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It was more misunderstood than stupid. Ironically when Apple introduced their solution it was actually better than what we have now. It was interesting to watc

It was more misunderstood than stupid. Ironically when Apple introduced their solution it was actually better than what we have now. It was interesting to watch people lose their minds because they didn't understand how the current or proposed system worked. Current system everything can be decrypted on the cloud and is scanned for CSAM by all ISPs/service providers. Apple wanted the device to scan for CSAM and if it got flagged, it allowed the file to be decrypted on the cloud for a human to check it (again, what happens now). If it didn't get flagged then it stayed encrypted on the cloud and no one could look at it. This not only was a better protection for your data, it has a massive reduction in server costs. CSAM is also a list of hashes for some of the worst CP video/images out there. It doesn't read anything, just hash matching. The chance of mismatch is so incredibly small to be almost non-existent. Even so the current CSAM guidelines require a human to review the results and require multiple hits before you are even flagged. Again this is what is happening now. Personally I'm against having any agency the ability to read private messages, while at the same time I fully agree with what CSAM is trying to do. Realistically if countries want to read encrypted messages, they can already do so. Some do too. The fact that the EU is debating it is a good thing.

wobfan 1y ago
> Realistically if countries want to read encrypted messages, they can already do so. How? Are you implying adynchronous and synchronous encryption is broken? Because last time I checked since Snowden our encryption is basically the one single thing in the whole concept of the internet that has been done very right, with forward secrecy and long term security in mind. AFAIK there are no signs that someone or something has been able to break it. Also, the solutions you present do imply that someone already has the private key to decrypt. Sure, they'll say they'll just decrypt if your a bad person, but the definition of a bad person changes from government to government (see USA), and from CEO to CEO. Encryption should and mostly is built on zero trust and it only works with zero trust. Scanning, and risking the privacy of billions and billions of messages by having the key to read them because there have been some bad actors is fighting a fly with a bazooka. Which sounds funny overkill, but, fun fact, it also just doesn't work. It destroys a lot, and gains nothing. I don't have a better solution for the problem. But this solution is definitely the wrong one.
- _Algernon_ 1y ago
  >How? A couple of guys with 5$ wrenches can be pretty effective at extracting cryptographic secrets.
  - inglor_cz 1y ago
    Not on scale, though. Plus, this leaves some quite visible traces and leads to backlash. That is like saying that Guantanamo can defeat religious terrorism. In individual cases, yes, on the whole, absolutely not.
  - wobfan 1y ago
    I mean yeah, why break crypto when you can break kneecaps?
- EagnaIonat 1y ago
  > How? Are you implying adynchronous and synchronous encryption is broken? Not at all. You make encryption a crime. You ban certain apps. It won't stop people using encryption but that doesn't matter. Because just the act of using it makes you a dissident that can be dealt with. That is currently the process in Iran and Egypt for example. Even if they can't read the message and it's not illegal you can still be guilty by association. The act of sending a message can be tracked. There has been countless situations of that even outside the realm of instant messaging.
crinkly 1y ago
The problem with the CSAM detection is that it can be used for adversarial purposes as well. For example if someone decides an image is politically inconvenient and pressures it to be blocked by hash, then Apple may have to comply or remove themselves from an entire market. Building the mechanism to do that is not acceptable in a civilised society. And of course does this really solve the real problem of child exploitation? No it doesn't. It allows performative folk working for NGOs to feel like they've done something while children are still being abused and it is being covered up or not even investigated as is so common today. Improving policing and investigatory standards is where this should stop. We already have RIPA. All this does is create the expectation that a surveillance dragnet is acceptable. It is not.
- EagnaIonat 1y ago
  > Building the mechanism to do that is not acceptable in a civilised society. This mechanism has been in production for many years on all service providers. Example: - Microsoft since at least 2009. - Google since at least 2013
4bpp 1y ago
So what would stop the list of hashes from being extended with hashes of copyrighted media, evidence of corruption (labelled slander or an invasion of the perpetrator's privacy) or evidence of the preceding abuses of the system themselves? Once you have an established mechanism for "fighting crime", "don't use it to fight that type of crime" is not a position that has any chance of prevailing in the political landscape - see also all the cases of national security wiretaps being used against petty druggies.
- DoctorOW 1y ago
  Hashes don't really work that way. They don't actually give any high level of a photo's contents. You can't ask a hash to find all photos of a certain document or a meeting or anything like that. They really only detect exact copies, which makes them somewhat useful only for the most basic of copyright infringement (i.e. proving someone has a copy)
  - 4bpp 1y ago
    As far as I remember, Apple's proposal was to involve https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perceptual_hashing https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perceptual_hashing which is meant to sidestep this exact problem - and either way, your objection would be equally applicable to CSAM. There is no mechanism that works better for it than for copyright enforcement.
- EagnaIonat 1y ago
  > So what would stop the list of hashes from being extended with hashes of copyrighted media, evidence of corruption (labelled slander or an invasion of the perpetrator's privacy) or evidence of the preceding abuses of the system themselves? Absolutely nothing. But they are already scanning hashes now on everything.
isodev 1y ago
