4 ms·
Can air be dominated against a powerful adversary in the age of relatively cheap AA?
by postexitus 1y ago
Can air be dominated against a powerful adversary in the age of relatively cheap AA?
- sgt101 1y agoI don't think we know, but it does look like the answer is Yes. Both Iraq in 1991 and Iran in 2024 had extensive, developed, and expensive AA setups. The USA destroyed the Iraq assets by attrition, Israel surgically removed the Iranian ones. Russia apparently has no SEAD or DEAD capability because they didn't and haven't even attempted to remove the Ukrainian air defence network. I think this shows one of the key requirements for future European Air Force structures. Long range strike and SEAD/DEAD are going to be fundamental for creating the conditions for military dominance in the east.
- nradov 1y agoRight, and one of the major weaknesses of NATO is that outside the US none of the other members have much SEAD/DEAD capability. They might train for it occasionally but they don't have entire squadrons which specialize in that mission.
- sgt101 1y ago100% - this must change.
- nothercastle 1y agoIn both those situations the reason it was possible is because they weren’t being resupplied. The Russians can’t achieve this because advanced aa is constantly flowing in from US and Europe so eliminating existing AA is not enough.
- postexitus 1y agoAt the same time, despite their arguably modern capabilities, neither Russia nor Ukraine can fly their planes over contested regions, let alone get close to establishing air superiority. I am not entirely sure if we can compare Iraq/Iran setups (despite being same hardware) to an adversary who knows what they are doing like Russia/China.
- hollerith 1y ago>Russia apparently has no SEAD or DEAD capability because they didn't and haven't even attempted to remove the Ukrainian air defence network. According to a Youtube video I watched about a year ago, Russia destroyed 2 Patriot batteries deployed to the front lines, causing Ukraine to decide stop deploying the system near the front, but rather to use them to protect the parts of Ukraine far from the front from missile and drone attacks. Around the same time, Russia started dropping a few dozen glide bombs per day on Ukrainian positions near or on the front (and this was months before I saw the news about Moscow's planning to deploy a new generation of glide bombs that can glide a lot farther). That suggests that Moscow has made at least some progress on degrading Ukrainian air defenses at least in the area near the ground fighting because the Patriot system has a range of about 160 km against airplanes (less against missiles) which is a lot further than a (current generation) Russian glide bomb can glide.