4 ms·

If I'm reading that right, the attack assumes the attacker has (among other things) a private key (IK) stored only on the user's device, and the user's password

If I'm reading that right, the attack assumes the attacker has (among other things) a private key (IK) stored only on the user's device, and the user's password. Thus, engaging on this attack would seem to require hardware access to one of the victims' devices (or some other backdoor), in which case you've already lost. Correct me if I'm wrong, but that doesn't seem particularly dangerous to me? As always, security of your physical hardware (and not falling for phishing attacks) is paramount.

josh2600 2y ago
This is my read as well. Just double clicking here.
vetrom 2y ago
No, it means that if you approve a device to link, and you later have reason to unlink the device, you can't establish absolutely that the unlinked device can no longer access messages, or decrypt messages involving an account, breaking the forward-secrecy guarantees. That leaves you with the only remedy for a signal account that has accepted a link to a 'bad device' being to burn the whole account. (maybe rotating safety numbers/keys would be sufficient, i am uncertain there) -- If you can prove the malicious link was only a link, then yeah, the attack i described is incomplete, but the issues in general with linked devices and remedies described are the important bits, I think.
- inor0gu 2y ago
  That's not what the attack does tho - they have access to your private key so they can complete the linking protocol without your phone and add as many devices as they want (up to the allowed limit). If you add a bad device, you are screwed from that moment on, assuming you don't sync your chat history. You can always see how many devices a user has: they have a unique integer id so if I wanna send you a message, I generate a new encrypted version for each device. If the UI does not show your devices properly than that is an oversight for sure, but I don't think it's the case anymore. Either way, you'd have to trust that the Signal server is honest and tells you about all your devices. To avoid that, you need proofs that every Signal user has the save view on your account (keys), which is why key transparency is such an important feature.
  - rendaw 2y ago
    That sounds exactly like what GP wrote.
- UltraSane 2y ago
  That is really quite bad.
reactordev 2y ago
“Just install this chrome browser extension” is all it takes now. Hell, you can even access cookies and previously visited sites from within the browser. All it takes is some funky ad, or chrome extension, or some llama-powered toolbar to gain access to be able to do exactly that. Background services on devices has been a thing for a while too. Install an app (which you grant all permissions to when asked) and bam, a self-restarting daemon service tracking your location, search history, photos, contacts, notes, email, etc
- noname120 2y ago
  How is that related in any way to Signal?
  - reactordev 2y ago
    My point is that anything you install on your device is a vector. Can install MITM attacks. Can read your data, etc. Sidecar attacks. This was classic phishing though
vlovich123 2y ago
It sounds like all that's needed is a device that had been linked in the past. Unlinking doesn't have the security requirements you'd think it would and there's a phishing attack to make scanning a QR code trigger a device link (which seems really really bad if the user doesn't even have to take much action)
- inor0gu 2y ago
  Your phone (primary device) and the linked ones have to share the IK since that is the "root of trust" for you account: with that you generate new device keys, renew them and so on. Those keys are backed by Keystore on Android, and some similar system on Windows/Linux, i'd assume the same for MacOS/iOS (but I don't know the details) so it's not as simple as just having access to your laptop, they'd need at least root. Phishing is always tricky, probably impossible to counter sadly - each one of us would be susceptible at the wrong moment.
  - vlovich123 2y ago
    I would be surprised if there aren’t ways to design it cryptographically to ensure that an unlinked device doesn’t have access to future messages. The problem with how Signal has designed it is that is a known weakness that Signal has dismissed in the past.
  - vlovich123 2y ago
    I think the point is that as a user you expect revocation of trust to protect you going forward, yet it doesn’t (e.g. the server shouldn’t be forwarding new messages to). That’s a design decision Signal made but clearly it’s one that leaves you open to harm. Moreover, it’s a dangerous decision because after obtaining the IK in some way (e.g. stolen device) you’re able to then essentially surreptitiously take over the account without the user ever knowing (i.e. no phishing needed). As an end user these are surprising design choices and that Signal discounted this as not part of their threat model to me suggest their threat model has an intentional or unintentional hole; second-hand devices that aren’t wiped are common & jail breaks exist. This isn’t intractable either. You could imagine various protocols where having the IK is insufficient for receiving new messages going forward or impersonating sending messages. A simple one would be that each new device establishes a new key that the server recognizes as pertaining to that device and notifications are encrypted with a per-device key when sending to a device and require outbound messages to be similarly encrypted. There’s probably better schemes than this naive approach.
deleted 2y ago
[deleted]

josh2600 2y ago

This is my read as well. Just double clicking here.

