments.
        1y ago

ekr____ 1y ago

This isn't correct, because your domain name server may be insecure even while the one used by the CA is secure. Moreover, CT helps detect misissuance but does not detect incorrect responses by your resolver.

ocdtrekkie 1y ago
If someone can log into your domain registrar account or your web host, they can issue themselves a complete valid certificate. It won't matter if the CA resolver is secure, because the attacker can successfully validate domain control.
- ekr____ 1y ago
  Yes, that's correct. The purpose of the WebPKI and TLS is not to protect against this form of attack but rather to protect against compromise of the network between the client and the server.
PunchyHamster 1y ago
but if your domain server is insecure attacker can get a cert for it