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I'm slowly starting to think that NATO/EU is using Ukraine as a trench war test ground. Ukraine right now needs to invest in offensive capability, not defensive
by aynyc 1y ago
I'm slowly starting to think that NATO/EU is using Ukraine as a trench war test ground. Ukraine right now needs to invest in offensive capability, not defensive capability. If they don't bring the war to Russia in full scale, it'll never end.
In simplest term, it's like your neighbor parks their car on your driveway, you get police to issue fines, or maybe even get it towed. But your neighbor has money, so they keep paying fines, etc.. Your whole neighborhood supports you, so they would call the cops for you, go to town hall and all of that. In the end, you'll never win and get your parking space back. The only way is to park your and all your supporters' cars in their driveway, give them a taste of their own medicine.
- tim333 1y agoAt the moment the Ukrainian strategy, as well as defending themselves seems to be largely to take out the Russian oil industry and other economic targets with the aim that their economy collapses or at least they can't afford to keep the war going. The Economist discussing that https://archive.ph/Rjuzy https://archive.ph/Rjuzy
- lossolo 1y agoThat will not happen. Even the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline is still carrying some Russian crude through Ukraine to Hungary and Slovakia. This is all mirage. Russian oil gets mixed in India and then gets back to EU. Only U.S., Canada, the EU, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and a few others sanctioned Russia. So over 140 countries did not sanction Russia and can buy oil from them without any mixing and outside the Western price cap system. Cutting Russia off completely from the global oil market would send prices through the roof, and most countries don’t want that. That’s why Ukraine has reportedly been reminded behind closed doors not to hit Russian oil exports too hard.
- slyall 1y agoUkraine is targeting refineries rather than Crude production/supply. This impact refined oil exports and domestic supply and is causing Russia pain. Oil refineries are also very soft target. They can't cut off the Druzhba pipeline because they need to keep Hungary and Slovakia happy.
- vintermann 1y ago> If they don't bring the war to Russia in full scale, it'll never end. How exactly do you picture it ending? No, really. Imagine you got everything you wanted. Everyone delivers max offensive capability to Ukraine. Ukraine brings the war to Russia in full scale. Putin, or his successors, give up. Then what? At the end of the day, Russia will still be there, at Ukraine's borders. What happens? (Unless you're one of those who imagine a split-up - a sentiment Putin absolutely has noticed and used in building domestic support, by the way. But either way, there will be something that used to be Russia at Ukraine's borders, and they may not be very happy about their neighbors after a full scale war.) I'll listen to any plausible scenario - plausible to you I mean, I'll defer judgment for now. Don't worry about convincing me, just convince yourself. I just want to know what happy outcome you imagine after Ukraine has somehow brought the war to Russia and won.
- yks 1y agoI mean, you can ask this question about literally every war. It ends with a heavily armed border, and uneasy peace until Russia gets a leader that realizes that wars of attrition destroy attacker's nation wealth just as much as defender's. Maybe Putin achieves the immortality he's dreaming about, or maybe Russia never gets a leader like that, well, at least Ukraine would get an opportunity to build up a nation that is too costly to invade.
- tim333 1y agoIt's looking a bit like Russia's adventure in Afghanistan. With that, after a decade: >The war gradually inflicted a high cost on the Soviet Union as military, economic, and political resources became increasingly exhausted. (wikipedia) and the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 and collapsed in 1991. I doubt Russia can keep this one going for a decade. They are currently losing about 1000 soldiers a day and have a deficit of ~$100bn/yr, 17% interest rates and 20% of their oil refining capacity taken out by Ukrainian drone strikes which are escalating.
- lossolo 1y ago> I doubt Russia can keep this one going for a decade. They only need to keep going longer than their opponent. Ukraine has fewer soldiers and resources than Russia and currently has almost no offensive capability, as seen on the battlefield. All they can really do is defend, and even then they’re still losing ground, not much, but still losing territory. Here in the West, we’re facing economic problems, high debt, and a shortage of weapons production, especially in the EU. I’d like what you’re saying to happen, but that’s wishful thinking. And Afghanistan wasn’t the primary or even a major reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse. > I doubt Russia can keep this one going for a decade They have oil, gas, and minerals that the rest of the world needs, and they have an internal propaganda machine that lets them hold out for a long time. I remember "experts" saying Russia would collapse economically in 2023, then in 2024 for sure, and that they’d run out of rockets. Now it’s 2025, and that collapse isn’t even on the horizon.
- littlestymaar 1y ago> I'm slowly starting to think that NATO/EU is using Ukraine as a trench war test ground The US has definitely used the Ukraine war as a way to wear out the Soviet stockpiles out of Russia. The EU just hasn't either political will or capabilities to really help Ukraine win.
- ponector 1y agoNo one has/had political will to help Ukraine win. USA actually had will to help Russia to continue invasion. Imagine USA to send lend-lease weapons with strings attached: do not use against Hitler's troops in German territories. But that's exactly what is happening in Ukraine war.
