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TeleMessage, used by Trump officials, can access plaintext chat logs
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- dang 1y agoRecent and related: Technical analysis of the Signal clone used by Trump officials - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43875476 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43875476 - May 2025 (313 comments)
- ChrisArchitect 1y agoMike Waltz Accidentally Reveals App Govt Uses to Archive Signal Messages https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43865103 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43865103
- chipsrafferty 1y ago[flagged]
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- proactivesvcs 1y agoI'd find it useful if I could access my Signal chat logs in plaintext. The software offers no facility to do this on any platform, and on Desktop the programs that have allowed me to take proper backups are (by necessity) a moving target because of changes to the database, so I am constantly having to get around to updating them and occasionally even that's a pain.
- XorNot 1y agoIt'd also be useful if backups on Android actually streamed somewhere off the phone so they could be meaningfully appended to, kept. Or handled per channel (i.e. my baby pictures channel with family).
- proactivesvcs 1y ago...and if the restore process wasn't so fragile. The only time I needed to backup and restore it just crashed part-way through, so the backup process wasn't even doing any validation.
- hedora 1y agoThe lack of encrypted (and cross platform) backups is the biggest security hole I know of in Signal. People inevitably end up working around it, which can mean using SMS, copying the threads / screenshots / attachments to arbitrary other storage, or switching to things like TeleMessage because of record keeping requirements. I wish Signal were less hostile towards forks. I'd happily switch to a client that uses their network, but that's compatible with iCloud backup.
- Zambyte 1y agoThis comment confused me a lot, because Signal has encrypted backups, just not cross platform. Looking into it more, it seems that iOS only has a "transfer" option instead of allowing backups. It's hard not to suspect this is due to arbitrary limitations on filesystem access on iOS.
- nicce 1y agoThat would hit the Google One revenue if people would use alternatives… But also, it must have something to do with law enforcement. On the other hand, Google may say that forensic investigation of phone is harder (if no jailbreak), but on the otherhand it is easier to hand over the data behind the scenes from the remote cloud. Backups are not E2EE by default (user can enable, so they have an argument), so in most cases law enforcement can access WhatsApp messages, SMS messages and anything else without a problem. Many people don’t think about this, and defaults matter.
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- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> I'd find it useful if I could access my Signal chat logs in plaintext I'd probably also find it useful if I could access your Signal chat logs in plaintext. That's the problem.
- jazzyjackson 1y agoIf someone has enough control of the app to utilize its export-to-plaintext button you were SOL anyway, there are plenty of use cases for “export a password protected encrypted blob of chat history so I don’t lose everything every time I switch devices”
- JumpCrisscross 1y ago> If someone has enough control of the app to utilize its export-to-plaintext button Or find the lowest-paid, most-indebted and/or most-adulterous member of the TeleMessage team and bribe and blackmail them.
- Zambyte 1y agoSignal already has exactly that? That isn't the same as a plain text export like the GP was saying though.
- nicbou 1y agoNeither do other chat apps. It's usually impossible to regularly export your chats to a machine you own in a format you can use. Same with photo apps.
- theyknowitsxmas 1y agoAnyone can change the client name and build it to mislead baddies when photographed in public.
- csours 1y agoOh dear, this seems to be a bit of a footgun.
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- tptacek 1y agoIsn't that the point?
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- Aurornis 1y agoNo, the point is for the government to have access the plaintext after it is securely delivered to an approved archive location, not TeleMessage having access on AWS-hosted servers exposed to the public internet. TeleMessage pitched their service as using end-to-end encryption of the message into the corporate archive. > End-to-End encryption from the mobile phone through to the corporate archive Apparently the plaintext messages were going to a TeleMessage server on AWS (not an approved government archive location) that was publicly accessible. Naturally it was hacked.
- fnordpiglet 1y agoI doubt that’s the point either. The government should have cipher text they are able to decrypt in an approved archive location with rigorously managed key material and a careful cryptographically variable chain of custody from its inception. Plain text should never factor into this.
- matthewdgreen 1y agoThe US government does have storage facilities and secure messaging tools with escrow, all designed for exactly this use-case (secure messaging amongst DoD personnel.) But the whole point of Signal+TeleMessage was to route around that "clunky stuff" by outsourcing it to a vendor.
- fnordpiglet 1y ago
- fnordpiglet 1y agoThese are the guys trying to jail Krebs for being honest. They earned the “experts” they deserve.
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- actionfromafar 1y agoAnd still there is ample support for the administration, also here. I am curious how much of it is through cognitive dissonance and how much not thinking too hard about the stuff a particular supporter don't like, and how much of it is with eyes open, embracing the crazy and the incompetence for some "higher goal" whatever that may be. (It also probably is very different, all from "own the libs" through "escalate the second coming of Christ" or any combination thereof.)
- mtlynch 1y agoFor anyone else confused, "Krebs" in this context refers to Chris Krebs[0, 1], former Director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Chris Krebs is unrelated to Brian Krebs of Krebs on Security. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Krebs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Krebs [1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-risks-from-chris-krebs-and-government-censorship/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-pr...
- khaki54 1y agoYou DO realize that TeleMessage was put in place and procured before Trump took office right?
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- yapyap 1y agogenius
- aeontech 1y agoWhy bother hacking your phone and installing a keylogger when we can convince your IT department to buy it and install it for your entire team. Have to say, this is pretty epic.
