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I would not entirely dismiss the way the power market works in Texas. I have not disagreement the 2021 storm should never have happened. At the same time though

I would not entirely dismiss the way the power market works in Texas. I have not disagreement the 2021 storm should never have happened. At the same time though, I don’t believe other energy markets work very well either. I would prefer a more Texas like approach but with some thoughtfulness around capacity instead of just generation.

tw04 1y ago
> I have not disagreement the 2021 storm should never have happened. But they still haven’t fixed any of the issues. The exact same thing is going to happen again when (not if) it freezes. > I would prefer a more Texas like approach but with some thoughtfulness around capacity instead of just generation. Capacity isn’t the issue. Lack of winterization of pumps is the issue. Because that costs money and private companies have zero incentive to make the investment if government doesn’t force them to.
- infecto 1y ago
  You are missing the forest for the trees. Winterization is a fix for last time’s failure, not a strategy for the future. A market like Texas can work if it values resilience alongside price efficiency, meaning capacity planning, diversified generation, and yes, some enforced standards. Otherwise you’re just running a lean system that collapses the moment reality strays from the model. That storm was an issue for other markets as well but they were mostly able to get away with rolling blackouts due to interconnects. Those same markets and similar winterization issues but were under FERC guidelines. Folks love to anchor onto to winterization issue like it did not impact other FERC regions.
  - tw04 1y ago
    >You are missing the forest for the trees. I'm really not. >Winterization is a fix for last time’s failure, not a strategy for the future. A market like Texas can work if it values resilience alongside price efficiency, meaning capacity planning, diversified generation, and yes, some enforced standards. Otherwise you’re just running a lean system that collapses the moment reality strays from the model. What are you even trying to say? A private company isn't going to magically "value resilience" if there's no incentive to do so. They make MORE money when they have outages, why would they prevent that? The solution to the issue, which has worked literally everywhere else, is government regulation. Talk about missing the forest for the trees. "If only capitalism didn't work the way it works it would be perfect". >That storm was an issue for other markets as well but they were mostly able to get away with rolling blackouts due to interconnects. Those same markets and similar winterization issues but were under FERC guidelines. Folks love to anchor onto to winterization issue like it did not impact other FERC regions. Citation of which other markets had blackouts due to not winterizing pumps that had been called out repeatedly after identical outages prior in 2010 and 1989? You conveniently left that out, I'm sure it was just an oversight. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Texas-grid-again-faces-scrutiny-over-cold-15955392.php https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Tex... Because if I had to bet money, you're talking about the power companies in other states who WERE prepared for the freeze asking homeowners to drop their thermostats a couple degrees because the cold snap was driving demand significantly higher than normal. NOT because of power plant outages due to lack of preparation and component failure - due to lack of regulation.
    - infecto 1y ago
      You’re clearly frustrated here, but let’s keep it in the realm of facts rather than snark. I didn’t “leave out sources” to hide anything, I was speaking from the same public data you can find in FERC/NERC’s joint report on the 2021 event. SPP did in fact suffer significant generation losses, around 30% at peak, during the February 2021 storm. Causes were mixed: natural gas supply constraints, plant equipment failures, and yes, winterization gaps. Prior to that event, FERC’s winterization guidance was minimal and largely voluntary, so both SPP and ERCOT were operating without strong federal mandates. The difference in outcomes wasn’t that SPP magically avoided the same issues, it was that SPP is interconnected with MISO and other regional grids. That allowed them to rotate outages in short windows to maintain stability, while ERCOT’s ~50% generation loss, combined with its isolation from other grids, meant load shedding had to be longer and deeper to prevent collapse. If we’re going to critique Texas’s market, we should separate the “market structure” question from the “operational standard” question. A competitive market like ERCOT’s can work, but without binding requirements on winterization and resource adequacy, you’re just betting the grid on ideal conditions. SPP’s experience shows that interconnection alone doesn’t prevent failures, but it does give operators more options when the weather turns. Can you drop some of the hyperbole and passive aggressiveness? You don’t even understand my position yet being quite passive aggressiveness for no reason.
      - tw04 1y ago
        I'm done with the discussion until you can provide a link to all the other states under regulation that had outages as as result of frozen pumps that had occurred multiple times over the previous 25+ years. It's a straightforward ask that you're actively avoiding because it didn't happen and contradicts the story you're fabricating.
