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> It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads I can understand this argument. > The USAF's force model involves basing at big, well-equipp

> It's able to operate from airstrips that are no more than roads I can understand this argument. > The USAF's force model involves basing at big, well-equipped, well-protected air bases. But I don't understand this one. Isn't a drone attack a drone attack? The same drones that could take out F-16s could take out Gripens. You'd have to defend your expensive weapon systems in either case. Don't we need a new strategy that isn't entirely reliant upon extremely powerful, but extremely expensive hardware? I'd imagine you still want your expensive pieces, but that you want a compliment of inexpensive combat items and fortified bunkers as a line of defense to protect them when not deployed.

freeopinion 1y ago
I admit I didn't read the article. Is the Gripen 40% cheaper so that countries can own more of them? Also smaller airbases can mean more airbases. So a single drone attack might take out one or two bases worth of Gripen. But it takes a lot more drones and a lot more sophisticated attack to take out all the Gripen spread across so many small bases.
- dralley 1y ago
  Gripen is more expensive to purchase than the F-35 and F-16. The operating costs are a bit cheaper than the F-16 and substantially cheaper than the F-35 however.
dgrin91 1y ago
Yes but it's a question of finding targets. Why was Ukraine able to decimate the Russian Air Force? Partly because they are all based out of big, well known bases. Even in wartime they have to be in a big base. A jet like the Gripen can move basically instantly to basically anywhere and then it's hard to find, especially because it can just move again
- riffraff 1y ago
  I don't want to sound negative, I wish all the best to Ukraine, but did they actually "decimate" the Russian air force? I was under the impression a few attacks on air bases happened, but a lot more drones were aimed at refineries and other infrastructure.
  - hgomersall 1y ago
    Given the original definition of decimate, to remove one in ten, perhaps so.
  - jacquesm 1y ago
    Yes. They hit a substantial fraction of the Russian long range bombers and assorted other aircraft. Quite a bit of that is at least for the moment impossible for Russia to replace.
- petre 1y ago
  True, but the Gripen is not a big strategic bomber and Sweden doesn't have nukes to threaten other countries with. They do air policing and would employ guerilla tactics in case of war, like put a gripen in a cattle shed somewhere and operate it from a road¹. It's a good strategy for a smaller country with lower population density to defend itself. Possibly not such a great option for Benelux, but for most of the EU, save for the big boys it's great. Even Germany could employ it, with the amount of sheds and the highway network that they have. Russia and the US needs aibases to operate strategic bombers from. 1. https://youtu.be/HbkScZFCgro https://youtu.be/HbkScZFCgro
simne 1y ago
> The same drones that could take out F-16s could take out Gripens Gripens could base on ordinary highway, so could distribute planes through big territory. Drones usually have limited range, so they really could target most air bases capable for F-16 (using for example semi-truck container as movable nest), but it is literally impossible now, to target all highways.
Animats 1y ago
The USAF argues over this internally. See [1], and a reply, [2]. Some USAF officers have been making noise about the need for more dispersal for years.[3] There's a "build tougher bases" faction in the military. Read "Concrete Sky"[4] If you want to read up on this, those are some good starting points. [1] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Volume-3_Number-3/Grieco_and_Bremer.pdf https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Jo... [2] https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-airpower-amnesia/ https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-air... [3] https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/A... [4] https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Concrete+Sky+-+Air+Base+Hardening+in+the+Western+Pacific+-+Shugart+-+Walton.pdf https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Concrete...
- echelon 1y ago
  This is so much better than I even asked for! Thank you so much for putting this together and sharing. Any opinion as to which faction(s) will win these arguments?
maxglute 1y ago
The on paper assumption / sales pitch that remains valid in most scenarios is increased survivability of shooters = more sorties. If hardware can operate from austere conditions you can squeeze in a few more missions, which may be tactically/operationally significant, but there's limitations on modern airframes, still need to go back to a well resourced large base (5th gen also requires conditioned shelters) for maintenance, i.e. it's still fundamentally a bandaid solution. The logistics tail is also larger <- this gets slept on (or underplayed in public facing messaging). It remains valid in most scenarios, as in most force on force that is not US/PRC, because very few countries has c4isr abilities to kill chain entire operational theatre, i.e. it's partially hopium strategy in US vs PRC in IndoPac. Which circles back to your second point, the related debate around hardening and distributing is almost distraction - airforce capitalization of highend platforms is in the shitters - so there's parallel discussion around distributed / agile deployment but with cheaper CCAs. Of course what's typically being hand waved away is the logistics tail part, i.e. there's already massive maintenance personnel shortages, unlikely to disperse thousands of maintenance crews on the ground to support the concept. The even more handwaved part for US in IndoPac is host nation access / political constraints. There's a reason US wants JP to support ACE/agile combat employment (as in on main islands), increase harden shelters... but JP reluctant to open main islands. Because no one wants more American forces doing shenanigans with their civilians and the optics of having support fleets reminding populace they're on the frontline is bad. Hence JP still largely constraining US to Okinawa/Ryukyus, PH in Luzon/Palawan. The further downstream handwaving of all this is even if properly implemented, is now you've spread out shit load of more exposed logistics staff across vulnerable islands, i.e. dramatically increased exfiltration complexity / suicide deployments. Survivability of drones increases, survivability of the logistics force decreases. Which is... even worse optics, hence it's rarely even part of discussion with respect to ACE. There some self awareness with marine NMESIS MLRS / EABO (expeditionary advanced base operations)... i.e. wait we're sending marines on likely one way missions to tiny islands that PRC can lock down? Maybe that's worth if they take out a type055.
victorbjorklund 1y ago
Easier to spot a plane in one of X airports vs spot a plane on any road anywhere in the country hiden in the woods

freeopinion 1y ago

I admit I didn't read the article. Is the Gripen 40% cheaper so that countries can own more of them? Also smaller airbases can mean more airbases. So a single drone attack might take out one or two bases worth of Gripen. But it takes a lot more drones and a lot more sophisticated attack to take out all the Gripen spread across so many small bases.

