3 ms·

Why Intel Deprecated SGX?

22 points by ricecat 1y ago

Lirael 1y ago
[flagged]
walterbell 1y ago
SGX may be a record holder for exploits, https://hn.algolia.com/?query=sgx https://hn.algolia.com/?query=sgx
- sublimefire 1y ago
  Most of them require physical access so it is not the same as some log4j vuln.
  - walterbell 1y ago
    Per article, physical access is within SGX threat model.
- anonymousDan 1y ago
  About 2 of those are actual exploits?
  - walterbell 1y ago
    For some definition of 2? Intel SGX Fuse Key0, a.k.a. Root Provisioning Key Extracted by Researchers Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Against Intel SGX SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom ÆPIC Leak: SGX, Intel’s data fortress, has been breached yet again Intel SGX defeated yet again–this time thanks to on-chip power meter SGAxe and Crosstalk: Plundering of crypto keys from ultrasecure SGX Spectre Attack on SGX PoC
    - anonymousDan 1y ago
      Thanks - many of those didn't show up on your original link.
anonymousDan 1y ago
Pretty incoherent article. Not sure what point they are trying to make about the threat model of SGX. SGX was/is a groundbreaking attempt to solve a very difficult problem IMO. TEEs are still an active area of research that has benefited massively from the availability of an actual implementation in mainstream processors. And most other CPU manufacturers are also offering their own flavour of TEE, many of which have learned lessons from SGX.
- AstralStorm 1y ago
  The point about the threat model of SGX is that insulating an enclave with it does nothing to protect the code actually handling the data from the enclave. It really does not even protect against firmware side attacks. For that, TPM attestation is just as good. At some point, somewhere, data processed by the SGX enclave has to pass through the usual VTd or such. Unless SGX enclave is used to feed data directly into hardware, in which case the weak point is the firmware and bus instead. If it ensured no side channel attacks, it would be useful for some operations. But it does not therefore it isn't.
  - iforgotpassword 1y ago
    It was touted as making cloud computing secure. How anyone could actually believe this is beyond me. The cloud provider has physical access to the host machine. For all I know it could all be smokes and mirrors, emulated on a C64, while all my data is getting exfiltrated. The only people who ever bought into this is cryptobro crackheads and government contractors doing it for compliance bullshit. Up to 0% of cloud customers went as far as to even try to verify the thing does what it says it does. Case in point: TeleMessage. Supposedly E2E-Encrypted message archival turns out to be a plain text database on some servers. Surprised Pikachu face.
    - sublimefire 1y ago
      This is some tinfoilhat stuff. An extreme suggestion that a cloud provider would physically open up machines and exfiltrate the keys so that they could then read the memory of a customer workload, for what reason? Remember that hardware is virtualised and makes it difficult to pin point which server is running what. Not using such tech makes it easier for the cloud provider to inspect memory so that is not a better approach.
underdeserver 1y ago
Should be (2022).
everfrustrated 1y ago
Headline is missing important context: Intel is keeping SGX on servers and no longer offering it on non-server chips like workstations and laptops.
noname120 1y ago
From Wikipedia[1]: > A pivot by Intel in 2021 resulted in the deprecation of SGX from the 11th and 12th generation Intel Core processors, but development continues on Intel Xeon for cloud and enterprise use. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#cite_ref-bleep_6-0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#cite...
bjackman 1y ago
This never made any sense to me for consumers. Enclaves and confidential compute are about the owner of the physical device giving up power and handing it to a remote entity. In the case of SGX on consumer hardware that usually meant consumers giving up power to Netflix or whoever via DRM bullshit. On the other hand, TDX on server devices is mostly about cloud providers giving up power to their users. This is a fundamentally better use case for TEEs. So overall this makes sense to me. Kinda annoying that this stuff is so complicated that they have to leave it out of cheaper parts but that also makes sense, this must be incredibly invasive stuff that increases the cost in so many areas.
- lostmsu 1y ago
  It could have been used for a distributed cloud over consumer hardware.
  - bjackman 1y ago
    That would be a neat usecase but it's not a slam dunk. TEEs in theory eliminate the need for the user to trust the owner of the hardware. But for a cloud you need to eliminate the other direction too. Cloud companies achieve this by... Spending a LOT of money on it. And the technical project of doing that is easier, because they control the whole host stack. I'm not sure it's technically feasible to achieve that in an environment where the host also needs to also support stuff like running Steam! But still, maybe if you constrained the requirements enough it could be possible, it would have been a really cool thing to try!
bananapub 1y ago
because it kept getting owned, then fixed, then owned again
2bluesc 1y ago
> Chipworks offers $50-250k to fully extract the eFUSE of one Intel i5 processor, so the eFUSE content is encrypted by a master key (called “global wrapping logic key” in the patent). I wonder how readily things like this are known within the HW security community?
rstuart4133 1y ago
Warning: the article is full of acronyms. Despite having section titles like "SGX Basics" unless you are familiar with terms like EPID, e-Fuse, iclsClient and many more, you aren't going to get much from it beyond "Intel dropped SGX for non-server CPU's in 2022".

