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How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors
- BizarroLand 2y agoIs there a reliable way to, for instance, distrust all FB/Meta certs in my homelab so that any service that attempts to contact them would fail?
- mcpherrinm 2y agoThe flipside of the same technical points is https://sslmate.com/blog/post/entrust_distrust_more_disruptive_than_intended https://sslmate.com/blog/post/entrust_distrust_more_disrupti... where some non-browser clients don't handle this, or worse, handle it incorrectly.
- tptacek 2y agoRight; it's imperfect, as everything is. But of course, it's also a huge bit of leverage for the root programs (more accurately, a loss of leverage for CAs) in killing misbehaving CAs; those programs can't be blackmailed with huge numbers of angry users anymore, only a much smaller subset of users. Seems like a good thing, right?
- LegionMammal978 2y agoOnly insofar as you trust the root programs to use their leverage responsibly, both today and in the medium-to-long-term future.
- tptacek 2y agoThe operators of the root programs control the browsers (and, in some cases, the operating systems!), so this doesn't make much sense.
- LegionMammal978 2y agoAny leverage against the root programs in the form of angry users is also leverage against the browser devs, is it not? Either way you look at it, the root programs/browser devs receive less pushback and gain more autonomy. My biggest concern is long-term censorship risk. I can imagine the list of trusted CAs getting whittled down over the next several decades (since it's a privilege, not a right!), until it's small enough for all of them to collude or be pressured into blocking some particular person or organization.
- tptacek 2y agoYour concern is that there will be... too few CAs?
- LegionMammal978 2y agoYes. It would add another potential point of failure to the process of publishing content on the Web, if such a scenario came to pass. (Of course, the best-case scenario is that we retain a healthy number of CAs who can act independently, but also maintain compliance indefinitely.)
- tptacek 2y agoI don't know what to say; I think that's the first time I've heard that concern on HN. Thanks!
- throw_a_grenade 2y agoTo add to this, EU's 2021 eIDAS (the one with mandatory trustlist) was a response to similar lack of availability. Contrary to what most HNers instincively thought it wasn't about interception: EC was annoyed that none of root programs is based in EU, and that causes 100% of trust decisions to be made on the other side of the Big Water. EC felt a need to do something about in, having in regard the fact that TLS certificates are needed for modern business, healthcare, finance etc., they have seen it as economy sovereignity issue. My point is, lack of options, aka availability, is (or may be perceived as) dangerous on multiple layers of of WebPKI.
- Y_Y 2y ago> Right; it's imperfect, as everything is. Is this tautology helpful? For sure it's commonly used, but I honestly have a hard time seeing what information it conveys in cases like this.
- dadrian 2y agoNon-browser clients shouldn't be expected to crib browser trust decisions. Also, the (presumably?) default behavior for a non-browser client consuming a browser root store, but is unaware of the constraint behavior, is to not enforce the constraint. So they would effectively continue to trust the CA until it is fully removed, which is probably the correct decision anyway.
- DSMan195276 2y agoTo me that's an odd position to take, ultimately if the user is using Mozilla's root CA list then they're trusting Mozilla to determine which certs should be valid. If non-browser programs using the list are trusting certs that Mozilla says shouldn't be trusted then that's not a good result. Now of course the issue is that the information can't be encoded into the bundle, but I'm saying that's a bug and not a feature.
- dadrian 2y agoMozilla’s list is built to reflect the needs of Firefox users, which are not the same as the needs of most non-browser programs. The availability/compatibility vs security tradeoff is not the same.
- lxgr 2y ago> the information can't be encoded into the bundle Can it not? It seems like this SCTNotAfter constraint is effectively an API change of the root CA list that downstream users have to in some way incorporate if they want their behavior to remain consistent with upstream browsers. That doesn't necessarily mean full CT support – they might just as well choose to completely distrust anything tagged SCTNotAfter, or to ignore it. That said, it might be better to intentionally break backwards compatibility as a forcing function to force downstream clients to make that decision intentionally, as failing open doesn't seem safe here. But I'm not sure if the Mozilla root program list ever intended to be consumed by non-browser clients in the first place.
- mcpherrinm 2y ago
- bigiain 2y agoHmmmm, speaking of distrust and Mozilla... I wonder how much I should be concerned about Mozilla's trust store's trustworthiness, given their data grab with Firefox? I've switched to LibreWolf over that (more in protest than thinking I'm personally being targeted). But I'm pretty sure LibreWolf will still be using the Mozilla trust store? I haven't thought through enough to understand the implications of the moneygrubbing AI grifters in senior management positions at Mozilla being in charge of my TLS trust store, but I'm not filled with joy at the idea.
- dadrian 2y agoWhat actual risk are you worried about here? Mozilla changed their data policy, therefore the root store might do what...?
- chicom_malware 2y agoWebPKI is a maze of fiefdoms controlled by a small group of power tripping little Napoleons. Certificate trust really should be centralized at the OS level (like it used to be) and not every browser having its own, incompatible trusted roots. It's arrogance at its worst and it helps nobody.
- tialaramex 2y ago> (like it used to be) When are you imagining this "used to be" true? This technology was invented about thirty years ago, by Netscape, which no longer exists but in effect continues as Mozilla. They don't write an operating system (then or now) so it's hard to see how this is "centralized at the OS level".