> Realistically if countries want to read encrypted messages, they can already do so. Some do too. The fact that the EU is debating it is a good thing. I agree that the discussion is evolving the bill every time and there are always good amounts of feedback and comments. It’s a bit annoying when tech websites don’t always update themselves with the latest changes, just labelling it ChatControl doesn’t mean it’s the same policy that was discussed 5 years ago. It makes for good click bait titles, but the technical nuances are missing. For example, one would be interested to read a comparison between the “privacy” of a tool matching photos against a database of signatures vs. say Apple’s performative privacy in the Photos app or the iCloud + chatGPT/Apple Intelligence mix.
fwn 1y ago
> CSAM is also a list of hashes for some of the worst CP video/images out there. It doesn't read anything, just hash matching. The list presumably contains CSAM hashes. However, it could also include hashes for other types of content. AFAIK the specific scope at any point in time is not something that can be fully evaluated by independent third parties, and there is no obvious reason why this list could not be extended to cover different types of content in the future. Once it is in place, why not search for documents that are known to facilitate terrorism? What about human trafficking? Drug trafficking? Antisemitic memes spring to mind. Or maybe memes critical of some government, a war, etc. This is because, despite the CSAM framing, it is essentially a censorship/surveillance infrastructure. One that is neutral with regard to content.
- EagnaIonat 1y ago
  CSAM scanning has been around for at least 15 years. All service providers are required to do it by law. You are absolutely correct with your "what-ifs" and this underlines the need for more oversight and transparency. The process (my knowledge is a few years old) is that service providers or Law enforcement from countries can submit files to the CSAM database. The database is owned by National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). Once they receive the files they review them and confirm that the files meet the standard for the database, document its entry, create a hash and add that to the database. After that the file is destroyed. This whole process requires multiple approvals and numerous humans review the files before the hash goes into the CSAM. Also every hash has a chain of custody. So in the event of an investigation they know exactly everyone who was involved in putting that hash into CSAM. So it's possible to submit an image that is not what CSAM is intended for, but the chances of it even remotely getting into the database is next to nothing. To add to this service providers can be sued for submitting invalid files.
  - fwn 1y ago
    > CSAM scanning has been around for at least 15 years. All service providers are required to do it by law. That is true for scanning in the cloud, but it's important not to conflate this with client-side scanning. The distinction between cloud and local processing is foundational. Collapsing that boundary would mark a serious shift in how surveillance infrastructure operates. > Once they receive the files they review them and confirm that the files meet the standard for the database, document its entry, create a hash and add that to the database. After that the file is destroyed. That is already a structural problem: If the original is destroyed, how can independent parties verify that database entries still correspond to the intended legal and ethical scope? This makes meaningful oversight functionally impossible. Even if centralizing control in a state-funded NGO were considered acceptable (which is already questionable), locating that NGO in the US (subject to US law and politics!) is a serious issue. Why should, say, the local devices of German citizens be scanned against a hash list maintained under US jurisdiction? > So it's possible to submit an image that is not what CSAM is intended for, but the chances of it even remotely getting into the database is next to nothing. To add to this service providers can be sued for submitting invalid files. Procedural safeguards are good, but they don't solve the underlying problem: the entire system hinges on policy decisions that can change. A single legislative change is all it takes to expand the list’s scope. The current process may seem narrow today, but it offers no guarantees about tomorrow. We’ve seen this pattern countless times: surveillance powers are introduced under the pretext of targeting only the most heinous crimes, but once established, they’re gradually repurposed for a wide range of far less serious offenses. It is the default playbook.
thefz 1y ago
> Ironically when Apple introduced their solution it was actually better than what we have now. It was interesting to watch people lose their minds because they didn't understand how the current or proposed system worked. What, the cloud scanning of user photos was a good idea for you? The private companyt deciding what is good or bad idea? The automated surveillance that could lead to people wrongfully accused idea? > f it didn't get flagged then it stayed encrypted on the cloud and no one could look at it. If Apple can decrypt your data when they find a match, they can decrypt ALL your data. Who says it will be used for good? Do you trust a private company this much?
- EagnaIonat 1y ago
  > What, the cloud scanning of user photos was a good idea for you? That is what is happening before Apples suggestion and is still happening. > The automated surveillance that could lead to people wrongfully accused idea? A hash scan is perfectly fine. It can tell you nothing about what is in your file except that if it matches another file that they know is CP. Even then a flagged item has to be reviewed by law enforcement in case of a mistake and a single file is normally not enough to convict. The chance is very slim of a mismatch. Facebook for example report a 1 in 50 billion chance of a mismatch. To put that in context. The chance of a miss is 1 photo every 10 years across all users of facebook (approx 3 billion active users). > If Apple can decrypt your data when they find a match, they can decrypt ALL your data. Again. This is what is happening now for ALL service providers. Apples suggestion was that if a file wasn't flagged it could only be decrypted by the owners device and nothing else. Not even Apple.
  - thefz 1y ago
    Are you OK with private companies basically playing the police with your data?
    - deleted 1y ago
      [deleted]
    - EagnaIonat 1y ago

