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Who would the potential bad actor be here? Someone whose committing to your repo right? I guess the risk is that they add something malicious in the commit and
by nonethewiser 2y ago
Who would the potential bad actor be here? Someone whose committing to your repo right? I guess the risk is that they add something malicious in the commit and you dont see it. Which is maybe obfuscated to some extent by this little known fact. But all the malicious code would be there in the open just like any other commit.
I mean, it seems like it would either take not noticing the malicious code which is always a threat vector. Or seeing it and mistakenly thinking "aha, but you arent actually running it!" and then letting it through based on that (which is of course ridiculous).
Or there is some other way to exploit this that I'm unaware of.
Edit: OK, maybe this is a little better. Re-write some malicious bash look alike somewhere outside the repo, install it from github actions (make it look like you are updating bash or something) and then its doing the bad thing.
- woodruffw 2y agoNot committing necessarily; there are plenty of GitHub Action triggers that a workflow can use that allow third-party use. I don’t think there’s a really direct security risk here, per se: it’s just another way (there were plenty already) in which write implies execute in GHA.