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> Losing it means losing access to your backup permanently, and Signal cannot help you recover it. Oof... That's going to be tough to explain to normal users.

> Losing it means losing access to your backup permanently, and Signal cannot help you recover it. Oof... That's going to be tough to explain to normal users. "Sorry you've been paying for backups all this time, but you should have written down this code that you will only ever use once somewhere safe and remembered where it is. All your data is gone." Not the right security trade-off for most people.

iamtheworstdev 1y ago
there are more than a few backup providers that do this security trade off with user acceptance of the risk. if this trade off isn't good for the user, they can use any other number of insecure backups.
staplers 1y ago
It's this way, or it's not encrypted. The whole premise of their privacy model requires this. Signal opens themselves up to government coercion and ruined reputation otherwise.
elvisloops 1y ago
The implementation feels uncharacteristically crude for Signal. Instead of seamless protections, you just get handed 64 characters you’re told to “store securely.” That’s not realistic: most people will screenshot it, and those screenshots will end up in unencrypted cloud backups.
- fastest963 1y ago
  Sure but the key is still in a separate location from the backup. Signal can't decrypt the backup and if Signal is hacked someone would still need to get your screenshot to decrypt the backup. Not perfect but far better than an unencrypted backup.
0x457 1y ago
If they were able to recover backups for you, then it wouldn't be secure. Right trade-off.
tgsovlerkhgsel 1y ago
Absolutely the right security trade-off for Signal users. Anything else would devalue the entire product. Whatsapp chose a different approach (which is reasonable for their user base) but that means that there is an escrow key. Regardless of your choices, messages that you sent may end up "end to end encrypted" but in reality stored in the cloud with a key escrowed to Meta... The backup feature seems to be opt-in, i.e. the requirement to write the key down won't be too surprising.
kelnos 1y ago
If you're using Signal, of all things, that's probably a reasonable security/usability trade off. Granted, I'm sure there are a lot of people out there who just use Signal because one of their more security-conscious friends/family members told them to install it, and so you're probably right for those people. But, frankly, I can't see how else they could do it. Offering an unencrypted option, or weakening the encryption (by storing a copy of the key on Signal's servers) would make Signal not Signal.
arccy 1y ago
when you're shown the code, it has 2 buttons: copy to clipboard and save to password manager. if you choose password manager you should be relatively safe...
- fastest963 1y ago
  I have 1Password installed and it prompted to save in 1Password. Worked perfectly. It even let me paste from 1Password on the verification screen. It was the most seamless password manager experience I've ever had.

iamtheworstdev 1y ago

there are more than a few backup providers that do this security trade off with user acceptance of the risk. if this trade off isn't good for the user, they can use any other number of insecure backups.

staplers 1y ago

It's this way, or it's not encrypted. The whole premise of their privacy model requires this. Signal opens themselves up to government coercion and ruined reputation otherwise.

elvisloops 1y ago

The implementation feels uncharacteristically crude for Signal. Instead of seamless protections, you just get handed 64 characters you’re told to “store securely.” That’s not realistic: most people will screenshot it, and those screenshots will end up in unencrypted cloud backups.

fastest963 1y ago
Sure but the key is still in a separate location from the backup. Signal can't decrypt the backup and if Signal is hacked someone would still need to get your screenshot to decrypt the backup. Not perfect but far better than an unencrypted backup.

0x457 1y ago

If they were able to recover backups for you, then it wouldn't be secure. Right trade-off.

tgsovlerkhgsel 1y ago

Absolutely the right security trade-off for Signal users. Anything else would devalue the entire product. Whatsapp chose a different approach (which is reasonable for their user base) but that means that there is an escrow key. Regardless of your choices, messages that you sent may end up "end to end encrypted" but in reality stored in the cloud with a key escrowed to Meta... The backup feature seems to be opt-in, i.e. the requirement to write the key down won't be too surprising.

kelnos 1y ago

If you're using Signal, of all things, that's probably a reasonable security/usability trade off. Granted, I'm sure there are a lot of people out there who just use Signal because one of their more security-conscious friends/family members told them to install it, and so you're probably right for those people. But, frankly, I can't see how else they could do it. Offering an unencrypted option, or weakening the encryption (by storing a copy of the key on Signal's servers) would make Signal not Signal.

arccy 1y ago

when you're shown the code, it has 2 buttons: copy to clipboard and save to password manager. if you choose password manager you should be relatively safe...

fastest963 1y ago
I have 1Password installed and it prompted to save in 1Password. Worked perfectly. It even let me paste from 1Password on the verification screen. It was the most seamless password manager experience I've ever had.