wobfan 1y ago

> Realistically if countries want to read encrypted messages, they can already do so. How? Are you implying adynchronous and synchronous encryption is broken? Because last time I checked since Snowden our encryption is basically the one single thing in the whole concept of the internet that has been done very right, with forward secrecy and long term security in mind. AFAIK there are no signs that someone or something has been able to break it. Also, the solutions you present do imply that someone already has the private key to decrypt. Sure, they'll say they'll just decrypt if your a bad person, but the definition of a bad person changes from government to government (see USA), and from CEO to CEO. Encryption should and mostly is built on zero trust and it only works with zero trust. Scanning, and risking the privacy of billions and billions of messages by having the key to read them because there have been some bad actors is fighting a fly with a bazooka. Which sounds funny overkill, but, fun fact, it also just doesn't work. It destroys a lot, and gains nothing. I don't have a better solution for the problem. But this solution is definitely the wrong one.

_Algernon_ 1y ago
>How? A couple of guys with 5$ wrenches can be pretty effective at extracting cryptographic secrets.
- inglor_cz 1y ago
  Not on scale, though. Plus, this leaves some quite visible traces and leads to backlash. That is like saying that Guantanamo can defeat religious terrorism. In individual cases, yes, on the whole, absolutely not.
- wobfan 1y ago
  I mean yeah, why break crypto when you can break kneecaps?
EagnaIonat 1y ago
> How? Are you implying adynchronous and synchronous encryption is broken? Not at all. You make encryption a crime. You ban certain apps. It won't stop people using encryption but that doesn't matter. Because just the act of using it makes you a dissident that can be dealt with. That is currently the process in Iran and Egypt for example. Even if they can't read the message and it's not illegal you can still be guilty by association. The act of sending a message can be tracked. There has been countless situations of that even outside the realm of instant messaging.

crinkly 1y ago

The problem with the CSAM detection is that it can be used for adversarial purposes as well. For example if someone decides an image is politically inconvenient and pressures it to be blocked by hash, then Apple may have to comply or remove themselves from an entire market. Building the mechanism to do that is not acceptable in a civilised society. And of course does this really solve the real problem of child exploitation? No it doesn't. It allows performative folk working for NGOs to feel like they've done something while children are still being abused and it is being covered up or not even investigated as is so common today. Improving policing and investigatory standards is where this should stop. We already have RIPA. All this does is create the expectation that a surveillance dragnet is acceptable. It is not.

EagnaIonat 1y ago
> Building the mechanism to do that is not acceptable in a civilised society. This mechanism has been in production for many years on all service providers. Example: - Microsoft since at least 2009. - Google since at least 2013

4bpp 1y ago

So what would stop the list of hashes from being extended with hashes of copyrighted media, evidence of corruption (labelled slander or an invasion of the perpetrator's privacy) or evidence of the preceding abuses of the system themselves? Once you have an established mechanism for "fighting crime", "don't use it to fight that type of crime" is not a position that has any chance of prevailing in the political landscape - see also all the cases of national security wiretaps being used against petty druggies.

DoctorOW 1y ago
Hashes don't really work that way. They don't actually give any high level of a photo's contents. You can't ask a hash to find all photos of a certain document or a meeting or anything like that. They really only detect exact copies, which makes them somewhat useful only for the most basic of copyright infringement (i.e. proving someone has a copy)
- 4bpp 1y ago
  As far as I remember, Apple's proposal was to involve https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perceptual_hashing https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perceptual_hashing which is meant to sidestep this exact problem - and either way, your objection would be equally applicable to CSAM. There is no mechanism that works better for it than for copyright enforcement.
EagnaIonat 1y ago
> So what would stop the list of hashes from being extended with hashes of copyrighted media, evidence of corruption (labelled slander or an invasion of the perpetrator's privacy) or evidence of the preceding abuses of the system themselves? Absolutely nothing. But they are already scanning hashes now on everything.

