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The facts seem to be that a helicopter diverted from its published course (300 feet rather than 100 feet) and made a reckless, fatal mistake. TCAS was too late

The facts seem to be that a helicopter diverted from its published course (300 feet rather than 100 feet) and made a reckless, fatal mistake. TCAS was too late or not usable at that low altitude. The controller - who had previously warned of inbound traffic and passed responsible to the pilot by putting them in visual separation, which was in turn confirmed - was also too late. Hire more controllers? Sure, maybe, but I can't help but think this was very avoidable using technology and training.

formerly_proven 2y ago
Visual separation at night in dense airspace has no checks and no margin for error. There is no way for anyone to tell whether the crew is tracking the correct aircraft or whether they are correctly guessing its attitude etc. That practice is plainly asking for an accident to happen.
- PaulRobinson 2y ago
  In the UK I know traffic is indicated with a relative position and altitude: “traffic at your 10 o’clock, 2 miles, altitude 1500 feet”. The ATC for the Reagan crash did not indicate a relative or absolute position, only referencing “the CRJ”, which might be hard to identify in the dark, and the helicopter pilot may have assumed he “had visual”, but was looking at a different aircraft.
  - davkan 2y ago
    I keep seeing comments that no relative position was given but ATC does provide detail in their initial communications, though not subsequent. > Traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ, it's 1,200 feet setting up for Runway 33.
    - lumost 2y ago
      Where is the Woodrow bridge? Are all pilots expected to know this flying around the Reagan airport? There are multiple bridges on the Potomac.
      - 15155 2y ago
        The helicopter crew resided in this area and this is one of the largest, widest, most-used bridges in the area.
pstuart 2y ago
That article makes a very valid point that they need new technology and training, but can't due to internal failures and the whims of congress. What happened with this accident is a wake call but nothing will change -- the current administration is interested in destroying institutions, not building them up.
- euroderf 2y ago
  I imagine this one hits pretty close to home for Congresscritters. You might see some action.
  - pstuart 2y ago
    > You might see some action. One would hope, but it's a tricky thing to do and it's so much easier to do media performances for your constituents. TFA mentioned that they tried modernizing way back and it was a failure. To make it succeed would require both adequate funding and good governance -- both currently in short supply. Ironically, DOGE would be perfect for this role if it did what it says on the tin (the GE part of the name). My spidey sense on that it that it's really about doing a Jack Welch number on disliked organizations. But hey, Welch made GE into the powerhouse it is today so there's hope! /s
    - cjbenedikt 2y ago
      GE powerhouse? Beg to differ. https://cleantechnica.com/2024/08/26/jack-welch-screwed-up-ge-boeing-and-with-them-much-us-climate-action/ https://cleantechnica.com/2024/08/26/jack-welch-screwed-up-g...
      - pstuart 2y ago
        I had a trailing `/s` there. It was not a compliment on my part.
        cjbenedikt 2y ago
        Ah, didn't notice. My bad.
EA-3167 2y ago
TCAS has limitations as you suspect. Below 1000 feet it doesn't make Resolution Advisories (RA) because of the very real risk that it could steer a pilot into terrain. Below 500 feet it doesn't deliver aural warnings, only the visual ones. These are both limitations of the tech as it exists right now, and in theory pilots should be aware of this and be extremely cautious. Personally I'm in favor of the "Swiss cheese" model of accidents, in which a lot of errors might routinely happen, but they're blocked from leading to an accident by other measures. When however the holes in the cheese line up... boom. There's evidence that there was a culture of accepting near-misses along this route, there's evidence that the training flight ignored best practices, there was a single ATC person managing rotary and fixed wing in that airspace, it was night time, the jet was making an approach to the shorter runway, etc etc. On any given night one or two of these factors might have lined up, but not all of that. That night however they all lined up, and people died. This notion of failure in depth is the driving force between the total nature of an NTSB investigation, they don't want to find the LAST failure, they want to find ALL of the failures.
dzhiurgis 2y ago
How much or what parts of atc can be automated? If have a feeling it’s what musk will try to do.
- multjoy 2y ago
  Then people will die.
  - dzhiurgis 2y ago
    Always did. Somehow this area looks ripe for some automation - extremely difficult for human brain, tons of rules. Being risky makes even more sense to automate.
cameldrv 2y ago
The way this airspace is set up is very unusual where there is only about 150 feet of separation between the approach and the helicopter route. Normally there would be at least 500 feet and more likely 1000 feet of separation. Also the controller did call out the traffic but he wasn’t that specific about where it was, just that it was a CRJ, which you can’t even really tell at night. He also didn’t call out the traffic to the jet. To be fair to the controller though, he was working two positions simultaneously due to a controller shortage. He might have been able to be more helpful if he wasn’t so busy that night.
- davkan 2y ago
  The controller was specific about the location of the CRJ during initial communication with the Blackhawk. > Traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ, it's 1,200 feet setting up for Runway 33. Subsequent communications in the following minute from both parties were not specific.
jrs235 2y ago
Flying the helicopter mission with only one crew chief may also have contributed if the chef was distracted or not looking/watching out the left side of the helicopter for the airplane, possibly looking out the right side and/or watching the airport.

formerly_proven 2y ago

Visual separation at night in dense airspace has no checks and no margin for error. There is no way for anyone to tell whether the crew is tracking the correct aircraft or whether they are correctly guessing its attitude etc. That practice is plainly asking for an accident to happen.