vetrom 2y ago

No, it means that if you approve a device to link, and you later have reason to unlink the device, you can't establish absolutely that the unlinked device can no longer access messages, or decrypt messages involving an account, breaking the forward-secrecy guarantees. That leaves you with the only remedy for a signal account that has accepted a link to a 'bad device' being to burn the whole account. (maybe rotating safety numbers/keys would be sufficient, i am uncertain there) -- If you can prove the malicious link was only a link, then yeah, the attack i described is incomplete, but the issues in general with linked devices and remedies described are the important bits, I think.

inor0gu 2y ago
That's not what the attack does tho - they have access to your private key so they can complete the linking protocol without your phone and add as many devices as they want (up to the allowed limit). If you add a bad device, you are screwed from that moment on, assuming you don't sync your chat history. You can always see how many devices a user has: they have a unique integer id so if I wanna send you a message, I generate a new encrypted version for each device. If the UI does not show your devices properly than that is an oversight for sure, but I don't think it's the case anymore. Either way, you'd have to trust that the Signal server is honest and tells you about all your devices. To avoid that, you need proofs that every Signal user has the save view on your account (keys), which is why key transparency is such an important feature.
- rendaw 2y ago
  That sounds exactly like what GP wrote.
UltraSane 2y ago
That is really quite bad.

reactordev 2y ago

“Just install this chrome browser extension” is all it takes now. Hell, you can even access cookies and previously visited sites from within the browser. All it takes is some funky ad, or chrome extension, or some llama-powered toolbar to gain access to be able to do exactly that. Background services on devices has been a thing for a while too. Install an app (which you grant all permissions to when asked) and bam, a self-restarting daemon service tracking your location, search history, photos, contacts, notes, email, etc

noname120 2y ago
How is that related in any way to Signal?
- reactordev 2y ago
  My point is that anything you install on your device is a vector. Can install MITM attacks. Can read your data, etc. Sidecar attacks. This was classic phishing though

vlovich123 2y ago

It sounds like all that's needed is a device that had been linked in the past. Unlinking doesn't have the security requirements you'd think it would and there's a phishing attack to make scanning a QR code trigger a device link (which seems really really bad if the user doesn't even have to take much action)

inor0gu 2y ago
Your phone (primary device) and the linked ones have to share the IK since that is the "root of trust" for you account: with that you generate new device keys, renew them and so on. Those keys are backed by Keystore on Android, and some similar system on Windows/Linux, i'd assume the same for MacOS/iOS (but I don't know the details) so it's not as simple as just having access to your laptop, they'd need at least root. Phishing is always tricky, probably impossible to counter sadly - each one of us would be susceptible at the wrong moment.
- vlovich123 2y ago
  I would be surprised if there aren’t ways to design it cryptographically to ensure that an unlinked device doesn’t have access to future messages. The problem with how Signal has designed it is that is a known weakness that Signal has dismissed in the past.
- vlovich123 2y ago
  I think the point is that as a user you expect revocation of trust to protect you going forward, yet it doesn’t (e.g. the server shouldn’t be forwarding new messages to). That’s a design decision Signal made but clearly it’s one that leaves you open to harm. Moreover, it’s a dangerous decision because after obtaining the IK in some way (e.g. stolen device) you’re able to then essentially surreptitiously take over the account without the user ever knowing (i.e. no phishing needed). As an end user these are surprising design choices and that Signal discounted this as not part of their threat model to me suggest their threat model has an intentional or unintentional hole; second-hand devices that aren’t wiped are common & jail breaks exist. This isn’t intractable either. You could imagine various protocols where having the IK is insufficient for receiving new messages going forward or impersonating sending messages. A simple one would be that each new device establishes a new key that the server recognizes as pertaining to that device and notifications are encrypted with a per-device key when sending to a device and require outbound messages to be similarly encrypted. There’s probably better schemes than this naive approach.

deleted 2y ago

[deleted]