        infecto 1y ago
        Not sure why you are so angry. I am trying to help you understand at least my perspective but you keep being quite aggressive for no reason. You are framing this as if the only relevant comparison is “multiple frozen pump events over 25+ years,” but that is narrowing the scope to avoid the larger point. The February 2021 FERC/NERC report clearly documents that frozen instrumentation, valves, and pumps occurred in both regulated and unregulated markets during the same storm. SPP, MISO, and even parts of PJM experienced outages tied to equipment freezing, though the scale and duration differed because of interconnection and resource diversity. What is different in Texas is not that freezing only happens there, but that ERCOT lost roughly 50 percent of its generation and could not import meaningful power to offset it. SPP lost about 30 percent, had similar natural gas and winterization issues, but managed to rotate outages for shorter periods because it could pull from neighboring grids. If you want the source, the joint FERC, NERC, and regional entity “February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations” report is publicly available and breaks this down by region. It does not fit the claim that regulated markets never see cold-weather-driven pump or plant failures. The record shows they do, but their structure gives them more tools to manage the consequences. My whole original point was that a more market based generation and consumption model should not be overlook but let’s go through some simple facts because I think your narrative is off track. 1) Both Ercot and SPP had winter weather failures during that storm. Pretty similar on the natural gas side, frozen wells, lack of supply, huge spikes in the spot market. 2) SPP which is federally regulated had very similar winterization voluntary guidelines in place. Post event there are now new rules in place for winter. 3) SPP was able to fair better because they used a rolling blackout to different regions. Using the interconnect they could get energy from outside their grid and create short 60min blackouts. ERCOT had no luxury because of their lack of real interconnects. https://www.spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%202021%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf https://www.spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%2... You’re more than welcome to read the review of the event from SPP. They call out well-head freeze offs, frozen cooling towers, intakes, fuel lines, etc. 50% of forced generation was a fuel supply issue. You’re making it sound like Texas was an outlier here. It was not, SPP had the same exact issues of course with a slightly different fuel mix but they got by better with their interconnects. I don’t know why you are struggling to see that this winter event caught other grids by surprise. I am not defending Texas here but simply pointing out facts compared to your modified narrative.
dathinab 1y ago
> I don’t believe other energy markets work very well either. but is isn't even about that storm, big "oh no" situations happen sooner or later (e.g. see energy outage in Spain) what is important is that you learn from it. but more important in this argument is the general design, how can it handle flexible loads, how can it share loads between areas, how many ways to handle partial failure does it has etc. and Texas is kinda not that good in all of that AFIK the problem is that there are markets where politics fully getting "out of the way", doesn't work as the market dynamics favor things which might be better for the people running the gird, but are bad on a state economical level anyway (but getting in the way here is using tax money to make sure the net is stable, not getting int the way of that to protect personal investments) it's a bit like freighttrains in many parts of the EU, there operating does in most situation make no profit. But having them is helping the economy as a whole and can (implicitly) safe the state/region etc. money. So it makes sense to place some tax money into making them still viable to operate as that investment in a roundabout way saves more money then spend.
- infecto 1y ago
  I agree that the ability to adapt, whether to flexible loads, partial failures, or cross-area balancing, is the real test of a grid design. Texas’s isolation means it inherently lacks some of the tools SPP or MISO can use, which makes resilience harder. That is not a “market” problem so much as a structural one. ERCOT’s ruleset was built to optimize for low-cost generation in-state, not multi-region contingency planning. Where I think a Texas-like market could work better is if you layered competitive generation with enforceable capacity and resiliency standards, along with some interconnection flexibility. Right now, the market rewards generators for selling MWh in good weather, not for being ready in bad weather. That is the economic misalignment. The EU freight analogy works in the sense that reliability is often a public-good investment. No private actor has the incentive to overbuild or maintain resources for rare events. Texas’s approach does not have to mean politics fully getting out of the way. It could mean using market signals to keep prices efficient while still mandating the backup, winterization, and grid-sharing capabilities that the economy needs.

