4 ms·

That "incredible" tech didn't seem to help all that much in Afghanistan. Not only did the US lose, I never got the sense we were even particularly close to winn

That "incredible" tech didn't seem to help all that much in Afghanistan. Not only did the US lose, I never got the sense we were even particularly close to winning, even if we'd stayed there for another 20 years and trillion dollars. In terms of tangible wins, what was Palantir's "incredible" tech actually delivering?

dogman144 1y ago
It delivered two things, and the easy response to your fair point is tactical tools — a rifle, great software — don’t win wars on their own. 1) Palantir was the first breath of fresh air that brought actually good tech with modern tech support practices to the warfighter, and by extension put the big defense contractors on notice. I personally believe this impact was tremendously important as there were real safety connotations involved, and anyone with a family member downrange could appreciate this. 2) Palantir was great targeting software that worked like modern tech vs a custom Linux distro with a GUI from 1970 and required 5 months of finagling to get vendor support for. So Palantir just brought standard 2010’s tech to soldiers betting their safety on it. This was incredible although ordinary.
- master_crab 1y ago
  There’s a name for that: technical arbitrage. Not something you can build a long term company on, because others get wind of it sooner or later.
  - nradov 1y ago
    Sometimes you really can build a long-term company on technical arbitrage when the established competitors are incapable of significant improvement due to misaligned internal incentives. Sometimes executives will allow a company to die instead of fixing it because that outcome maximizes their own personal income or career trajectory: this is one aspect of the principal-agent problem.
- stephen_g 1y ago
  If anything though, all the civilians that they accidentally targeted probably played a part in radicalising a lot more people on the ground, so if anything the tools probably made things worse. I'm sure it was very shiny looking software though, but that doesn't mean it's good.
  - dogman144 1y ago
    You’d have to define “good” and your understanding of fires targeting chains before I feel I could make a useful response! You’d be mistaken to think of me as a fan. But, I understand, I think you miss, what Palantir did as a net positive for defense acquisitions and the very legitimate impact on warfigter safety. And, how huge of an achievement it was, given what vendor impact on basic military’ing in the 2000-2010’s was like. Also, good or bad, all this modern defense innovation new American Century VC stuff, which good or bad is part of the tech industry and it’s continued stability, in my mind sources from this break through. Also, maybe the software tracked down an IED network or two. And that means there are some limbs on Americans that aren’t robotic. Pretty great too.
    - insane_dreamer 1y ago
      My biggest takeaway is surprise at how much the old sw must have sucked. Without knowing anything about it, I've always assumed military tech was cutting edge.
      - jandrewrogers 1y ago
        There are bits and pieces that are quite sophisticated but a lot of DoD software is impressively awful.
      - dogman144 1y ago
        That should be the takeaway, paired with if you ever make a startup avoid “military grade” marketing as you’ll eventually sell to a vet who thinks it’s quite humorous. The other takeaway is tech used to target insurgents is now getting American citizen data.
- lisbbb 1y ago
  1970? But Linux came out in the mid 1990s...
goodluckchuck 1y ago
It sounds like you’re judging by the political outcomes, and frankly the tactical effectiveness is pretty far disconnected from that. It’s like saying a Chef’s knife must be dull because the meal tastes bad.
ineedaj0b 1y ago
there's lots of near admission by numerous service members (retired now) who go on those war/special forces podcasts and admit they had their hands tied and told to stall. the 'brass' didn't want the war to end - unclear if it was the presidents of the time or the generals but we accomplished the mission those in charge wanted (forever war).
- dogman144 1y ago
  Rarely or never lost a tactical battle or a strategic conflict ther. Some big ones like Operation Anaconda are the obvious outlier. But what the Army, Marines, and all the Air Force can’t do: nation-building. What the State Dept is supposed to do but didn’t: nation building What congress never really bothered to do per the Constitution: a non half-assed attempt at routine approval and review to authorize the use of military force What the public did: super bowls and tech boom, poor people and idealists go to war What senior officers did: another 18 months of warring and I get a deployment patch and strategic command What your line officers and NCOs did: love a combat tour, pay and patch, but how much do we dig into the bigger picture mission and put ourselves at risk on (check notes) War Year 19 Strategy #807 Lot of reasons!
GoatInGrey 1y ago
On the contrary, the US-led coalition achieved military victory in Afghanistan in under 60 days. Which is an incredible feat. Though what that coalition failed to achieve, and where people try to adjust the definition of tactical victory, was the nation-building goal of creating a functional, independent Afghanistan government. The counterinsurgency aspect was the process of protecting that fledgling "nation". The very uncomfortable truth here is that Israel is demonstrating how to effectively destroy insurgencies in Gaza and Lebanon. You cannot pussyfoot with nasty, brutal tactics and expect to accomplish anything. This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars, and we seem to have collectively forgot it again.
- dogman144 1y ago
  The counterinsurgency lessonz of note from a doctrinal standpoint have little to do with how you framed it and I recall it. So before we go in on Total War is the Best War, your framing feels convenient vs actually thought out. How to do counterinsurgency, as I ran into it from the “what works” angle in the formal setting to learn these things. - the Malaya/British example. Notably Britain doesn’t run Malaya anymore and that country doesn’t exist. This is the direction you’re arguing works fwiw - COIN and Patraeus (sp), assuming conditions were correct across the board and you could get a unit commander and all related stakeholders to try it. Notably we didn’t “win the insurgency” in Afghanistan So there are both well established COIN case studies, one heavy and one light, both didn’t work, and no overlap with what you’re arguing.
- DiogenesKynikos 1y ago
  Defeating the government of an impoverished, low-tech country in 60 days is not exactly like Napoleon crossing the Alps. It's also not victory. The US fought for 20 years, could never eliminate the insurgency, and then withdrew with its tail between its legs, leaving the old government to come back to power. Yes, if you kill 10%, 20%, 30% of the population, maybe you'll eventually destroy the insurgency, though that approach hasn't worked yet for Israel in Gaza. But if you're not completely genocidal, that's not an option. > This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars The world wars were not counterinsurgency operations (except from the German and Japanese side in the occupied countries). They were traditional wars between major powers.