22 points by ricecat 1y ago

Lirael 1y ago

[flagged]

walterbell 1y ago

SGX may be a record holder for exploits, https://hn.algolia.com/?query=sgx https://hn.algolia.com/?query=sgx

sublimefire 1y ago
Most of them require physical access so it is not the same as some log4j vuln.
- walterbell 1y ago
  Per article, physical access is within SGX threat model.
anonymousDan 1y ago
About 2 of those are actual exploits?
- walterbell 1y ago
  For some definition of 2? Intel SGX Fuse Key0, a.k.a. Root Provisioning Key Extracted by Researchers Plundervolt: Software-Based Fault Injection Attacks Against Intel SGX SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom ÆPIC Leak: SGX, Intel’s data fortress, has been breached yet again Intel SGX defeated yet again–this time thanks to on-chip power meter SGAxe and Crosstalk: Plundering of crypto keys from ultrasecure SGX Spectre Attack on SGX PoC
  - anonymousDan 1y ago
    Thanks - many of those didn't show up on your original link.

anonymousDan 1y ago

Pretty incoherent article. Not sure what point they are trying to make about the threat model of SGX. SGX was/is a groundbreaking attempt to solve a very difficult problem IMO. TEEs are still an active area of research that has benefited massively from the availability of an actual implementation in mainstream processors. And most other CPU manufacturers are also offering their own flavour of TEE, many of which have learned lessons from SGX.

AstralStorm 1y ago
The point about the threat model of SGX is that insulating an enclave with it does nothing to protect the code actually handling the data from the enclave. It really does not even protect against firmware side attacks. For that, TPM attestation is just as good. At some point, somewhere, data processed by the SGX enclave has to pass through the usual VTd or such. Unless SGX enclave is used to feed data directly into hardware, in which case the weak point is the firmware and bus instead. If it ensured no side channel attacks, it would be useful for some operations. But it does not therefore it isn't.
- iforgotpassword 1y ago
  It was touted as making cloud computing secure. How anyone could actually believe this is beyond me. The cloud provider has physical access to the host machine. For all I know it could all be smokes and mirrors, emulated on a C64, while all my data is getting exfiltrated. The only people who ever bought into this is cryptobro crackheads and government contractors doing it for compliance bullshit. Up to 0% of cloud customers went as far as to even try to verify the thing does what it says it does. Case in point: TeleMessage. Supposedly E2E-Encrypted message archival turns out to be a plain text database on some servers. Surprised Pikachu face.
  - sublimefire 1y ago
    This is some tinfoilhat stuff. An extreme suggestion that a cloud provider would physically open up machines and exfiltrate the keys so that they could then read the memory of a customer workload, for what reason? Remember that hardware is virtualised and makes it difficult to pin point which server is running what. Not using such tech makes it easier for the cloud provider to inspect memory so that is not a better approach.

underdeserver 1y ago

Should be (2022).

everfrustrated 1y ago

Headline is missing important context: Intel is keeping SGX on servers and no longer offering it on non-server chips like workstations and laptops.

noname120 1y ago

From Wikipedia[1]: > A pivot by Intel in 2021 resulted in the deprecation of SGX from the 11th and 12th generation Intel Core processors, but development continues on Intel Xeon for cloud and enterprise use. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#cite_ref-bleep_6-0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#cite...

bjackman 1y ago

This never made any sense to me for consumers. Enclaves and confidential compute are about the owner of the physical device giving up power and handing it to a remote entity. In the case of SGX on consumer hardware that usually meant consumers giving up power to Netflix or whoever via DRM bullshit. On the other hand, TDX on server devices is mostly about cloud providers giving up power to their users. This is a fundamentally better use case for TEEs. So overall this makes sense to me. Kinda annoying that this stuff is so complicated that they have to leave it out of cheaper parts but that also makes sense, this must be incredibly invasive stuff that increases the cost in so many areas.

lostmsu 1y ago
It could have been used for a distributed cloud over consumer hardware.
- bjackman 1y ago
  That would be a neat usecase but it's not a slam dunk. TEEs in theory eliminate the need for the user to trust the owner of the hardware. But for a cloud you need to eliminate the other direction too. Cloud companies achieve this by... Spending a LOT of money on it. And the technical project of doing that is easier, because they control the whole host stack. I'm not sure it's technically feasible to achieve that in an environment where the host also needs to also support stuff like running Steam! But still, maybe if you constrained the requirements enough it could be possible, it would have been a really cool thing to try!

bananapub 1y ago

because it kept getting owned, then fixed, then owned again

2bluesc 1y ago

> Chipworks offers $50-250k to fully extract the eFUSE of one Intel i5 processor, so the eFUSE content is encrypted by a master key (called “global wrapping logic key” in the patent). I wonder how readily things like this are known within the HW security community?

rstuart4133 1y ago

Warning: the article is full of acronyms. Despite having section titles like "SGX Basics" unless you are familiar with terms like EPID, e-Fuse, iclsClient and many more, you aren't going to get much from it beyond "Intel dropped SGX for non-server CPU's in 2022".