tw04 1y ago

> I have not disagreement the 2021 storm should never have happened. But they still haven’t fixed any of the issues. The exact same thing is going to happen again when (not if) it freezes. > I would prefer a more Texas like approach but with some thoughtfulness around capacity instead of just generation. Capacity isn’t the issue. Lack of winterization of pumps is the issue. Because that costs money and private companies have zero incentive to make the investment if government doesn’t force them to.

infecto 1y ago
You are missing the forest for the trees. Winterization is a fix for last time’s failure, not a strategy for the future. A market like Texas can work if it values resilience alongside price efficiency, meaning capacity planning, diversified generation, and yes, some enforced standards. Otherwise you’re just running a lean system that collapses the moment reality strays from the model. That storm was an issue for other markets as well but they were mostly able to get away with rolling blackouts due to interconnects. Those same markets and similar winterization issues but were under FERC guidelines. Folks love to anchor onto to winterization issue like it did not impact other FERC regions.
- tw04 1y ago
  >You are missing the forest for the trees. I'm really not. >Winterization is a fix for last time’s failure, not a strategy for the future. A market like Texas can work if it values resilience alongside price efficiency, meaning capacity planning, diversified generation, and yes, some enforced standards. Otherwise you’re just running a lean system that collapses the moment reality strays from the model. What are you even trying to say? A private company isn't going to magically "value resilience" if there's no incentive to do so. They make MORE money when they have outages, why would they prevent that? The solution to the issue, which has worked literally everywhere else, is government regulation. Talk about missing the forest for the trees. "If only capitalism didn't work the way it works it would be perfect". >That storm was an issue for other markets as well but they were mostly able to get away with rolling blackouts due to interconnects. Those same markets and similar winterization issues but were under FERC guidelines. Folks love to anchor onto to winterization issue like it did not impact other FERC regions. Citation of which other markets had blackouts due to not winterizing pumps that had been called out repeatedly after identical outages prior in 2010 and 1989? You conveniently left that out, I'm sure it was just an oversight. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Texas-grid-again-faces-scrutiny-over-cold-15955392.php https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Tex... Because if I had to bet money, you're talking about the power companies in other states who WERE prepared for the freeze asking homeowners to drop their thermostats a couple degrees because the cold snap was driving demand significantly higher than normal. NOT because of power plant outages due to lack of preparation and component failure - due to lack of regulation.
  - infecto 1y ago
    You’re clearly frustrated here, but let’s keep it in the realm of facts rather than snark. I didn’t “leave out sources” to hide anything, I was speaking from the same public data you can find in FERC/NERC’s joint report on the 2021 event. SPP did in fact suffer significant generation losses, around 30% at peak, during the February 2021 storm. Causes were mixed: natural gas supply constraints, plant equipment failures, and yes, winterization gaps. Prior to that event, FERC’s winterization guidance was minimal and largely voluntary, so both SPP and ERCOT were operating without strong federal mandates. The difference in outcomes wasn’t that SPP magically avoided the same issues, it was that SPP is interconnected with MISO and other regional grids. That allowed them to rotate outages in short windows to maintain stability, while ERCOT’s ~50% generation loss, combined with its isolation from other grids, meant load shedding had to be longer and deeper to prevent collapse. If we’re going to critique Texas’s market, we should separate the “market structure” question from the “operational standard” question. A competitive market like ERCOT’s can work, but without binding requirements on winterization and resource adequacy, you’re just betting the grid on ideal conditions. SPP’s experience shows that interconnection alone doesn’t prevent failures, but it does give operators more options when the weather turns. Can you drop some of the hyperbole and passive aggressiveness? You don’t even understand my position yet being quite passive aggressiveness for no reason.
    - tw04 1y ago
      I'm done with the discussion until you can provide a link to all the other states under regulation that had outages as as result of frozen pumps that had occurred multiple times over the previous 25+ years. It's a straightforward ask that you're actively avoiding because it didn't happen and contradicts the story you're fabricating.
      - infecto 1y ago
        Not sure why you are so angry. I am trying to help you understand at least my perspective but you keep being quite aggressive for no reason. You are framing this as if the only relevant comparison is “multiple frozen pump events over 25+ years,” but that is narrowing the scope to avoid the larger point. The February 2021 FERC/NERC report clearly documents that frozen instrumentation, valves, and pumps occurred in both regulated and unregulated markets during the same storm. SPP, MISO, and even parts of PJM experienced outages tied to equipment freezing, though the scale and duration differed because of interconnection and resource diversity. What is different in Texas is not that freezing only happens there, but that ERCOT lost roughly 50 percent of its generation and could not import meaningful power to offset it. SPP lost about 30 percent, had similar natural gas and winterization issues, but managed to rotate outages for shorter periods because it could pull from neighboring grids. If you want the source, the joint FERC, NERC, and regional entity “February 2021 Cold Weather Grid Operations” report is publicly available and breaks this down by region. It does not fit the claim that regulated markets never see cold-weather-driven pump or plant failures. The record shows they do, but their structure gives them more tools to manage the consequences. My whole original point was that a more market based generation and consumption model should not be overlook but let’s go through some simple facts because I think your narrative is off track. 1) Both Ercot and SPP had winter weather failures during that storm. Pretty similar on the natural gas side, frozen wells, lack of supply, huge spikes in the spot market. 2) SPP which is federally regulated had very similar winterization voluntary guidelines in place. Post event there are now new rules in place for winter. 3) SPP was able to fair better because they used a rolling blackout to different regions. Using the interconnect they could get energy from outside their grid and create short 60min blackouts. ERCOT had no luxury because of their lack of real interconnects. https://www.spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%202021%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf https://www.spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%2... You’re more than welcome to read the review of the event from SPP. They call out well-head freeze offs, frozen cooling towers, intakes, fuel lines, etc. 50% of forced generation was a fuel supply issue. You’re making it sound like Texas was an outlier here. It was not, SPP had the same exact issues of course with a slightly different fuel mix but they got by better with their interconnects. I don’t know why you are struggling to see that this winter event caught other grids by surprise. I am not defending Texas here but simply pointing out facts compared to your modified narrative.