PaulRobinson 2y ago
In the UK I know traffic is indicated with a relative position and altitude: “traffic at your 10 o’clock, 2 miles, altitude 1500 feet”. The ATC for the Reagan crash did not indicate a relative or absolute position, only referencing “the CRJ”, which might be hard to identify in the dark, and the helicopter pilot may have assumed he “had visual”, but was looking at a different aircraft.
- davkan 2y ago
  I keep seeing comments that no relative position was given but ATC does provide detail in their initial communications, though not subsequent. > Traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ, it's 1,200 feet setting up for Runway 33.
  - lumost 2y ago
    Where is the Woodrow bridge? Are all pilots expected to know this flying around the Reagan airport? There are multiple bridges on the Potomac.
    - 15155 2y ago
      The helicopter crew resided in this area and this is one of the largest, widest, most-used bridges in the area.

pstuart 2y ago

That article makes a very valid point that they need new technology and training, but can't due to internal failures and the whims of congress. What happened with this accident is a wake call but nothing will change -- the current administration is interested in destroying institutions, not building them up.

euroderf 2y ago
I imagine this one hits pretty close to home for Congresscritters. You might see some action.
- pstuart 2y ago
  > You might see some action. One would hope, but it's a tricky thing to do and it's so much easier to do media performances for your constituents. TFA mentioned that they tried modernizing way back and it was a failure. To make it succeed would require both adequate funding and good governance -- both currently in short supply. Ironically, DOGE would be perfect for this role if it did what it says on the tin (the GE part of the name). My spidey sense on that it that it's really about doing a Jack Welch number on disliked organizations. But hey, Welch made GE into the powerhouse it is today so there's hope! /s
  - cjbenedikt 2y ago
    GE powerhouse? Beg to differ. https://cleantechnica.com/2024/08/26/jack-welch-screwed-up-ge-boeing-and-with-them-much-us-climate-action/ https://cleantechnica.com/2024/08/26/jack-welch-screwed-up-g...
    - pstuart 2y ago
      I had a trailing `/s` there. It was not a compliment on my part.
      - cjbenedikt 2y ago
        Ah, didn't notice. My bad.

EA-3167 2y ago

TCAS has limitations as you suspect. Below 1000 feet it doesn't make Resolution Advisories (RA) because of the very real risk that it could steer a pilot into terrain. Below 500 feet it doesn't deliver aural warnings, only the visual ones. These are both limitations of the tech as it exists right now, and in theory pilots should be aware of this and be extremely cautious. Personally I'm in favor of the "Swiss cheese" model of accidents, in which a lot of errors might routinely happen, but they're blocked from leading to an accident by other measures. When however the holes in the cheese line up... boom. There's evidence that there was a culture of accepting near-misses along this route, there's evidence that the training flight ignored best practices, there was a single ATC person managing rotary and fixed wing in that airspace, it was night time, the jet was making an approach to the shorter runway, etc etc. On any given night one or two of these factors might have lined up, but not all of that. That night however they all lined up, and people died. This notion of failure in depth is the driving force between the total nature of an NTSB investigation, they don't want to find the LAST failure, they want to find ALL of the failures.

dzhiurgis 2y ago

How much or what parts of atc can be automated? If have a feeling it’s what musk will try to do.

multjoy 2y ago
Then people will die.
- dzhiurgis 2y ago
  Always did. Somehow this area looks ripe for some automation - extremely difficult for human brain, tons of rules. Being risky makes even more sense to automate.

cameldrv 2y ago

The way this airspace is set up is very unusual where there is only about 150 feet of separation between the approach and the helicopter route. Normally there would be at least 500 feet and more likely 1000 feet of separation. Also the controller did call out the traffic but he wasn’t that specific about where it was, just that it was a CRJ, which you can’t even really tell at night. He also didn’t call out the traffic to the jet. To be fair to the controller though, he was working two positions simultaneously due to a controller shortage. He might have been able to be more helpful if he wasn’t so busy that night.

davkan 2y ago
The controller was specific about the location of the CRJ during initial communication with the Blackhawk. > Traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ, it's 1,200 feet setting up for Runway 33. Subsequent communications in the following minute from both parties were not specific.

jrs235 2y ago

Flying the helicopter mission with only one crew chief may also have contributed if the chef was distracted or not looking/watching out the left side of the helicopter for the airplane, possibly looking out the right side and/or watching the airport.