dogman144 1y ago

It delivered two things, and the easy response to your fair point is tactical tools — a rifle, great software — don’t win wars on their own. 1) Palantir was the first breath of fresh air that brought actually good tech with modern tech support practices to the warfighter, and by extension put the big defense contractors on notice. I personally believe this impact was tremendously important as there were real safety connotations involved, and anyone with a family member downrange could appreciate this. 2) Palantir was great targeting software that worked like modern tech vs a custom Linux distro with a GUI from 1970 and required 5 months of finagling to get vendor support for. So Palantir just brought standard 2010’s tech to soldiers betting their safety on it. This was incredible although ordinary.

master_crab 1y ago
There’s a name for that: technical arbitrage. Not something you can build a long term company on, because others get wind of it sooner or later.
- nradov 1y ago
  Sometimes you really can build a long-term company on technical arbitrage when the established competitors are incapable of significant improvement due to misaligned internal incentives. Sometimes executives will allow a company to die instead of fixing it because that outcome maximizes their own personal income or career trajectory: this is one aspect of the principal-agent problem.
stephen_g 1y ago
If anything though, all the civilians that they accidentally targeted probably played a part in radicalising a lot more people on the ground, so if anything the tools probably made things worse. I'm sure it was very shiny looking software though, but that doesn't mean it's good.
- dogman144 1y ago
  You’d have to define “good” and your understanding of fires targeting chains before I feel I could make a useful response! You’d be mistaken to think of me as a fan. But, I understand, I think you miss, what Palantir did as a net positive for defense acquisitions and the very legitimate impact on warfigter safety. And, how huge of an achievement it was, given what vendor impact on basic military’ing in the 2000-2010’s was like. Also, good or bad, all this modern defense innovation new American Century VC stuff, which good or bad is part of the tech industry and it’s continued stability, in my mind sources from this break through. Also, maybe the software tracked down an IED network or two. And that means there are some limbs on Americans that aren’t robotic. Pretty great too.
  - insane_dreamer 1y ago
    My biggest takeaway is surprise at how much the old sw must have sucked. Without knowing anything about it, I've always assumed military tech was cutting edge.
    - jandrewrogers 1y ago
      There are bits and pieces that are quite sophisticated but a lot of DoD software is impressively awful.
    - dogman144 1y ago
      That should be the takeaway, paired with if you ever make a startup avoid “military grade” marketing as you’ll eventually sell to a vet who thinks it’s quite humorous. The other takeaway is tech used to target insurgents is now getting American citizen data.
lisbbb 1y ago
1970? But Linux came out in the mid 1990s...