dathinab 1y ago

> I don’t believe other energy markets work very well either. but is isn't even about that storm, big "oh no" situations happen sooner or later (e.g. see energy outage in Spain) what is important is that you learn from it. but more important in this argument is the general design, how can it handle flexible loads, how can it share loads between areas, how many ways to handle partial failure does it has etc. and Texas is kinda not that good in all of that AFIK the problem is that there are markets where politics fully getting "out of the way", doesn't work as the market dynamics favor things which might be better for the people running the gird, but are bad on a state economical level anyway (but getting in the way here is using tax money to make sure the net is stable, not getting int the way of that to protect personal investments) it's a bit like freighttrains in many parts of the EU, there operating does in most situation make no profit. But having them is helping the economy as a whole and can (implicitly) safe the state/region etc. money. So it makes sense to place some tax money into making them still viable to operate as that investment in a roundabout way saves more money then spend.

infecto 1y ago
I agree that the ability to adapt, whether to flexible loads, partial failures, or cross-area balancing, is the real test of a grid design. Texas’s isolation means it inherently lacks some of the tools SPP or MISO can use, which makes resilience harder. That is not a “market” problem so much as a structural one. ERCOT’s ruleset was built to optimize for low-cost generation in-state, not multi-region contingency planning. Where I think a Texas-like market could work better is if you layered competitive generation with enforceable capacity and resiliency standards, along with some interconnection flexibility. Right now, the market rewards generators for selling MWh in good weather, not for being ready in bad weather. That is the economic misalignment. The EU freight analogy works in the sense that reliability is often a public-good investment. No private actor has the incentive to overbuild or maintain resources for rare events. Texas’s approach does not have to mean politics fully getting out of the way. It could mean using market signals to keep prices efficient while still mandating the backup, winterization, and grid-sharing capabilities that the economy needs.