- lxgr 2y agoIt was true for at least Chrome until around 2020: Chrome used to not ship with any trusted CA list and default to the OS for that. Firefox has their own trusted list, but still supports administrator-installed OS CA certificates by default, as far as I know (but importantly not OS-provided ones).
- inetknght 2y ago[flagged]
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- fsfsdfads 2y ago[dead]
- lxgr 2y agotl;dr: By using the CT logs as a trusted timestamping service, if I understand it correctly?
- tptacek 2y agoMore broadly, because longstanding universal adoption of CT makes it possible for root programs to grandfather in older certificates, so that they can axe a CA without generating SSL errors for all that CA's existing certificates, which is something they couldn't do before.
- peanut-walrus 2y agoBy far the most logical default behavior to me is that if the issuing CA was valid and trusted when the cert was issued, the cert should be considered valid until it expires. This of course means you need a trusted timestamping service or I guess CT can fulfill the same purpose. For CAs who get distrusted due to reasons which imply their issued certs might not be trustworthy, either revoke the certs individually or use a separate "never trust" list.
- zahllos 2y agoThis is what is done for code and document signing, because you want the signed object to continue to be valid even after the certificate expires. However it has a tradeoff: you cannot remove any certificate from a CRL if revoked, ever. Under normal circumstances certificates naturally expire so only need to remain in CRLs if revoked before then, but with timestamps they are valid indefinitely so must be explicitly marked invalid.
- cryptonector 2y agoThe better thing to do for this case is to only check the code signing certificate's validity at install time rather than every time you run the code. Then you don't have to have boundlessly growing CRLs. In general checking code signatures at run-time is just a perf-killing waste of resources. Ideally secure, measured boot would also measure the OS filesystems you're booting, and that kinda requires a content-addressed storage copy-on-write type filesystem such that you can seal boot/keys to a root hash of the root filesystem, but here we are in 2025 and we don't quite have that yet. ZFS comes closest, though it's not a CAS FS, but somehow the last mile of this never got implemented by anyone in any operating system.
- egberts1 2y agoCT is a temporary glue until the keyless Signal protocol takes over TLS.
- lxgr 2y agoWhat protocol are you referring to?
- permo-w 2y agoI’m not sure I see the point of these certificates in the first place. you can get literally any website certified in 5 minutes
- bell-cot 2y agoThis is often cited as the reason (but there are plenty more): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack If the CA's are doing their jobs...then FirstBank.com can get a cert for their web site. But the gang who rooted a bunch of home routers (or hacked a WiFi setup, or whatever) can't. If not...then yeah, that's the problem.
- sybercecurity 2y agoTrue - the purpose was to authenticate, not just encrypt. Years ago, every CA had additional tiers of authentication for certificates that included all sorts of ID checks, corporate records, etc. The idea was that businesses would pay extra for a certificate that guaranteed they were the legitimate brand. However, users couldn't easily differentiate between these levels, so there was no point. Now people have come to realize a cert basically ties a service to a domain name and that is basically the best you can do in most cases.
- ClumsyPilot 2y ago> The idea was that businesses would pay extra for a certificate that guaranteed they were the legitimate brand I really liked that functionality, it made sense to me
- richwater 2y agoI dont. Putting the decision of who is a "legitimate brand" shouldn't be in the hand of a private company or bureaucratic government. The concept is ripe for discrimination at pretty much every step.
- ClumsyPilot 2y ago
- udev4096 2y agoCAs should have been a thing of past by now. We should learn from the truly distrusted architecture of Tor onion services. There is no central authority in onion services, the site owner has full control over the site. All the traffic is always encrypted and you don't have to trust anyone for it
- WhyNotHugo 2y agoWe could also be relying on DNSSEC+DANE, where the domain owner publishes TLS public keys via DNS. Without a third party CA. The main limitation right now is browser support. Browsers _only_ support CAs, so CAs continue being the norm.
- mycall 2y agoBrave should try an implementation as it fits their paradigm.
- lxgr 2y agoHow so?
- growse 2y agoWho do you think signs the DNSSEC root?
- cryptonector 2y agoThey can't be MITMing people left and right without getting caught. Maybe getting caught is not a problem, but still. And if you use query name minimization[0] then it gets harder for the root CA and any intermediates but the last one to decide whether to MITM you. And you can run your own root for your network. [0] QName minimization means if if you're asking for foo.bar.baz.example. you'll ask . for example. then you'll ask example. for baz.example. and so on, detecting all the zone cuts yourself. As opposed to sending the full foo.bar.baz.example. query to . then example. and so on. If you minimize the query then . doesn't get to know anything other than the TLD you're interested in, which is not much of a clue as to whether an evil . should MITM you. Now because most domainnames of interest have only one or two intermediate zones (a TLD or a ccTLD and one below that), and because those intermediates are also run by parties similar to the one that runs the root, you might still fear MITMing. But you can still use a combination of WebPKI and DANE, in which case the evil DNSSEC CAs would have to collaborate with some evil WebPKI CA. Ultimately though DNSSEC could use having CT.
- 1oooqooq 2y agoOne issue I have is governments that serve their own CA which you must trust before accessing their services. BR, IN, CN, RU, some US federal services (which might still exist after musk junta took over), ES, etc... I'm fine with some gov bureaucrat setting the keys for their own services, but the CAs are usually able to sign for all the internet. Would be nice if browsers/OS would allow an easy way to limit the TLDs you accept to trust a CA, but that is on the cert.