goodluckchuck 1y ago

It sounds like you’re judging by the political outcomes, and frankly the tactical effectiveness is pretty far disconnected from that. It’s like saying a Chef’s knife must be dull because the meal tastes bad.

ineedaj0b 1y ago

there's lots of near admission by numerous service members (retired now) who go on those war/special forces podcasts and admit they had their hands tied and told to stall. the 'brass' didn't want the war to end - unclear if it was the presidents of the time or the generals but we accomplished the mission those in charge wanted (forever war).

dogman144 1y ago
Rarely or never lost a tactical battle or a strategic conflict ther. Some big ones like Operation Anaconda are the obvious outlier. But what the Army, Marines, and all the Air Force can’t do: nation-building. What the State Dept is supposed to do but didn’t: nation building What congress never really bothered to do per the Constitution: a non half-assed attempt at routine approval and review to authorize the use of military force What the public did: super bowls and tech boom, poor people and idealists go to war What senior officers did: another 18 months of warring and I get a deployment patch and strategic command What your line officers and NCOs did: love a combat tour, pay and patch, but how much do we dig into the bigger picture mission and put ourselves at risk on (check notes) War Year 19 Strategy #807 Lot of reasons!

GoatInGrey 1y ago

On the contrary, the US-led coalition achieved military victory in Afghanistan in under 60 days. Which is an incredible feat. Though what that coalition failed to achieve, and where people try to adjust the definition of tactical victory, was the nation-building goal of creating a functional, independent Afghanistan government. The counterinsurgency aspect was the process of protecting that fledgling "nation". The very uncomfortable truth here is that Israel is demonstrating how to effectively destroy insurgencies in Gaza and Lebanon. You cannot pussyfoot with nasty, brutal tactics and expect to accomplish anything. This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars, and we seem to have collectively forgot it again.

dogman144 1y ago
The counterinsurgency lessonz of note from a doctrinal standpoint have little to do with how you framed it and I recall it. So before we go in on Total War is the Best War, your framing feels convenient vs actually thought out. How to do counterinsurgency, as I ran into it from the “what works” angle in the formal setting to learn these things. - the Malaya/British example. Notably Britain doesn’t run Malaya anymore and that country doesn’t exist. This is the direction you’re arguing works fwiw - COIN and Patraeus (sp), assuming conditions were correct across the board and you could get a unit commander and all related stakeholders to try it. Notably we didn’t “win the insurgency” in Afghanistan So there are both well established COIN case studies, one heavy and one light, both didn’t work, and no overlap with what you’re arguing.
DiogenesKynikos 1y ago
Defeating the government of an impoverished, low-tech country in 60 days is not exactly like Napoleon crossing the Alps. It's also not victory. The US fought for 20 years, could never eliminate the insurgency, and then withdrew with its tail between its legs, leaving the old government to come back to power. Yes, if you kill 10%, 20%, 30% of the population, maybe you'll eventually destroy the insurgency, though that approach hasn't worked yet for Israel in Gaza. But if you're not completely genocidal, that's not an option. > This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars The world wars were not counterinsurgency operations (except from the German and Japanese side in the occupied countries). They were traditional wars between major powers.