4 ms·
What has prevented this (a good legit CA co) from happening before now?
by justahuman74 2y ago
What has prevented this (a good legit CA co) from happening before now?
- SpicyLemonZest 2y agoLet's Encrypt has been around for a decade and is doing pretty well for itself. The manual validation required for EV and OV certificates precludes it from being a passion project, unless managing a call center and a squad of document reviewers is your dream job.
- Thorrez 2y agoLet's Encrypt doesn't issue EV and OV. Honest Achmed’s Used Cars and Certificates wouldn't have to either.
- boricj 2y agoIt wouldn't be fun if Honest Achmed’s Used Cars and Certificates didn't also issue EV and OV certificates. It wouldn't be on brand to miss out on entire segments of the certificate market.
- nickf 2y agoTime and money. Plus right now even if you bought the infra, the staff, paid for and passed the audits, and then waiting while Apple, Mozilla, Google and Oracle (at least) included your roots...Microsoft aren't taking more right now. So you have to wait for some unknown time in the future when/if they start doing that again. You could purchase a root off an existing CA, subject to the trust stores approving it, and the boatload of cash you'd need to buy it (plus still having the staff and infra to operate it).
- skissane 2y ago> Microsoft aren't taking more right now. So you have to wait for some unknown time in the future when/if they start doing that again. Interesting, I hadn’t heard that, is there anywhere I can read more about it? > You could purchase a root off an existing CA, As well as a sub-CA, I remember in theory you can have two independent CAs with cross-signing… but do browsers actually support that?
- nickf 2y agoNothing public to point to, sorry. Sub-CAs: Not really. Operational risk to the parent CA is huge, you'd be hard pressed to get any current public CA to sign an issuing CA to be operated externally. Cross-signing still works (though it is the stuff of nightmares in many cases) but again you have to have money and a CA willing to do it!
- twisteriffic 2y agoEntrust is/was doing it with ssl.com after they were detrusted.
- nickf 2y agoNo, SSLCorp are hosting and managing a CA with Entrust branding. Same as Sectigo are doing. Entrust aren't doing issuance, verification - they're straight reselling from white-labeled issuing CAs.
- zinekeller 2y ago"Nothing public to point out to" is probably accurate but it is noted publicly here: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/new-ca-application https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/new-...
- rocqua 2y agoWhere's the value? Anyone can get a cert from lets-encrypt. No users of your website care how trustworthy your CA is. And CA's are too big to fail, so you barely need to worry about your CA being removed by the trust store. So you can only compete on price. If we want to change this, we need a way for a certificate to be co-signed by multiple CA's. So that the certificate can be presented to the user, and they can figure out if any trusted CA of theirs has signed the certificate. This way, revoking trust in a CA becomes easier, because people should have multiple signatures on their certificate. That means, all of a sudden, that the quality of a CA actually matters. Whilst it might seem this is already possible, it is not. Cross-signing is only a thing for intermediate certificates, and does not work. You can also have multiple certificates for the same key, but when starting a TLS session, you must present a single certificate. (This seems to have changed for TLS 1.3, so perhaps this is already possible?)
- toast0 2y agoI think TLS 1.3 still requires the end entity (server/client) cert first. All the other certs can now be in any order and the verification is suppoaed to figure out a valid path. In theory, you could make an intermediate CA and get cross signed certs from multiple CAs (hopefully with Name Constraints), your intermediate CA signs your server cert, and you include all your cross certs and the intermediate certs for those. And the client figures out which chains it can make and if it likes any of them. But experience has shown, verification may find a chain with signatures that line up, but the CA is expired or revoked in the local trust store, and reject the verification, even though another chain could have been found with the provided certificates. And, because of the limited information in tls handshakes from real world clients, it's difficult (maybe impossible) to know which CAs a client would accept, so that the server could present an appropriate chain.
- o11c 2y agoThe obvious solution is for TLS 1.4 to mandate that all certificate chains contain at least one expired certificate.