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- khaki54 1y agoThis may be a factual but not truthful article. This was initially framed to appear like the Trump Administration was doing something out of the ordinary by using Signal. There were also accusations that they were using Signal's disappearing message feature to conceal their activities from the authorities, and that they were breaking the Presidential Records Act, etc. Now it's revealed that they are using a version that actually archives all the messages to be compliant with the law and individual Agency policies. The new theory is that the Trump Administration is doing something especially nefarious by archiving the messages and/or they are doing it insecurely and they are controlled by Israel. First and foremost, the Signal infrastructure was setup in most cases by the previous administration! Even a cursory search of USA Spending reveals millions were spent on telemessage before Trump was elected. https://www.usaspending.gov/search?hash=d900bda0a5eccae47ba7655a5ac2830f https://www.usaspending.gov/search?hash=d900bda0a5eccae47ba7... I'm not a journalist, but look for yourself. As for accusations that what the Biden Administration procured and configured is insecure: it's not. TeleMessage has a configuration approved for CUI that integrates with GCC-high (IL4) and O365 DoD (IL5). Thus they are fine to collect and archive unclassified CUI, ITAR, NSS data, command and control/ISR, tactical data, etc. "TeleMessage can go a long way in enabling regulatory compliance by working with Microsoft to capture, archive, and maintain text messages, voice calls, and other files, leading to stress-free adherence to all the security controls required as per FedRAMP. Crucially, the mobile archiver supports Microsoft 365 Government Community Cloud, Government Community Cloud High, and Department of Defense solutions across all devices, carriers, and instant messengers. Federal agencies and contractors can issue their own phones to personnel or have their employees use their own BYOD devices because TeleMessage can still securely retain all the communication within its servers or have it forwarded to a data storage vendor of choice. There is also the option of cross-carrier and international mobile text and calls archiving." -- https://web.archive.org/web/20250502041804/https://www.telemessage.com/fedramp-environments-explained/ https://web.archive.org/web/20250502041804/https://www.telem... So far they're good in theory. They decrypted messages are transmitted in at least 1 encrypted wrapper (TLS) to mobile archiver, then ultimately landing in the DoD Azure cloud environment. The question is whether the whole chain after the phone is in the DoD environment, or if it routes through Telemessage's systems. If you look at the hack (https://archive.ph/yyyLg https://archive.ph/yyyLg), initially it leads you to believe that the message archiver doesn't live in the DoD environment and instead lives in AWS commercial or some lesser rated cloud. I think this is only true some of the time. Note in the hack, they only have messages from CPB. They don't appear to have any .mil, cia.gov, eop.gov, etc. CBP doesn't have access to the IL5 DoD Tenant in the first place and their archiver is likely hosted in AWS Commercial or AWS East/West (IL2). Frankly, I don't think that any of the higher sensitivity organizations will be routing through a TeleMessage controlled server, or any server lower than IL4. They host that piece on their own infrastructure.
- Zambyte 1y ago[flagged]
- mmooss 1y agoSo far, no especially substantive analysis in this HN thread. What can anyone say at this point? A large portion of HN's commenters wouldn't make this mistake in a quickly written offhand comment.
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- dogman144 1y agoIt’s probably against the rules to self-link old comments. And it’s hard to be remotely proud about having a good take on this news as it unfolded. However, when this first broke, select HN users were claiming this was OPSEC 4D chess and not deeply irresponsible cybersec practices. That was a terrible take then, and it’s a terrible take now. Clear as day when this started there was a nasty vendor supply chain risk lurking, and if it was 4D cybersec chess it was done by some absolute muppets. Bad setups get exploited in natsec. A bad setup exploited. Sounds like a brutal US natsec leak is brewing.
- metadat 1y ago> It’s probably against the rules to self-link old comments It's not against the rules to link past comments - in fact it's preferred to repeating the same or similar content across stories. At the same time, does 'look, I had the right take once in the past' make for interesting conversation? I'm keen to see it unfold!
- Bilal_io 1y agoI think it's good to compare and contrast the items you got right and wrong in the take and discuss why it did or did not play out that way.
- dogman144 1y agoNo, I rarely think self-referential comments are useful, let alone interesting. I do think it’s useful however to claim information space on a serious topic before, interestingly, various apologists show up as is happening ITT now.
- whatshisface 1y agoBrewing? This is it. All of these messages have been leaking; that's what the article is about.
- dogman144 1y agoHave you found info on the chat texts? Referring to “a leak” as in these chats go public in some form vs into a RU SCIF somewhere, and that there’s some verification of what the clear text chats were/who’s in it. I am speculating it’ll be the latter scenario, with periodic strategic leaks.
- asadm 1y ago[flagged]
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- mersorion 1y agoStories like this are why we started the gospl.chat project I've been part of. Most so called “secure” systems sabotage themselves not by accident, but because of compromises. There's always an attempt to “secure the system” for the system which often results in architectures that fail the people they're supposed to protect. Industry headliners often focus on encryption protocols, but E2EE alone doesn’t guarantee safety. If a user or business finds themselves in a life-threatening situation most messaging platforms will do nothing to protect them and may even become part of the threat. We approached gospl.chat from the opposite direction - modeled real world threats and built a communication system that minimizes the risk of harm, even in worst-case scenarios. Security isn’t just about math. It’s about context. It’s about the environment where an app is used and how it behaves when things go wrong. Our goal isn’t to win a crypto audit. It’s to make sure no one loses their freedom, safety, or life because of a message.
- felishiagreen12 1y ago[flagged]