- littlestymaar 1y agoThe US had limited interest in the Ukraine winning and a lot to gain from Russia wearing down until they are far from even dreaming of being a peer adversary. The EU on the other hand is under existential threat from Russia so they (we, actually as I'm French) really ought to do something serious to help Ukraine not only stabilize the front line and wear down Russia, but win this war. But because we underinvested in defense for decades (because the Western Europe couldn't imagine a conflict was possible with their biggest trade partner, and because eastern Europe was too keen on trading political influence inside the EU to the US in exchange for security guarantees against Russia without having to build a capable military on their own) we ended up in 2022 with little capabilities to really help Ukraine. And because of the obsession with public spending and debt reduction, countries refused to seriously invest seriously in their industrial capabilities to supply the Ukrainians with a war-changing amount of ammo and other assets. (the fact that South Korea alone was able to give more ammo to the Ukrainians than the whole of EU in 2023 is a sad joke really). I can't really blame the US, they played their own interests while minimizing consequences for them (and that's also why they wanted to avoid escalation in priority). But I do blame European leaders, including my own president, for not taking this matter as seriously as they should have. (For a full 10 month in 2023 Les forges de Tarbes, France's main production of 155mm shells, has been stuck with no way of producing anything because they couldn't pay their suppliers because they lacked liquidity to do so, this was utterly ridiculous and should have been solved with a single phone call. But nobody in charge bothered, for almost a year…)
- nickff 1y ago>"I'm slowly starting to think that NATO/EU is using Ukraine as a trench war test ground. Ukraine right now needs to invest in offensive capability, not defensive capability. If they don't bring the war to Russia in full scale, it'll never end." Most long wars in the last century become trench wars; maneuver warfare is too expensive (in terms of materiel) to sustain between adversaries who are at all balanced; the Iran-Iraq War is a good example of this. Additionally, most small/proxy wars are used as testing grounds for either validating new weapons, or checking the viability of old/expired munitions; Ukraine is being used this way, but so was Libya. It seems that any decisive action is too risky for Western leaders to contemplate. Western leaders seem willing to 'stir the pot' in places like Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, but never want to commit decisive resources. The threat of nuclear escalation seems to be too high for the minuscule popularity that one might win as a victor in Ukraine. Non-nuclear countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Canada, etc.) could commit ground and air forces to Ukraine's aid with little to no risk of any consequences, but even they are unwilling to do so. The sad part is that the lesson being taught here is that China will be able to conquer Taiwan with almost no risk of foreign intervention, no matter how long it takes them.
- tim333 1y agoThe situation is a fair bit different with Taiwan. Firstly "In April 2001, George W. Bush publicly announced the American defense of Taiwan"..."This framework was approved by President Donald Trump in 2018" (wikipedia) Secondly there's a sea in between China and Taiwan meaning it could largely be defended by a no fly zone. In Ukraine once Russia troops have crossed the border it isn't easy to get rid of them without a lot of messy ground warfare.
- nickff 1y agoI agree with you on both counts, but I'm not sure I would count on any president post-GWB to actually defend Taiwan. Nobody seems to have put much behind the Minsk Agreement. Even if they did, I'm not sure how long that would last if nobody else supported them. Can you imagine any of the (mostly european) countries which cry so loudly about Ukraine (while unwilling to commit forces), actually sending meaningful support to Taiwan?
- romperstomper 1y ago> I'm slowly starting to think that NATO/EU is using Ukraine as a trench war test ground Ukrainian government even officially proposed that some time ago as I remember.
- scotty79 1y agoI was actually quite amazed that US doesn't really see Ukraine as proving ground for their weapons. I guess they don't really want to find out if they are any good in practice. So far they just implied they were good because they were expensive, but for example tanks weren't really all that useful.
- 627467 1y ago> US doesn't really see Ukraine as proving ground How do we know this? Aren't some defense tech companies (anduril?) publicly disclosing shipment of new weapons to Ukraine?
- 627467 1y agoAnyone who read about Spanish civil war could tell Ukraine was going to become 2020s (30s?) equivalent of 1930s Spain
- tim333 1y agoI don't see that. Ukraine doesn't really have a civil war. Zelensky doesn't seem a Franco type.
- stefantalpalaru 1y ago[dead]
- EnPissant 1y agoThey are willing to fight to the last Ukrainian, that's for sure.
- nradov 1y agoNATO doesn't intend to ever fight a trench war. The war in Ukraine is a useful testing ground for certain weapons but I don't think they care much about trench warfare in general. NATO doctrine has always been to destroy the adversary's air defense system first, then rely on air dominance to enable maneuver warfare on the ground. Neither Russia nor Ukraine had much in the way of functional air forces so they had to fall back on more primitive attritional tactics.
- petre 1y agoOthers tried to invade Russia and failed. The way to beat them is through bankrupcy. The US managed to do that to the USSR once. The Ukrainian strategy of taking out their refineries is good. Regarding interceptor drones, Russia can't complain that the West is giving them offensive weapons. Although I fail to see how anything short of lasers or microwave weapons to fry the drones' circuitry would work against large drone swarms.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- tim333 1y agoIt works by large swarms of interceptors. 1000 shaheds met by 2000 interceptors. Which is why you want "cost less than 10% of the Russian systems destroyed."