isodev 1y ago

> Realistically if countries want to read encrypted messages, they can already do so. Some do too. The fact that the EU is debating it is a good thing. I agree that the discussion is evolving the bill every time and there are always good amounts of feedback and comments. It’s a bit annoying when tech websites don’t always update themselves with the latest changes, just labelling it ChatControl doesn’t mean it’s the same policy that was discussed 5 years ago. It makes for good click bait titles, but the technical nuances are missing. For example, one would be interested to read a comparison between the “privacy” of a tool matching photos against a database of signatures vs. say Apple’s performative privacy in the Photos app or the iCloud + chatGPT/Apple Intelligence mix.

fwn 1y ago

> CSAM is also a list of hashes for some of the worst CP video/images out there. It doesn't read anything, just hash matching. The list presumably contains CSAM hashes. However, it could also include hashes for other types of content. AFAIK the specific scope at any point in time is not something that can be fully evaluated by independent third parties, and there is no obvious reason why this list could not be extended to cover different types of content in the future. Once it is in place, why not search for documents that are known to facilitate terrorism? What about human trafficking? Drug trafficking? Antisemitic memes spring to mind. Or maybe memes critical of some government, a war, etc. This is because, despite the CSAM framing, it is essentially a censorship/surveillance infrastructure. One that is neutral with regard to content.

EagnaIonat 1y ago
CSAM scanning has been around for at least 15 years. All service providers are required to do it by law. You are absolutely correct with your "what-ifs" and this underlines the need for more oversight and transparency. The process (my knowledge is a few years old) is that service providers or Law enforcement from countries can submit files to the CSAM database. The database is owned by National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). Once they receive the files they review them and confirm that the files meet the standard for the database, document its entry, create a hash and add that to the database. After that the file is destroyed. This whole process requires multiple approvals and numerous humans review the files before the hash goes into the CSAM. Also every hash has a chain of custody. So in the event of an investigation they know exactly everyone who was involved in putting that hash into CSAM. So it's possible to submit an image that is not what CSAM is intended for, but the chances of it even remotely getting into the database is next to nothing. To add to this service providers can be sued for submitting invalid files.
- fwn 1y ago
  > CSAM scanning has been around for at least 15 years. All service providers are required to do it by law. That is true for scanning in the cloud, but it's important not to conflate this with client-side scanning. The distinction between cloud and local processing is foundational. Collapsing that boundary would mark a serious shift in how surveillance infrastructure operates. > Once they receive the files they review them and confirm that the files meet the standard for the database, document its entry, create a hash and add that to the database. After that the file is destroyed. That is already a structural problem: If the original is destroyed, how can independent parties verify that database entries still correspond to the intended legal and ethical scope? This makes meaningful oversight functionally impossible. Even if centralizing control in a state-funded NGO were considered acceptable (which is already questionable), locating that NGO in the US (subject to US law and politics!) is a serious issue. Why should, say, the local devices of German citizens be scanned against a hash list maintained under US jurisdiction? > So it's possible to submit an image that is not what CSAM is intended for, but the chances of it even remotely getting into the database is next to nothing. To add to this service providers can be sued for submitting invalid files. Procedural safeguards are good, but they don't solve the underlying problem: the entire system hinges on policy decisions that can change. A single legislative change is all it takes to expand the list’s scope. The current process may seem narrow today, but it offers no guarantees about tomorrow. We’ve seen this pattern countless times: surveillance powers are introduced under the pretext of targeting only the most heinous crimes, but once established, they’re gradually repurposed for a wide range of far less serious offenses. It is the default playbook.

thefz 1y ago

> Ironically when Apple introduced their solution it was actually better than what we have now. It was interesting to watch people lose their minds because they didn't understand how the current or proposed system worked. What, the cloud scanning of user photos was a good idea for you? The private companyt deciding what is good or bad idea? The automated surveillance that could lead to people wrongfully accused idea? > f it didn't get flagged then it stayed encrypted on the cloud and no one could look at it. If Apple can decrypt your data when they find a match, they can decrypt ALL your data. Who says it will be used for good? Do you trust a private company this much?

EagnaIonat 1y ago
> What, the cloud scanning of user photos was a good idea for you? That is what is happening before Apples suggestion and is still happening. > The automated surveillance that could lead to people wrongfully accused idea? A hash scan is perfectly fine. It can tell you nothing about what is in your file except that if it matches another file that they know is CP. Even then a flagged item has to be reviewed by law enforcement in case of a mistake and a single file is normally not enough to convict. The chance is very slim of a mismatch. Facebook for example report a 1 in 50 billion chance of a mismatch. To put that in context. The chance of a miss is 1 photo every 10 years across all users of facebook (approx 3 billion active users). > If Apple can decrypt your data when they find a match, they can decrypt ALL your data. Again. This is what is happening now for ALL service providers. Apples suggestion was that if a file wasn't flagged it could only be decrypted by the owners device and nothing else. Not even Apple.
- thefz 1y ago
  Are you OK with private companies basically playing the police with your data?
  - deleted 1y ago
    [deleted]
  - EagnaIonat 1y ago