dralley 1y ago
Gripen is more expensive to purchase than the F-35 and F-16. The operating costs are a bit cheaper than the F-16 and substantially cheaper than the F-35 however.

dgrin91 1y ago

Yes but it's a question of finding targets. Why was Ukraine able to decimate the Russian Air Force? Partly because they are all based out of big, well known bases. Even in wartime they have to be in a big base. A jet like the Gripen can move basically instantly to basically anywhere and then it's hard to find, especially because it can just move again

riffraff 1y ago
I don't want to sound negative, I wish all the best to Ukraine, but did they actually "decimate" the Russian air force? I was under the impression a few attacks on air bases happened, but a lot more drones were aimed at refineries and other infrastructure.
- hgomersall 1y ago
  Given the original definition of decimate, to remove one in ten, perhaps so.
- jacquesm 1y ago
  Yes. They hit a substantial fraction of the Russian long range bombers and assorted other aircraft. Quite a bit of that is at least for the moment impossible for Russia to replace.
petre 1y ago
True, but the Gripen is not a big strategic bomber and Sweden doesn't have nukes to threaten other countries with. They do air policing and would employ guerilla tactics in case of war, like put a gripen in a cattle shed somewhere and operate it from a road¹. It's a good strategy for a smaller country with lower population density to defend itself. Possibly not such a great option for Benelux, but for most of the EU, save for the big boys it's great. Even Germany could employ it, with the amount of sheds and the highway network that they have. Russia and the US needs aibases to operate strategic bombers from. 1. https://youtu.be/HbkScZFCgro https://youtu.be/HbkScZFCgro

simne 1y ago

> The same drones that could take out F-16s could take out Gripens Gripens could base on ordinary highway, so could distribute planes through big territory. Drones usually have limited range, so they really could target most air bases capable for F-16 (using for example semi-truck container as movable nest), but it is literally impossible now, to target all highways.

Animats 1y ago

The USAF argues over this internally. See [1], and a reply, [2]. Some USAF officers have been making noise about the need for more dispersal for years.[3] There's a "build tougher bases" faction in the military. Read "Concrete Sky"[4] If you want to read up on this, those are some good starting points. [1] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Volume-3_Number-3/Grieco_and_Bremer.pdf https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Jo... [2] https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-airpower-amnesia/ https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/drone-hype-and-air... [3] https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/A... [4] https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Concrete+Sky+-+Air+Base+Hardening+in+the+Western+Pacific+-+Shugart+-+Walton.pdf https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Concrete...

echelon 1y ago
This is so much better than I even asked for! Thank you so much for putting this together and sharing. Any opinion as to which faction(s) will win these arguments?

maxglute 1y ago

The on paper assumption / sales pitch that remains valid in most scenarios is increased survivability of shooters = more sorties. If hardware can operate from austere conditions you can squeeze in a few more missions, which may be tactically/operationally significant, but there's limitations on modern airframes, still need to go back to a well resourced large base (5th gen also requires conditioned shelters) for maintenance, i.e. it's still fundamentally a bandaid solution. The logistics tail is also larger <- this gets slept on (or underplayed in public facing messaging). It remains valid in most scenarios, as in most force on force that is not US/PRC, because very few countries has c4isr abilities to kill chain entire operational theatre, i.e. it's partially hopium strategy in US vs PRC in IndoPac. Which circles back to your second point, the related debate around hardening and distributing is almost distraction - airforce capitalization of highend platforms is in the shitters - so there's parallel discussion around distributed / agile deployment but with cheaper CCAs. Of course what's typically being hand waved away is the logistics tail part, i.e. there's already massive maintenance personnel shortages, unlikely to disperse thousands of maintenance crews on the ground to support the concept. The even more handwaved part for US in IndoPac is host nation access / political constraints. There's a reason US wants JP to support ACE/agile combat employment (as in on main islands), increase harden shelters... but JP reluctant to open main islands. Because no one wants more American forces doing shenanigans with their civilians and the optics of having support fleets reminding populace they're on the frontline is bad. Hence JP still largely constraining US to Okinawa/Ryukyus, PH in Luzon/Palawan. The further downstream handwaving of all this is even if properly implemented, is now you've spread out shit load of more exposed logistics staff across vulnerable islands, i.e. dramatically increased exfiltration complexity / suicide deployments. Survivability of drones increases, survivability of the logistics force decreases. Which is... even worse optics, hence it's rarely even part of discussion with respect to ACE. There some self awareness with marine NMESIS MLRS / EABO (expeditionary advanced base operations)... i.e. wait we're sending marines on likely one way missions to tiny islands that PRC can lock down? Maybe that's worth if they take out a type055.

victorbjorklund 1y ago

Easier to spot a plane in one of X airports vs spot a plane on any road anywhere in the country hiden in the woods